


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Ukraine Through the Prism of Geopolitical Challenges: Analytical Aspect

Abstract

This paper examines the global trends that will be reflected in global politics. Systematization of a large number of sources of major research centers allowed forming a hierarchy of challenges and threats able to influence global and regional policy. Special attention is given to Ukraine, events which significantly influence the Eurasian and global political space. The article gives an insight of the political processes in Ukraine, its problems and achievements. Understanding the situation in Ukraine in the light of global trends allows us to realize the impact on geopolitical balance of power in the world.

Events in Ukraine, as in Syria, became the catalyst for change that led to reformatting of political and regional map of the world. Significant pressure from new social, political, economic, military, informational and humanitarian threats and challenges was put upon security and bureaucratic structures of the European Union, NATO, UN and others. The obvious is that the global security system based on the principles of collective responsibility of the twentieth century is affected by a considerable transformation. This, in turn, has put on the agenda the issue of the capacity of modern political and business elites and the management establishment responds adequately to new manifestations of systemic crises and threats. The efficiency of the management of public authority institutions in internal and external policy is not only to improve the analytical tools to identify key social issues, but also the ability to form the institutional and civil mechanisms of preventive counteract against the disintegration of the political and economic environment of the state.

But traditionally forecasts are significantly correlated with the realities of life and professional and volitional qualities of consumers of intellectual products in the field of management. Currently, a large number of analytical studies, prognostic versions of the future, futurological predictions from authoritative think-tanks perform not just their main prognostic function - an objective reflection of patterns of global and regional processes, but in most cases a multi-purpose product of political influence.

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Political analytics in public policy is a tool of public opinion formation (an artificial change of public attitudes, priorities, perceptions, expectations etc.) and implementation of some projections of the future or for world politics the most likely and expected models of situations development in high-risk areas.

Analytical forecasts are often (have become) not only a means of pseudo scientific impact on society, with wide manipulative tools, using misinformation, "gray" technologies of the hidden influence on the individual and groups of individuals, hybrid types of information influence etc., but also behavioral models of national policy key actors. This is primarily due to political preconception and relations with different centers of force, well-known expert-analytical agencies. Accordingly, analytical findings of many of them are entirely synthetic and designed in order to model, correlate and correct agenda and project the necessary previously ordered future efficiently.

In early 2016 the global analytical and expert community, the leading "think tanks" began to provide us with own predictive versions of events development in the world both at global and regional levels. In many ways, the most influential models of the future differ from each other, and therefore need to build a more coherent and systematic view of the likely scenarios for the future.

In addition, it is significant to emphasize that the complexity of forecasting and analytical activity caused by the intensity, dynamic processes and increase of the number of input data exponentially in the current development of the world. The justification of this is a methodological weakness of well-known world think-tanks in the matters of development of even short-term forecasts on Syria, Ukraine migration processes, European Union, Mediterranean etc. This led to a serious debate in analytic community in the US and Western Europe on the revision of established strategies of information-analytical and expert activities.

In particular, the results of the scenarios made by the most "think tanks" in the past year, according to our estimate, have come true with the coincidence of 40 per cent. Especially they reveal not always accurate forecasts regarding the situation deployment around the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine under the so-called "Minsk format", the resolution of the conflict in Syria under the so-called "Geneva format", critical and final phase of destabilization and destruction of the Russian Federation, significant decline in economic development and social explosions in the People's Republic of China, the stabilization of situation in the "Arab spring" zone, efficacy of international mechanisms and institutions in addressing global challenges (especially in the matters of war and peace) etc.

Keywords: *global trends, public policy, Ukrainian crisis, think-tanks, corruption, gray area, financial and political pressure groups, conflict in Eastern Ukraine*

Key differences and contradictions in forecasts of the world's leading information and analytical agencies

The analysis is prepared on the basis of analytical materials of leading internal and international think tanks, news agencies, research institutions, media, peer reviews (Atlantic Council, Bloomberg, The National Interest, The American Interest, BBC, CNN, Huffington Post, Politico, Open Democracy, Washington Post, The Daily Beast, The New York Times, The Telegraph, The Guardian, Washington Examiner, Le Monde, Le Figaro, Bild, Die Welt, Reuters, Stratfor, RAND Corporation, Project Syndicate, The Economist, Washington Post, New York Times, BBC, CNN, The Guardian, Strategic Forecasting, Heritage Foundation, Transparency International, RAND Corporation, Syndicate Project, Council on Foreign Relations, The Times, Le Figaro, Le Monde, Die Presse, Die Welt, Die Zeit, Bild, Hurriyet, news agency Xinhua, Izvestia, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Kommersant, ITAR TASS, Interfax, UNIAN, Ukrinform, Ukrainian Pravda, Day, Mirror of the Week, Correspondent, Explorer, Focus, week, Radio Liberty, Voice of America, media design channel 112 and etc.)[1].

Global and regional prospects	Discrepancy of real scenarios on the international scene
Ukraine	The conflict in Ukraine is not solved. Moreover, the probability of the situation resolution in the coming years seems illusory. "Conflict freeze". The critical socio-economic and socio-political complication inside the country. The degradation of the political regime, the confidence loss of the majority concerning the existing political authority.
The Minsk format of talks	Currently, the platform of talks slows down the process of the negotiations and demonstrates its ineffectiveness in solving of the Ukrainian problem. However, there is no alternative format yet.
Syria	The worsening situation in Syria due to the increase of actors who more openly participate in the events in the region (The Russian Federation,

	Turkey, Iran and others, about 26 subjects and objects of the process.).
The Geneva format of talks	Seems similar to Minsk format which reveals its inefficacy and low efficiency in the negotiation process.
The Russian Federation	Despite international pressure Russia continues its aggressive geopolitical behavior in the world (Ukraine, Syria, military exercises on the borders with the countries of the NATO-EU, conflict with Turkey etc.), even under the worsening of socio-economic pressure it still keeps control over the governance and social stability.
The Republic of China	Regardless partial stagnation in some sectors, China experiences gradual economic growth, infrastructural, scientific and military development, expansion of trade horizons etc. The state intensifies its foreign and military policy.
The areas of the "Arab spring" project	Much more complicated socio-economic and socio-political situation, bordering on the fact of the existence of this geographical range.
International relations system	The international community demonstrates increasingly its inability to solve the key problems of humanity in a short term, and international institutions show their inertia and inefficiency in preventing global and regional threats.

Undoubtedly, the past 2015 brought dramatic corrections to the planetary processes. This laid the new tendencies and trends for 2016. Therefore, in this paper we propose the own alternative vision of global and regional processes based on the latest analysis methods and research findings of previous years. The main attention is drawn to Ukrainian realities [2].

The main risks and threats at regional and global levels

1. Uncontrolled migration, permanent humanitarian and social crisis in some regions in Europe, Latin America, Eurasia, the Middle East etc.
2. The threat of global terror, extremism and weapons of mass destruction - "asymmetrical approach".

Personalization and local specification on the territories of Central and Eastern Europe.

3. Increased number of regional points of tension in a nonlinear warfare.

4. Expanding the geography of activities of quasi-state paramilitary formations - creation of new zones of tension.

5. Energy Revolution and redistribution of some regional markets in the world. Six zones of conflict.

6. Critical increase of social and economic inequality. Technogenic catastrophes and pandemia in the centers of global influence and their periphery.

7. Unsystematic civil conflicts and systemic crisis of the modern middle class. Criminalization of political and social processes in Europe.

8. Strengthening the role of national states and reformatting of supranational global and regional political-economic entities of the twentieth century.

9. Threats to liberal-democratic political trends: a global dimension. Strengthening of left-social and right-national movements and_NG associations.

10. Expansion of boundaries and increasing number of cross-border conflicts.

11. Crisis deepening and termination of post-Yalta global international relations period [3].

Some challenges and threats are worth looking at in more detail, but some issues need more extended analytical material.

UKRAINE in light of global processes: challenges and threats

Ukraine being one of the “painful points” of the new world order formation is and will remain one of the global and regional platforms of discussions with all the negative and positive consequences. Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian issue remains on the agenda for 2016. However, its format can change significantly under some conditions. This is primarily due to external factors: escalation of military conflict, maintaining anti-Putin Western coalition, financial, economic, military and political support to Ukraine. Particular attention in this context is drawn to the internal political situation in the

country: the way out of the systematical political crisis, the implementation of reforms, and stabilization of socio-economic and institutional life in Ukraine etc.

In order to understand the logic sequence of events in Ukraine it is worth mentioning the basic requirements of the Maidan in 2014: firstly, the protesters demanded changes in democratic elites; secondly, social responsibility of political authority to the citizens; thirdly, effective public administration in the key areas of human life; and lastly, foreign policy issues - euro integration processes and standards [4].

The Ukrainian political class, as in 2014, again faces sharply raised issues of values that would match the public mood and expectations, and fit into the framework of modern Ukraine's national interests. By the way the first protest actions of the students against the political regime of President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014 (Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Zaporozhye and others) took place under the national slogans and symbols of antiparty and anti-corporative undertone.

The fact is that politics in Ukraine by its characteristics remains undemocratic at large. This is not only because there is a war in the East of Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula is occupied by the Russian Federation, but because of not being transformed into public policy which is oriented on the interests of different social groups united by the desire to resolve socially important issues and problems. Thus the implementation of this policy still lies in the revolutionary expediency and corporate interests and remains out of the control of civil society, which in Ukraine is more efficient than government institutions. Evidence of this is a powerful volunteer and expert movement that has covered almost all areas of Ukrainian society. In addition, more than 70% of Ukrainians have negative attitude to the current political and post revolutionary government and believe that reforms are being implemented in the wrong direction. What is more, in the process of modernization of power some corporate and corruption conflicts occur sporadically among the Ukrainian political and administrative elite. Therefore the preservation of the elite type of Ukrainian policy in the new version with external personnel

management system provokes confrontation between the state and civil society and allows external global and regional actors influencing strategic decisions in the area of national security.

In our opinion one of the most threatening factors, which can lead to serious socio-political and socio-economic cataclysms in Ukraine is the unwillingness of the governing class to minimize the whole list of challenges which Ukraine statehood and society face. A factor of external control may indicate a lack of quality of administrative and political elite and the desire not to lose geopolitical influence in the region [5].

In this case, we feel the need to specify a list of problem areas, virtual and physical, leading to tension and confrontation in Ukraine:

1) Inefficient public policy of "post-Maidan" political regime in conditions of the warfare and the political and socio-economic crisis. Fragmentation of reforms, their social ineffectiveness and sometimes irresponsibility. Tremendous disappointment of the majority of Ukrainians in "junior reformers." The contrasting of "Revolution of dignity" ideas and the mood in civil society to modern Ukrainian political class, corruption scandals etc. [6].

2) The change of political vector of development of certain areas of public relations occurs on the background taking into account the external influence.

The liberal-democratic values and ideas are being checked on Eurasia political area.

The last 15 years were the years of social, political, economic and humanitarian challenges to the globalized world. The degree of uncontrollability and situatedness is growing every day and requires increasingly interventions and autocratic directive actions by the countries themselves both at the internal and external geopolitical levels.

Liberal democratic traditions of political and social management often illustrate their inability to influence events in the world, address new threats, such as violent border changes, new types of terrorism, uncontrolled migration etc.

Currently, it leads to the establishing declarative democratic, in fact, hybrid authoritarian with a focus on national and religious peculiarities political regimes in countries with unstable socio-political situation. This trend leads to considerable frustration for elites and citizens, in liberal-democratic ideology in the developed countries. These processes extend sympathy to use harsh management methods (US, EU, Russia and so on) and lay the groundwork for the effect of the so-called "escape from freedom" or "creeping authoritarianism." In turn it is reflected in latest version formations of authoritarian regimes in the form of phenomena of controlled democracy, information totalitarianism, freedom of choice virtualization, the illusion of democracy. Besides, in Ukraine as well as in the most parts of the world there is a systemic crisis of the middle class - threatening imbalance in percentage of resources distribution among the different layers of society in most parts of the world, which could lead to large-scale campaign of disobedience, social boycotts, riots followed by destabilization of the domestic and global levels.

It is illustratory, especially in Ukraine, where the elements of civil society are led by the middle class, which is today the backbone of modern Ukrainian political nation with its own vision of national priorities in a globalized world. Most likely, this will lead to a serious discussion about the role of the state, the dominant political class, the big business representatives and the civil society in terms of public policy and management. In this case we can expect a compromise result of reviewing the concept of social contract and principles of wealth allocation among all stakeholders.

3) The Military confrontation in the East of Ukraine. The conflict delay under the pressure of external actors and the conversion of certain regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions into the "gray zone." An attempt to increase the number of nationwide and regional points of tension in a nonlinear warfare, or so-called intermediary war in which the hidden actors through their satellites implement various types of hybrid struggles to expand zones of geopolitical influence. An example is the developments in Syria and Ukraine, which have become hazardous phenomena in the world. Number of players involved in

similar processes raises the issue of formation of the modern way of global leaders political and economic ambitions realization. Contrast of the situation lies in the following two keys: a) Failure to resolve international tensions will lead to new conflict zones and international relations crisis deepening; B) Awareness of the possibility of global conflict will force international community to work out alternative and relatively peaceful routes of mankind existence in the future [7], [8].

4) The civil society_(tension on a background of religious, cultural, historical, socio-cultural and geographical features and differences in the interpretation of events in the country for the last 3 years). Use of socio-humanitarian conflict in the confrontation between state institutions and new forms of extremism, radicalism and terrorism. They will expand their geography and increase the frequency, repetition of acute forms of violence. It must be understood that the danger comes not only from the militants who came to Europe amongst migrants. The events of the recent years indicate that we deal with terrorists-citizens of the EU and Eastern Europe. This fact makes the threat even more dangerous and unpredictable, and indicates that the crisis of the established principles of coexistence of different civilizations on the basis of the liberal-democratic trend is developing. Presumably, the events will unfold within the concept of the "clash of civilizations" or "asymmetric war for survival." As a result of the need to review the existing models of cultural dialogue will increase and global security concepts will face radical transformations.

5) Information confrontation. External confrontation with Russia, both in temporary occupied territories and information space of large Ukraine. Information warfare enhancement involving European and world media. The internal conflict between financial and political groups of impact and their media holdings, including the intensification of the struggle in a political crisis for the mighty resources of the President of Ukraine Mr. Poroshenko, key national oligarchs I. Kolomoisky, D. Firtash, S.Lovochkyn, V. Pinchuk, R. Akhmetov, partially Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and his associates etc.

Descriditation of Ukraine's information space and state institutions from the competing forces and external actors: Russia, European Union, the United States etc. [9]

6) The political confrontation between various groups of influence (at the national level - 12 groups, at the regional one - about 200) on the reallocation of all kinds of resources and joining the government. In this confrontation there the party organizations, associations of paramilitary volunteer corps, the public sector and some criminal groups will be involved.

7) The clannish bureaucratic opposition in the executive authorities and local governments with political, corporate, regional and family-tied characteristics (competition in managerial powers and functions in the reallocation of property, financial and material resources between "the old" and "the new" public servants).

8) The economic confrontation between the financial and political clans in the spheres of economy, the interference of third countries in this process. The politicization of economic processes in Ukraine.

9) Power confrontation. The emergence of uncontrolled paramilitary groups in some "peaceful regions" of Ukraine who are able to compete with the legal state security forces for the right to do justice and to lobby the interests of financial and political sponsors. The criminalization of political and economic processes in Ukraine in certain directions.

10) Commercial confrontation. Ukrainian goods export blocking from Russia and the low competitiveness of Ukrainian goods to European markets. The impact of the energy revolution on the Ukrainian economy structure. The transition from classical hydrocarbon resources to alternative energy sources (hydrogen, natural energy) in front of diversification of cross-continental channels of natural gas delivery, decrease of oil prices and the emergence of new global "controllers" can cause reformatting of the world system of relations between transnational corporations, which accordingly will display the existence of states and societies in a socio-economic and socio-political turmoil

with varying degrees of escalation. It immediately changes the scientific trends, technological and industrial constructions in the entire civilization.

11) Ukrainian crisis demonstrated the inefficiency of the international relations of the post-Yalta world, which could be seen just after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact denotification. Global policy subjects have not offered adequate rules and norms of international coexistence so far. The expression (demonstration) of this crisis were dramatic events in the former Yugoslavia, the military campaign in Iraq, Afghanistan, the military campaign of the Russian Federation in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, the growing confrontation between the two Koreas, the tension in relations between China and Japan etc.

The precedential willfully interpret international law and the breaches of the already signed international treaties, including the Budapest Memorandum and others, leveling of collegiality in the important international decision-making and the law of direct force by several global and regional centers, can cause a chain effect in other parts of the world by more local players in order to expand spheres of influence.

Today there are vital needs in the context of global conflict avoidance and survival of mankind are as species, consensus-oriented dialogue between the countries and civilization concerning a new model of sustainable and incremental development formation [10], [11].

For Ukraine, there are a lot of pro the new 2016 considering all the circumstances still goes through unresolved military conflict in the east of the country, the annexed Crimea, the threatening socio-economic situation, corporate clan-oligarchic corruption schemes and wars, a high degree of social tension, ambiguous process of reforms implementation, state management model crisis, inter-group conflicts between political and economic groups and pressure groups, the pressure of external actors over internal politics of Ukraine, frankly disappointment from Western partners regarding Ukrainian political class actions, the continuation of combined Russian aggression against Ukraine. The all above build up rather dangerous prospects.

Without any exaggeration, 2016 could be decisive for Ukraine. The destiny of Ukrainian state__subjectivity depends on consolidation of national political power especially and understanding the need of radical technological changes in the system of governance, based solely on national interests and priorities, the general social good and progressive development of civil society.

Its subjectivity is determined with the ability to form national interests and put them into practice in conjunction with efficient public policy subjects.

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Turkey and the European Union:
the Saga of the 50 Years-Long Accession Negotiations

Abstract

The EU-Turkey relations date back to 1960s when the European project started. With the Ankara Agreement of 12 September 1963, Turkey became an Associate member of the European Economic Community which was then an economic organisation from which today's EU emerged.

The EU's December 1997 sidelining of Turkey's application for full membership turned the direction on 3 October 2005 and Turkey begin its accession negotiations with the EU. Since then there is still ongoing debate based on cultural, economic and political assessment whether Turkey will fit to be a member of the EU. From the perspective of the institutional norms of Copenhagen criteria, the EU could possibly embrace all countries, regardless of culture, religion and historical background. The EU's uncompleted institutional structure gives rise some spatial, temporal and thematic scopes which introduce some new accession criteria such as European state, European identity, absorption capacity, open-ended process and approval of the member states which will make more complicated Turkey's full membership bid to the EU.

Despite Turkey's institutional reforms which bring the country that much closer towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and its dynamic economy which makes Turkey as the second country that fits the Maastricht criteria in Europe, European politicians and citizens remain deeply divided on Turkey's accession bid to the EU as a full member. As a consequence, the alternative accession proposals which depreciate the full membership of Turkey are argued by the EU's core members.

The purpose of this article is to answer the vague accession criteria, the different accession proposals towards Turkey and explain the new bargaining position of Turkey for its accession bid to the EU. The exclusion of Turkey from the EU's enlargement process will be evaluated by different theoretical approaches which constitute the interplay of the liberal intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism and path dependency process, rationalist approaches and sociological institutionalism.

Keywords: *Russian minority, minorities, Estonia, Russia*

Introduction:

One of the ‘founding fathers of Europe’, Jean Monnet’s basic idea was that there is always some common interest among people, whatever their differences are. And, he believed that common interest needed to be defined and organised. For Jean Monnet, the point was not to create coalitions of States, but to bring together the peoples.¹ Monnet’s ultimate objective was peace and understanding among men. His answer for the problems was to unite human beings and nations by proposing to them some common task in which they see their own interest and forget their differences.² Today, the foundation ideology of the European Union (EU) has changed tremendously since the EU polity reflects controversial issues concerning cultural, religious and ethnic identities. Since Turkey began its accession negotiations with the EU on 3 October 2005, there is still ongoing debate based on cultural, economic and political assessments whether Turkey will fit to be a member of the EU. The principles of the EU has been changed since 1960s when Turkey’s aspiration to be a full member of the EU started. The evolution of the EU can be described with the related articles of its treaties:

The preamble of the Treaty of Rome (1957), which is an unprecedented round of soul-searching of the countries of Europe blended with their traumas of the past and dreams of the future reads, *‘Resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts’*.³

The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ established in 1993 define conditions for admission to full membership to the EU in three categories. *First, an achievement of a country’s commitment to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;*

¹ Pascal Fontaine ‘Jean Monnet, Actualité d’un bâtisseur de l’Europe Unie’ in Jacqueline Grapin (rev.), *European Affairs*, <http://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/190-european-affairs/ea-december-2013/1829-jean-monnet-actualite-dun-batisseur-de-leurope-unie-by-pascal-fontaine>(accessed:17.12.2014)

² ‘What Jean Monnet Wrought’, *Foreign Affairs* (editorial), January 1977, Vol.55, Issue 2, pg-632-633. <http://eds-1b-1ebscost-1com-1ebSCO.han.buw.uw.edu.pl/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=1698440b-1f8a-4d9a-9109-0003f794443a%40sessionmgr112&vid=6&hid=122>(accessed:09.02.2015)

³ Treaty Establishing the European Union Community as amended by Subsequent Treaties,ROME,25 March 1957, Preamble, <http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/Preamble.html>(accessed:06.12.2014)

*second, the existence of functioning economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; third, evidence that the country is able to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.*⁴

The Maastricht criteria ratified in 1993 assumes to sustain the EU in the future and assumes sustainable convergence necessary for European Monetary Union (EMU) in five points: *1. an inflation rate no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; 2. nominal long-term interest rates not exceeding by more than 2 percentage points those for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; 3. no exchange rate realignment for at least two years; 4. a government budget deficit not in excess of 3 percent of each country's GDP; 5. a gross debt to GDP ratio that does not exceed 60 percent.*⁵

The EU stipulated such broad liberal-democratic institutional criteria in order to avoid much more controversial issues concerning cultural identities. European identity is not a given thick cultural or historical coating.⁶ It is unfortunate to experience a deep conflict between liberal-democratic institutional criteria and norm based criteria within the member states.

The EU's unique and uncompleted institutional structure gives rise to some vague criteria such as 'any European state' and 'European identity'. Because of the vague criteria, Turkey's accession to membership seems to be the most difficult and the most tangled issue during the periods of expansion. The article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), entered into force on 1 December 2009 reads, '*Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to*

⁴ Copenhagen Criteria 1993, European Commission-Enlargement-Accession criteria, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria> (accessed:14.12.2014)

⁵ Panos C. Afxention, 'Convergence, the Maastricht Criteria, and Their Benefits', *The Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2000-Vol.VII, Issue 1, pg.249. <http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ353/tesfatsion/MaastrichtConvergenceCriteria.Afxentiou.pdf> (accessed:30.01.2015)

⁶ Seyla Benhabib, 'Is European Multiculturalism a Paper Tiger', *Philosophia Africana*, Vol.8, No.2, August 2005, pg. 112.

become a member of the Union.⁷ Article 2 of TEU reads, *'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail*.⁸ And, the preamble of the Treaty on European Union reads, *'RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defense in accordance with*

the provisions of Article 42, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world.⁹

Furthermore, the internal dynamics which were introduced into the EU's literature on 12.10.2005 by the Negotiating Framework with Turkey of the Council of the European Union bring the argumentative notions such as absorption capacity, open-ended process and approval of the member states' citizens. The point 2 of the Negotiation Framework which highlights the national preferences of the member states reads, *'As agreed at the European Council in December 2004, these negotiations are based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed before hand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of*

⁷ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, pg.43. file:///C:/Users/----/Downloads/QC3209190ENC_002.pdf (accessed:08.12.2014)

⁸ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, pg.17. file:///C:/Users/----/Downloads/QC3209190ENC_002.pdf (accessed:08.12.2014)

⁹ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010. pg.16. file:///C:/Users/----/Downloads/QC3209190ENC_002.pdf (accessed:08.12.2014)

*membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.*¹⁰

The terms such as ‘any European state’, ‘European identity’, accompanied by the debate having a new turn with the continuous declarations of the former French President Nicholas Sarkozy that “Turkey does not belong to Europe”- “Turkey not fit for EU accession”¹¹ raise questions like: What is the definition of a European state? What is the European identity? Similarly, the terms such as ‘absorption capacity’, ‘open-ended process’ and ‘approval of the member states’ citizens’ raise doubts whether the institutional criteria or enlargement preferences play role on Turkey’s accession bid to the EU. And also, other forms of different accession alternatives proposed to Turkey by Germany in March 1997 and supported by French and Austrian governments cause the failing of EU’s commitment to keep the very essence of the integration process against a candidate country.

The main purpose of this article is to answer to these questions, and referring to Jean Monnet’s ultimate objective it will search whether the EU and Turkey can find some common task in which they see their own interest which lead them to cooperate together joining their forces to build a more prosperous common future. In order to give the answers for those questions, the article will proceed as follows: First, the rejection of Turkey’s EU accession bid will be analysed from different theoretical approaches. Second, the long path of Turkey’s accession to the EU will be examined along with the deadlocks from both parties. This will be followed by an exploration of double standards and discriminatory practices which depreciate the full membership of Turkey. The insuing section will examine the public support of both Turkey and the EU members for Turkey’s accession to the EU, and will follow to

¹⁰ Presidency Statement with the Consent of the Council, 12.10.2005, 12823/1/05 REV1-Accession negotiations with Turkey, Annex II-Principles governing the negotiations. http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/NegotiatingFrameowrk/Negotiating_Frameowrk_Full.pdf (accessed:05.12.2014)

¹¹ “Türkiye’nin yeri Avrupa değil” *CNN Türk*, May 23, 2007 and “I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe” – *The Washington Institute*-Winter 2007 and “Turkey not fit for EU accession”, *Deutsche Welle Akademic*, 26.02.2011 <http://www.dw.de/turkey-not-fit-for-eu-accession-sarkozy/a-14875593> (accessed:08.12.2014)

evaluate the official position of Poland in which popular support is the highest among the EU's member countries towards Turkey's membership to the EU.¹² Finally, Turkey's importance will be explained highlighting its economic strengths, its strategic role as an energy hub in the context of Europe's efforts to diversify its energy supplies,¹³ its geography which requires an intense cooperation within the EU to fight 'a common enemy of extremist terrorism'.

1. The interplay of theoretical approaches concerning Turkey's EU accession bid

Turkey's aspirations to be a full member of the EU since 1960s has become a highly contested issue. In the same line, the theoretical explanation of Turkey's EU accession embraces the contested and competing area of a range of theoretical perspectives. It is no doubt that the conceptualization of the 50 years-long accession negotiations to be a full member to the EU can not be elaborated by relying upon only a single theory. Because the position of Turkey creates a unique case and when its inclusion into the negotiation is in question, different theoretical approaches such as liberal intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism and path dependency process, rationalist approaches and sociological institutionalism are intertwined.

The Austrian and French governments approach to go to referendum can be explain by 'two-level game'. As Robert D. Putnam puts it 'domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled' and 'governments can be conceptualized as strategic actors' in two-level games. Unlike the "Second Image" or "Second Image Reversed," the two level approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.¹⁴ From this theoretical approach,

¹² Emre Hatipoğlu, Meltem Müftüler Baç and Ekrem Karakoç, 'Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey's EU accession, Turco-skepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level-Analysis', *MAXCAP Working Paper*, No:4, July 2014, pg.9. http://maxcap-project.eu/system/files/maxcap_wp_04_0.pdf(accessed:08.12.2014)

¹³ Adam Szymański, 'Religion as an Unofficial EU Membership Criterion: The Case of Turkey', in Adam Szymański (ed.) *Turkey and Europe-Challenges and Opportunities*, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, 2012, pg.99-100.

¹⁴ Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', *International Organisation*, Vol.42, No.3, Summer 1988, MIT Press Journals, Cambridge, MA-USA, 1988, pg.427-460.

the assumption is the EU governments refer to referendums in order to realize potential political gain in two level context of their respective countries. In the context of Turkey, the referendum decision taken by Austrian and French governments is considered as a strategic weapon. To go to referendum would be a good strategy for the governments who are opposing Turkey's accession to the EU in order to have a diplomatic leeway vis-à-vis Turkey. Their bargaining position would be stronger with the negative result of referendum in the countries where public opinion was already shaped by the official administrators not to allow Turkey to join into the EU.

The national governments of the EU are favoring the 'intergovernmentalist view' insofar as it permits them to control over domestic affairs and to attain their goals otherwise unachievable.¹⁵ The core of liberal intergovernmentalism presents three essential elements: the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.¹⁶ From this starting point, the process of enlargement can be explained by the egoistic interests and cost-benefit calculations of the member states. The exclusion of Turkey during the process of accession negotiation in 1997-Luxembourg Summit is a good example of national preferences of the member states.¹⁷ The EU's acceptance of Turkey's candidacy in 1999-Helsinki summit can be explained by the opposite theoretical approach which is historical institutionalism and path dependency process. Historical institutionalism does not believe that humans are simple rule followers or that they are simply strategic actors who use rules to maximize their interests as rational choice institutionalists defend. For historical institutionalists, history is not a chain of independent events and

¹⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Basic Blackwell Ltd, Vol.31, No.4, December 1993, pg.507.

¹⁶ Moravcsik, '*Preferences and Power*',pg.480.

¹⁷ Meltem Müftüleri-Baç&Lauren McLaren,'Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol.25,2003,pg.19-20.

there is a temporal dimension of the events.¹⁸ The commitment of the EU for Turkey's membership bid with the 1963-Ankara Association Agreement is a good example of path dependency process. Because it was once decided more than half century ago, it would not be easy to expel Turkey out of the EU taking into consideration the temporal dimension of the event and the interdependence of the variables.

EU enlargement processes have been generally established on value-based, rights-based and utility-based arguments.¹⁹ Whenever a rationale for admitting Turkey was occurred, it was explicitly binded to the utility-based arguments defined in terms of security. As Sjursen pointed out Turkey has been perceived as a security provider at the door of the EU, playing a constructive role in common efforts to contribute to peace and stability in the region. "*We want a stable, Europe-oriented Turkey (Werheugen 1999)*" and "*Turkey's importance stems from its strategic position (van den Broek 1993b)*". "*There is general recognition of Turkey's importance to the Union....Turkey's geo-strategic position and its steadfastness over decades as a secular, Moslem country...reinforces its position as a valued neighbour in a sensitive region (van den Broe 1997f)*". "*The European Union and Turkey are linked in a strategic partnership. We need Turkey as a reliable partner in foreign and security policy (Verheugen 2000a:4-5)*".²⁰ This can be explained by rational choice theory. Whenever Turkey's accession is in question, rationalist approaches stand in the forefront.

Furthermore, some vague criteria like 'European identity' and 'cultural values' are contrasts to Copenhagen criteria such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. These universal

¹⁸ Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008) pg.128.

¹⁹ Helene Sjursen, 'A Certain Sense of Europe? Defining the EU through enlargement', *European Societies*, 14 (4) 2012, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pg. 503-504. <http://eds-1a-1ebscohost-1com-1ebsco.han.buu.uu.edu.pl/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=94&sid=3656fc9b-3527-48af-aad2-281e425139a3%40sessionmgr4003&hid=4102> (accessed:02.02.2015)

²⁰ Helene Sjursen, 'Enlargement and the nature of the EU polity', in Helene Sjursen (ed.) *Questioning EU Enlargement, Europe in search of identity*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Abingdon, Oxon, 2006, pg.12-13.

qualities connote that EU should embrace all countries, regardless of religion, identity and historical background. In case of Turkey, the opposition of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey's membership stipulating 'cultural values' can be defined as the rational strategy of EU's core members. Such ambiguous criteria seem to be served as an instrument for pursuing a particular policy goal to conceal the utility-maximizing behaviour under a rational strategy by the EU's core members. This can be explained by sociological institutionalists' argument that utility-maximizing behavior may be considered as a subform of value-guided behaviour. And conversely, rational choice theorists argue that invoking of ideas and values subsume a rational strategy.²¹

The EU has been experiencing copious institutional changes stemmed from its uncompleted institutional structure. The new rules of institutional changes were not present when the EU started negotiations with Turkey. And consequently, the debate on Turkey's accession did not cover the future institutional changes which are imposed on Turkey. This can be explained by rational choice institutionalism that defends the institutions shape the patterns of incentives and sanctions available to individuals making decisions, and it argues institutions are important because they frame the individual's strategic behaviour. They follow rules because individually do better when they do so. They cooperate because they get more with cooperation than without it.²²

The theoretical explanation of Turkey's 50 years-long saga to be a full member to the EU can not be elaborated by relying upon a single theory. Turkey's unique case encompasses the interplay of all above mentioned approaches.

II - The long path of Turkey's accession to the EU

When the European integration project gained momentum with the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, which established the European Economic

²¹ Adrienne Heritier, 'Causal explanation', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2008) pg.66.

²² Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2008) pg.125-126.

Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Turkey sought to participate in it. Turkey became an Associate member of the EEC on 12 September 1963, concluding the Agreement establishing an association between the EEC and Turkey in Ankara. Thus, the long journey of Turkey's aspiration to be a full member of the EU started. At that time, the EEC was an economic organisation and its first body from which today's EU emerged was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which came into being in 1952 with the aim of managing the coal reserves collectively by the former enemies Germany and France that they should no longer oppose each other but join together. The aim was to change the enmity into cooperation in order to avoid further conflict over the raw material. At this point, the then EEC was an economic organisation and the *acquis communautaire* along with some other recent criteria for membership were not existed.

II.1 - Ankara Association Agreement (12 September 1963)

The Ankara Agreement envisaged the progressive establishment of a Customs Union which would bring the member states of the Community (the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of France, the Republic of Italy, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands) and the Republic of Turkey closer together in economic and trade matters. During the period 1963-1970 the EEC provided Turkey a loan worth 175 million ECU. The trade concessions granted to Turkey under the Agreement was not as effective as expected. Yet, the EEC's shares in Turkish imports rose from 29% in 1963 to 42% in 1972.²³ Although the Article 19 of the Ankara Agreement reads, *'The Member States of the Community and Turkey undertake to authorize, in the currency of the country in which the creditor or the beneficiary resides, any payments or transfers connected with the payment of goods, services or capital, and any transfer of capital or earnings, to the extent of the movement of goods,*

²³ Ministry of EU Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

services, capital and persons between them has been liberalized pursuant to this Agreement;²⁴ it excluded Turkey from the EEC decision-making mechanisms and most importantly precluded Turkey from recourse to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for dispute settlement.²⁵

II.2 - Customs Union of Turkey with the EU prior to its full integration

With the Ankara Association Agreement, Turkey has had the longest association with the EU among the candidate countries. According to the Additional Protocol which was signed on 13 September 1970, the EEC would abolish tariff and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey (with some exceptions including fabrics) upon the entry into force of the Protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set of 12 and 22 years. The Additional Protocol envisaged *the free circulation of natural persons between the Parties in the next 12 and 22 years*.²⁶ The final phase of the relations between Turkey and the European Community (EC) under the Ankara Association Agreement, as foreseen was to achieve the EC-Turkey Customs Union which entered into force on December 31, 1995. The scope of this customs union, based on the status of goods in free circulation was however limited to only industrial and processed agricultural products.²⁷ With the entry into force of the Customs Union since the beginning of 1996, Turkey abolished all duties and equivalent charges on imports of industrial goods from the EU and consequently the third countries with which the EU has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). While the goods of these third countries can freely enter Turkey due to the FTAs, Turkey cannot export

²⁴Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) 24.12.1973, NR.C113/2 [s.1]. "Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey", <http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement> (accessed:11.12.2014)

²⁵ Article 25 of the Ankara Agreement, (The article 25/2 reads, "The Council of Association may settle the dispute by decision; it may also decide to submit the dispute to the Court of Justice of the European Communities or to any other existing court or tribunal.") <http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement> (accessed:11.12.2014)

²⁶ Ministry of EU Affairs Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

²⁷ European Commission-Taxation and Customs Union. Turkey: Customs Union and preferential arrangements. a)General introduction http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/customs_unions/article_414en.htm (accessed:11.12.2014)

its goods to these countries. This inequality creates serious unfair competition against Turkey depending on the competition capacity of the third countries. This asymmetry helps to shield the EU's economy from the competition of Turkey. Thus, Turkey has become the only country that realised a Customs Union on industrial and processed agricultural products prior to full membership to the EU for which no other EU accession candidate agreed to it. Ankara agreed with the hope to gain faster accession to the EU via the foreign trade union. However, EU's commercial policy towards third countries brought diversities to Turkey's commercial activities. According to 1997 figures, Turkey's share in total EU exports is 3.1% while Turkey's share in total EU imports is 1.8% which was almost two fold at the expense of the latter.²⁸ Although Turkey has been the only country having the customs union with the EU prior to its full integration with the EU, it has demonstrated that Turkish economy was able to withstand EU competition, despite predictions to the contrary.²⁹ This unequal trade partnership also signified that Turkey became a growing market at the last decade of the 20th century and continues to be a regional power in the first quarter of 21st century. Turkey is still keeping its word for this costly asymmetric association on the second decade of the 21st century without a membership guarantee.

II.3 - Bestower Agreement could not help to resolve the stalemates during the enlargement periods:

The Ankara Association Agreement can be considered as a bestower agreement for Turkey's candidate status to the EEC. The article 237 of EEC Treaty stipulates: *"Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty*

²⁸ Ministry of EU Affairs Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

²⁹ Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=fta®ion=0> (accessed:12.12.2014)

necessitated thereby shall be object of an agreement between the Member states and the Applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements."³⁰ Since this article of the EEC Treaty stipulated that member states and applicant state would have determined the "*conditions of admission*", it was clear that full membership of Turkey to the EEC might be foreseen if and when both parties could fulfill their obligations of membership without stipulating some other criteria for joining to the EU, as it was laid out in the Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement which reads, '*As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community*'.³¹ Although it was a good beginning, the relations between Turkey and EU experienced a lot of bottlenecks and in some points the stalemates. The difficulties sometimes stemmed from the perceptions of both Turkish and EU sides against each other.³²

II.4 - The difficulties from the Turkish side:

The years from 1960s to 1980s were representing the political polarisation that carried Turkey to the military coup on September 12, 1980. The radical left and the radical right were strictly opposed to the European Commission (EC). In the eyes of radical left the EC was an appendage of American imperialism. For the Islamists linked with the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP), the EC was a "Christian Club". The discourse

³⁰ Karolina Ristova-Aasterud, 'The legal aspects of the EU accession procedure and its implication for the EU Eastern enlargement (from the EU founding treaties to treaty of Amsterdam)', *Iustianianus Primus Law Review* Vol.1:1 (2010), pg.2-3. <http://www.law-review.mk/pdf/01/Karolina%20Ristova-Aasterud.pdf>(accessed:10.12.2014)

³¹ Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC)24.12.1973, NR.C113/2 [s.1]. "Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey", <http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement> (accessed:11.12.2014)

³² Meltem Müftüleri-Bac and Lauren McLaren, 'Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol.25, Issue:1, pg.17-30, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0703633031000077181> (accessed: 25.11.2014)

of the ethnonationalists connected with the National Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) towards to the EC, was the combination of the 'anti-imperialism' and 'anti-Christian Club'. According to the latter's view, the EC-membership of Turkey would offer the European states a historic opportunity to weaken the country provoking the minorities to rebel against the Republic of Turkey and bring it to the brink of Sèvres.³³

II.4.a - Sèvres syndrome:

The Treaty of Sèvres has been a traumatic past experience in the collective memory of Turks. Encyclopaedia Britannica quotes the Treaty of Sèvres as such, "*The Treaty of Sèvres, (Aug.10, 1920), post-World War I pact between the victorious Allied powers and representatives of the government of Ottoman Turkey. The treaty abolished the Ottoman Empire and obliged Turkey to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa. The pact also provided for an independent Armenia, for an autonomous Kurdistan, and for a Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles.*"³⁴ Although the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) could not prevent Turks to perceive Europeans who consider Turks as the illegitimate invaders and occupiers European-Christian lands and the oppressors of European-Christian people. Consequently, Europeans are considered that they will expel Turks and give their own territories to their rightful owners, Armenians, Greeks and Kurds. At the end of 18th and in the beginning of the 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire threatened by Russia to realize its plan to replace Istanbul, and also threatened by Habsburg to conquer the Balkans strengthened the

³³ Hakan Yılmaz, 'Eurocepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion' in Susannah Verneh (ed.), *Eurocepticism in Southern Europe A Diachronic Perspective*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, Printed and bound in Great Britain, 2012, pg.185-208

³⁴ Treaty of Sèvres, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/536839/Treaty-of-Sevres> (accessed:12.12.2014)

perceived conception of Turks about Europeans.³⁵ Therefore, the requirements about the individual and minority rights which are part of the '*conditions of admission*' to the EU are perceived like the secret agenda to achieve by the *acquis communautaires* what the Europeans failed by force which was crowned by the Treaty of Sèvres.

II.4.b - Turkish political parties' opinion about the EU:

Between 1975-1977 the radical right parties formed a coalition with the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) which was the major center-right party, and later on supported the minority government of AP at the Parliament in 1980, during these two periods they had a huge power to block any attempt to converge Turkey to the EU. The center-left Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) which was in power during January/1978 – October/1979, influenced by increasingly rising popularity of left-wing anti-imperialist ideas in public opinion, in October 1978 declared to suspend unilaterally Turkey's obligations laid out in the 1963-Ankara Association Agreement. After the short period of ruling of minority government of the Justice Party, with the military intervention of 12 September 1980 the relations between Turkey and Community had come to a virtual freeze, as the EU refuses to have association agreements with non-civilian governments. After multiparty parliamentary elections on November 6, 1983 Turkey applied for full membership of the Community on 17 April 1987 on the basis of the EEC Treaty's article 237. The answer was concluded two and half years later on 17 December 1989. Turkey's application was not rejected outright, but prevented by the EC's internal problems such as Single Market and integration process of its three new member states (1981-Greece, 1986-Portugal and Spain).³⁶

³⁵ Halil İnalçık, 'Turkey and Europe: A Historical Perspective', *Turkey and Europe in History*, Eren Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2006, pg.100-113

³⁶ Ministry of EU Affairs Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

III - The difficulties from the EU side-The official position of Germany against Turkey's membership to the EU

Turkey's application which had been waiting for ten years, was turned down in December-1997 Luxemburg Summit, despite its successful completion of the Customs Union with the EU. The most important evidence for Turkey's exclusion from EU integration due to cultural difference was the declaration of the Christian Democrats led by the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the meeting of the Christian Democratic Forum in March 1997. Helmut Kohl and other Christian Democrat Leaders declared that they do not see Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. Instead they supported a strengthened cooperation between the EU and Turkey, without a bid of membership.³⁷ In response to the Luxemburg decision Turkey froze all political dialogue with the EU and declined to participate to the European Conference which was held in March 1998.

III.1 - Cyprus problem and the deadlock

It is quite interesting that the European Council excluded Turkey at the 1997-Luxembourg Summit and started accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus as if it was the representative of the whole island. Turkey declared that it would integrate Northern Cyprus with mainland Turkey. Although the tensions between Turkey and the EU were in the peak, the Turkish public support for EU membership was found to have significantly increased, up to about 62% by May 1998 comparing about 55% in spring 1996.³⁸ This fact should have had taken into consideration by the EU that the public support to the EU was still increasing and Turkish people was eager to adopt the *acquis*. The EU inherited the Cyprus problem by accepting Greek Cyprus against the United

³⁷ Zeki Kütük, *Turkey's Integration into the European Union-The Dynamics and Determinants of a Dilemmatic Relationship*, Turun Yliopiston Julkaisuja-Annales Universitatis Turkuensis, Sarja-Ser.B Osa-Tom.258, Turun Yliopisto-Turku, 2003, pg.159-160.

³⁸ Ali Çarkoğlu, 'Societal perceptions of Turkey's EU membership, Causes and consequences of support for EU membership', in Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.) *Turkey and European Integration-Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge Taylor&Francis, London, 2004, pg.22.

Nations (UN) Security Council formula. According to this formula “Matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European Economic Committee will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for the approval of the two communities in separate referenda.”³⁹ In fact, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan call on 29 June 1999 was trying to use the possibility of the EU accession as a catalyst for settling the Cyprus problem. Kofi Annan’s 2002 plan proposed two years to the both parties in order to study the plan of re-unification. The Turkish Cypriots voted yes (64,91%), the Greek Cypriots voted no (75.83%). The Republic of Cyprus was allowed to join the EU on 1 May 2004 as part of divided island. By including Greek Cyprus into the enlargement process before settling the Cyprus problem, the EU did not only disregard the Annan Plan-the U.N. formula for a unified Cyprus, but also implicitly paved the way for the deadlock. The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) community was left out and continues its existence as an ostracized community, because of the political embargoes and trade restrictions the TRNC could not develop its own economy.⁴⁰ The rejection of the UN plan for the reunification of the island by the Greek Cypriots was transmitted by Niels Kadritzke in May 2004 edition of *Le Monde Diplomatique* as such: “Cyprus: saying no to the future. This Greek chauvinism means the island stays divided, though its entry to Europe would have helped reunification.”⁴¹ The EU, in order to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to vote for a solution in the 2004 referendum, vowed that even if the Greek Cypriots rejected the U.N solution, the Turkish Cypriots would not be left in the cold.⁴² But ever since the referendum, the Turkish Cypriots was neglected. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot administration has learnt that it could scorn proposed settlement

³⁹ Kütük, *Turkey’s Integration*, pg.157.

⁴⁰ Olga Campbell-Thomson, ‘Pride and Prejudice: The Failure of UN Peace Brokering Efforts in Cyprus’, *PERCEPTIONS*, Summer 2014, Vol.XIX, No.2, pg.74-76.

⁴¹ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English Edition LMD, May 2004, <http://mondediplo.com/2004/05/07cyprus> (accessed: 14.12.2014)

⁴² Barçın Yinanç, ‘EU is the culprit for Turkish-Russian energy rapprochement’, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 22 January 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-is-the-culprit-for-turkishrussian-energy-rapprochement.aspx?PageID=238&NID=77265&NewsCatID=412> (accessed:22.01.2015)

plans without any loss of the privileges it has been granted by the international community.

III.2.a - Suspension of the negotiations between Turkey and the EU, by the Council

The Cyprus problem continued to produce a stalemate for Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU. In the 14/15 December 2006 Summit, the European Council endorsed the Conclusions on Turkey adopted by the Council on 11 December 2006⁴³ which reads, *'As concerns Turkey, the Council decided in particular to suspend negotiations on eight chapters relevant to Turkey's restrictions with regard to the Republic of Cyprus, and will not close the other chapters until Turkey fulfils its commitments under the additional protocol to the EU-Turkey association agreement, which extended the EU-Turkey customs union to the members states, including Cyprus, that joined the EU in May 2004.'*⁴⁴ The Cyprus issue reflects one of the most important double standards of the EU towards Turkey's integration to the EU as it was towards Turkish Cypriot's accession to the EU.

III.2.b - 1999-Helsinki Summit and Turkey's candidacy status to the EU

In December 1999, according to the article 12 of the Enlargement Process of the Helsinki Summit Presidency Council, Turkey became as a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.⁴⁵ After the Helsinki Summit's decision the Turkish government passed a National Programme for the Adoption of Acquis (NPAA), and on 3 October 2001 the Turkish Parliament accordingly adopted 34

⁴³Council of the European Union, Concl.3-16879/1/06-Brussels,12 February 2007 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf (accessed:14.12.2014)

⁴⁴ Council of the European Union, 16289/06 (Presse 352), 11.XII.2006 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/92122.pdf (accessed:14.12.2014)

⁴⁵ Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.htm#b (accessed:24.01.2015)

amendments to the Constitution necessary to meet the Copenhagen criteria, mainly the ‘sensitive issues’ such as abolition of the death penalty, more liberal legal rights to Kurdish-speakers, more freedom for the use and study of Kurdish which previously had been prohibited. The NPAA also expanded freedom of expression, curtailment of the power of the military, transforming the notorious National Security Council into an advisory board, release of political prisoners, and the growth of civil society. During the first and even the second term of the Muslim conservative party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), remarkable reform processes were conducted. Turkey has adopted so far 326 primary and 1730 secondary legislations to ensure alignment with the EU acquis.⁴⁶

III.3.a - The EU’s ambiguous criteria for Turkey’s accession to the EU

The EU’s traditional approach of Turkey’s membership bid has been based not only on Copenhagen criteria, but mostly on vague criteria such as cultural, religious and Islamic identity.⁴⁷ Because the vague criteria are not based on institutional norms, over time it is inevitable that they will be used as political tools. For example, after the September 11th 2001 event, the religion issue became Turkey’s asset as Joschka Fisher, German’s former Foreign Minister, pointed out *‘to modernize an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would be almost a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror, because it would provide real proof that Islam and modernity, Islam and the rule of law...(and) this great cultural tradition and human rights are after all compatible’*.⁴⁸ The same religion was conversely interpreted by another official, Frits Bolkestein, Dutch European commissioner for Internal Market and Services during 1999-2004. Recalling the history and

⁴⁶ Turkey’s new European Strategy, *Republic of Turkey-Ministry for EU Affairs*, pg.11. http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/turkeys_new_eu_strategy.pdf (accessed:18.02.2015)

⁴⁷ John Redmond, “Turkey and European Union: troubled European or European trouble?”, *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.2, March 2007, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pg.305-308.

⁴⁸ Robert Kagan, ‘Embraceable E.U.’, *The Washington Post*, 5 December 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34023-2004Dec3.html> (accessed:13.12.2014)

underlining the Christendom, he objected Turkish membership bid to the EU “*Islamisation of Europe*” should Turkey join the union, “*The relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain*”.⁴⁹ Yes, what was “in vain” was the Polish King Sobieski’s last minute attack to turn the second Ottoman effort to seize Vienna.⁵⁰ King Sobieski relieved his Habsburg neighbor in 1683, and as a response Austria partitioned his country, Poland, the next century three times in 1772, 1792 and 1795 with the other two European powers, Prussia and Russia.⁵¹

Similar discourse was also raised by the former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who said in 2004 that the accession of Turkey to the EU would signal “*the end of the EU*.”⁵² It is ironically seems that Mr. d’Estaing would be the witness of “*the end of the eurozone*” in his lifetime. The economists argue that every necessary precautions should be taken in order “non pas pour sauver l’euro, mas pour sauver l’Europe (*not to save euro, but to save Europe*).”⁵³ Mario Draghi, head of the European Central Bank (ECB) has just announced that a programme of quantitative easing (QE) will begin in March 2015.⁵⁴ According the Economist, the QE package could cause the

⁴⁹ Ian Traynor, ‘In 1683 Turkey was the invader. In 2004 much of Europe still sees it that way’, *The Guardian*, 22 September 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey> (accessed:27.01.2015)

⁵⁰ The author considers that the religion should not be politicised, the references to religion would not serve to the benefit of both parties, and the politicians should avoid to use sensitive issues in their speeches. She did therefore not mention that, ‘King Sobieski participated to the war upon the appeal made by Pope Innocent XI. for a Christian Crusade’.The author also reminds that religious references could generate a big outcry among the people as it recently happened in the U.S. when the President Obama referred to the Crusades in his speech at the National Prayer Breakfast on 5 February 2015. President Obama’s sentence was that people also “committed terrible deeds in the name of Christ”.(See Michale D. Shear, ‘Obama, Trying to Add Context to Speech, Faces Backlash Over Crusades’, *New York Times*, 6 February 2015)

The politicians should also think of the other side of the coin which was put by the former U.S. President Bill Clinton, at his speech in 1999 Prayer Breakfast:“People have claimed repeatedly that it was God’s will that they prevail in conflict.Christians have done it since the time of the Crusades...No faith is blameless in saying that they have taken up arms against others of other faiths, because it was God’s will they do so” (See Ruth Marcus,*The Washington Post*, 5 February 2015)

⁵¹ Norman Davies, ‘Heart of Europe-A short History of Poland’, *Oxford University Press*, Oxford, 1987, pg.304.

⁵² Traynor, ‘in 1683’, *The Guardian*, 22 September 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey> (accessed:22.01.2015)

⁵³ Wolfgang Streck, ‘L’Europe doit abandonner la monnaie unique’, *Le Monde*, 3 March 2015, pg.16.

⁵⁴ Paula Subacchi, ‘Will Quantitative Easing Work for Europe?’ *Newsweek*, 27 January 2015 <http://www.newsweek.com/will-quantitative-easing-work-europe-302405> (accessed:28.01.2015)

political damage in Germany and turn out to outweigh the economic benefits. The rise of the anti-euro Alternative for Germany (AfD) party would not make the ECB's decision easy.⁵⁵ In other words, Germany on board, some members of the EU don't want to share the burden of the others. The rejection of burden-sharing by some EU members rise some questions: 'where is the unity in the absence of prosperity' and 'where is the European identity' which is one of the alleged binding credentials of the EU for which Turkey has been excluded since 1960s?

When some EU countries have been struggling financial difficulties since 2008, Turkey has been consolidating its economic dynamism. Although Turkey's economic situation was impressively getting well comparing to 2000s, and having majority of its population backing the EU accession, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine told the Canadian Review in 2012: *"There is a question mark about the geographical extension of Europe, Turkey might not be among the new two or three new members. Even the treaty of accession will have been signed with Turkey, it is not clear whether it will be ratified by every country."*⁵⁶ The term of 'geographical extension of Europe' unequivocally raises the question about the Europe's geographical borders? If geographical borders define to be a 'European country' and political discourses such as 'Turkey is not a European country', what would it be the justification of Greenland's membership which left the European Economic Community in 1985, after six years of its accession to the EU in order to keep its fishing grounds from the European rules?

The ambiguous concepts like culture, religion, identity are not compatible with the 1993-Copenhagen Criteria which are formed by political and economic criteria beside the administrative and institutional capacity of the

⁵⁵ 'Charlemagne-Berlin v Frankfurt-Tensions are rising between Germany and the European Central Bank', *The Economist*, 24 January 2015, pg.21-25.

⁵⁶ Pierre Verluise, 'Géopolitique des frontières européennes (extract). Elargir, jusqu'où? ESKA 2014', *Diploweb.com, revue politique, articles, cartes, relations internationales, Union européenne, Pays candidats*, 21 April 2013, pg.10.

candidate country to implement the *acquis* (see pg.1&2). The concept of culture once was used to explain differences between societies. If culture is considered as the relationship of the individuals in a society, could it be possible to talk about the unique culture in the EU formed by the dissimilar societies? Is there any tangible definition of the culture? If culture is the value differences at the individual level, will be the inter-subjective knowledge at the collective level. Furthermore, it is particularly difficult to outline the cultural borders of Europe with respect to the eastern part and the Balkan territory. Historically, Turkish culture has had a profound impact over much of Eastern and Southern Europe where once was ruling the Ottoman Empire, today almost thirty independent states of much of them are established in Europe. Naturally, the historical, cultural and commercial relations of people living on those territories were inextricably entangled with the Ottoman Empire since the fourteenth century.

III.3.b - Some argumentative notions contrary to the Copenhagen criteria:

With the French and Austrian governments' decision to hold referenda on Turkey's accession diverted the issue to the completely different scene in which there is another player, the citizens of the EU's member states. Negotiation Framework (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005) brought new transitional measures in front of Turkey such as *'Turkey's acceptance of the rights and obligation arising from the *acquis* and may, exceptionally, give rise to transitional measures.'* And furthermore the safeguard measures represent the utmost discrimination against Turkey for the accession process. The related passage of the article 12 reads: *'Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangement or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agricultural. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of*

movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States.⁵⁷ These new elements make the Turkish accession to the EU more political than the technical procedures of the adoption of the EU acquis. Turkey definitely will fulfill all its obligations vis-à-vis the EU acquis, but it seems that the EU acquis are not necessarily enough for Turkish EU accession. The national preferences of the Member States in another word the public support of the Union will determine Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore the former President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso declared on the opening speech of the accession negotiation with Turkey: “Europe must learn more about Turkey. And Turkey must win the hearts and minds of European citizens. They are the ones who at the end of the day will decide about Turkey’s membership.”⁵⁸

III.4 - Public opinion in Europe for the support to Turkey’s accession to the EU:

Because the new safeguard measures will have decisive influence on the membership of Turkey, let’s look at the recent survey of MAXCAP⁵⁹ (July 2014) on the determinants of European public’s attitudes to Turkey’s accession to the EU indicates:

i) The national politicians are playing an important role in shaping public’s view on Turkish accession.

ii) The support of European public is depending on whether they will win or lose. The economic and security benefits Turkey’s membership would bring to the EU is important for a European citizen who immediately favors for the extension of the European market. Security wise, Turkey’s accession would strengthen the EU’s southeastern flank as it was during the Cold War. Foreign

⁵⁷ Negotiation Framework (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005), article 12 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf (accessed:08.01.2015)

⁵⁸ European Commission, ref:ECO5-322EN, date:3 October 2005 http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5088_en.htm (accessed:28.01.2015)

⁵⁹ Emre Hatipoğlu, Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Ekrem Karakoç, ‘Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey’s EU Accession, Turco-Skepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis’, *Maxcap (Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union) Working Paper Series*, No.4, July 2014, pg.6-26.

policy-wise, Turkey's accession to the EU will promote the EU's role as a peace-builder in its near-abroad.

iii) Turkey's well-being in the EU is perceived at the cost of EU's well-being. European public is regarding Turkey's accession to the EU from the utilitarian perspective.

iv) The data from the same survey shows that individual's own well-being and conception of material gain among the European citizens enter into equation with their emphasis on common values and identities.

'Social capital' idea is that societies can generate norms and practices of trust and cooperation, which over time will strengthen each other by their positive results.⁶⁰ From this departing point, European public perceives the candidate countries as being 'like them', not 'others' who may threaten their material well-being and moral values. Along this line, the accession of Turkey to the EU is considered by the European citizens as new and different culture entering into their realm and consequential effect of this perception is the 'fear' from such new cultures.

III.4.a - The role of the national politics for shaping public's view on Turkish accession to the EU.

Another finding of the survey is that in EU member states where Turkish migrants are relatively few, the norm-based ideational factors matter less. Unlikely the norm-based factors matters more in the EU countries with large Turkish immigrant populations.⁶¹ The same survey also indicates that the citizens of the EU's new member states in Central and Eastern Europe don't think that Turkey's accession to the EU will create problem due to cultural, historical and religious factors. This result of MAXCAP reveals that the national politicians are playing an important role in shaping public's view on

⁶⁰ Michael Keating, 'Culture and social science', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pg.105.

⁶¹ Hatipoğlu, Müftüler-Baç and Karakoç, 'Explaining Variation', pg.23.

Turkish accession. Therefore it would be plausible to evaluate the official position of Poland in which popular support is the highest among the EU's member countries towards Turkey's membership to the EU. According to data from EuroBarometer '79.3.2013' Poland is the most favorable country for Turkey's accession to the EU with the highest support 54% and with the least opposition 31% among the EU's member countries.⁶²

III.4.b - The evaluation of the official position of Poland:

What could the main reason be behind the Polish public attitude? Is it 600 years old diplomatic relationship between these two countries? Or when the whole Europe forgot about Poland, the Ottoman sultans remembered it? Or did the levelheaded Polish elites' discourses have shaped Polish public's view different than the other European publics being shaped by elite driven decision making process in Europe? Or did bilateral agreements have impact on the Polish public's opinion? The most important bilateral agreement is the 'Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Poland' which was signed on November 3, 1993.⁶³ This treaty confirms both parties commitment to all bilateral instruments which remain in force, particularly to the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Poland of July 23, 1923. By signing the Treaty of Friendship in 1923, Poland was one of the first countries that recognized the young Turkish State even before it became a Republic and in this way Poland proved that it did not forget the Ottoman Empire's faithfulness that never recognized the partitions of Poland by Austria, Prussia and Russia for 123 years. The article 3 of the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement reads: *'The Parties shall strive to transform Europe permanently into a continent where human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the basic principles of democracy and justice are respected. To attain this goal they shall cooperate within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of*

⁶² Hatipoğlu, Müftüler-Baç and Karakoç, 'Explaining Variation', pg.9.

⁶³ Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Poland. Done at Warsaw on 3rd day of November 1993.

Europe and other international organizations.' Turkey, a NATO member since 1952 helped Poland to be accepted as a NATO member in 1999. Poland, on its part, as his obligation within the framework of the article 3 has been supporting Turkey's accession to the EU since its own accession to the EU in 2004. However, Poland's efforts even during its six month-long presidency of the Council of the European Union during July- December 2011 have been largely ineffectual. Although some rejection for Turkey's EU accession happened from the political parties (Prawo I Sprawiedliwosc-PiS, Liga Polskich Rodzin-LPR) after 2005 parliamentary elections, in general, the main attitude of Polish decision makers primarily was over Ukraine's to support Turkish EU bid.⁶⁴ One of the key objectives of Poland's 'Eastern Policy' has been for the EU to develop intensive relationship with Ukraine since 1990s, in order to integrate it more closely with the West. Poland's 'Eastern Policy' will help not only its national security, but also will be a political tool to achieve its geopolitical objective of reducing the influence of Russia in the region. It is known that Poland has linked Ukraine's EU accession with Turkish membership of the EU.⁶⁵ Poland's direct or indirect support for the Turkish accession bid to the EU has been appreciated by Turkey since its accession negotiation officially began on 3 October 2005. Even before the official accession negotiation started, Poland did not accept the Austrian proposal regarding a privileged partnership as a substitute for full membership of Turkey to the EU. Jan Truszczyński, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that no solution other than membership with full rights will be accepted by Poland in July 2005.

Poland had been always supported by Turks, not only during the Ottoman Empire, but also during the World War II. When the Ambassador of Hitler, Von Papen, requested the Polish Embassy building in Ankara when Poland was occupied by the Nazis, the then President of young Republic of Turkey, İsmet Pasha did not accept his request with such words: "We have a

⁶⁴ Wojciech Forjyski, Przemysław Osiewicz, 'Conference paper presented at the third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics', İstanbul, Turkey, 21-23 September 2006, pg.1-4

⁶⁵ Aleks Szczerbiak, *Poland within the European Union- New awkward partner or new heart of Europe*, Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, Oxon, London, 2012, pg.88.

traditional friendship with Poland. In the past, during the partitions, Turkey waited 150 years for the arrival of the Polish ambassador, and now Turkey will not meet your request.⁶⁶ Thus, Ambassador Von Papen watched the Polish flag during the World War II.

In return, Turkey's attitude towards Poland finds its affirmative response in the eyes of Polish People. For example, a survey made by Washington-based research institute the German Marshall Fund in 2004 asserted that Europeans are deeply confused and 'many Europeans are ambivalent' at the prospect of a Muslim country of 70 million joining the Union. According to the same source, although the Poles are eternally proud of saving Christendom from Islam in 1683, the Polish priest tending the Vienna church said "Back then, the Turks had to be defeated. It was necessary. Now it's different. We need to be all one big family. Of course Turkey is European. Of course they should be in the EU".⁶⁷ The historical ties between Turkey and Poland and the role of the national politicians are supporting the results of the survey.

III.4.c - Proposals of different accession alternatives to Turkey by the triad of Germany, France and Austria

Germany's alternative accession proposals supported by the French and Austrian conservatives such as 'privileged membership', 'extended association membership', 'European economic area plus' are ambiguous. Political dimension behind these accession alternatives is based on the exclusion of Turkey from the decision-making process; economic dimension is to strengthen customs union and EU security and defence policy with Turkey.⁶⁸ The conditions of the asymmetric association under the name of the customs union

⁶⁶ <http://poltub.com.tr>-May 2014, (accessed:28.01.2015)

⁶⁷ Traynor, 'in 1683', *The Guardian*, 22 September 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey> (accessed:22.01.2015)

⁶⁸ Cemal Karakas, 'EU-Turkey: Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration? A Conceptual Framework for Accession Alternatives', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.51, No.6, 2013, pg. 1067-1068.

between Turkey and EU, at the expense of the latter are explained under the sub-division II.2 (see page 8). Other forms of different accession alternatives such as the 'gradual integration/membership, 'full membership minus' have also discriminative characters against Turkey since it will shoulder the burden on the field of trade relations but without free movement of Turkish businessmen/citizens, and on the field of foreign and security policy without having the right to participate in decision-making process.

Although this kind of discriminative proposals other than full membership are not written in the EU documents (Treaty of Rome and Copenhagen Criteria), the allusions of the 'absorption capacity' of the EU and 'open-ended negotiation' are implicitly describing the EU's formula "highest economic and security profit-minimum cost" at the expense of Turkey.⁶⁹ The proposals reducing the full membership degree of Turkey with the unbearable costly conditions of adopting the EU *acquis* raise questions about the trustworthiness and the credibility of the EU.

IV - New bargaining positions of Turkey:

IV.a - Turkey's economic performance versus unimpressive performance of the EU:

Now, let's look at the economic situation in Turkey whose membership bid has been also evaluated on its economic assessment as well. December 2014 edition of 'Eurostat Statistics Explained' presents consolidated data for 2011, 2012 and 2013. Volume indices per capita, 2011-2013 (EU-28=100) give to Turkey in 2011, a score of 51% of GDP per capita, ranking it above Bulgaria (44) and equal to Romania (51), below Poland (64) and a long way behind France (108), Germany (122), Luxemburg (265). In 2012, GDP per capita in

⁶⁹ Beril Dedeoğlu ve Seyfettin Gürsel, 'EU and Turkey: The Analysis of Privileged Partnership or Membership', pg. 3. http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/en/wordpress/uploads/2010/05/EU-and-Turkey-The-Analysis-of-Privileged-Partnership-or-Membership_final.pdf (accessed:19.02.2015)

Turkey is 52%, in 2013 53%.⁷⁰ In 2005, GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27=100) was 10 percentage points below its 2011 level. Pierre Verluise, Director of the geopolitical Website Diploweb.com., points out that the economic crisis shakes up the status quo and helps Turkey to close the gap. While the EU's performance was unimpressive: 2.1% GDP growth in 2010; 1.5% in 2011; with zero growth forecast for 2012, Turkey has reported significant improvement: 9% of GDP growth in 2010; 8.5% in 2011; 3.3% in 2012. He argues that while the EU is slowing Turkey is gaining momentum. The gap is being cut back faster than could have been envisaged prior the crises.⁷¹

From 2013 to 2023, GDP growth rate in Turkey 5.5% and 1.8% in the EU, with 0.2% annual population growth in the EU and 1.1% in Turkey would allow the latter to reach close to half of EU per capita income by 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey.⁷² Above given facts on the economic developments in both Europe and Turkey signify that the economic dimension of the EU-Turkey relationship has changed fundamentally. Turkey is getting much closer to being an "average" European country.

IV.b-Turkey's important role in its region and in its wider neighbourhood

Millions of people fleeing from Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) are accepted into Turkey. Turkey is hosting 1.700.000 Syrians and spent US\$ 6 billion so far. Conversely, the total number of Syrian refugees in Europe is 130.000 and international community's financial contribution is just US\$ 300 million. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres declared that Turkey had become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in

⁷⁰ GDP per capita, consumption per capita and price level indices, *Eurostat Statistics Explained*, December 2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/> (accessed:25.01.2015)

⁷¹ Verluise, '*Géopolitique des frontières européennes*', pg.1-6.

⁷² Kemal Derviş, '*Turkey and Europe, a New Perspective*', *Global Turkey in Europe*, November 2012, Policy Brief 03, pg.3.

the world amid a staggering growth in displacement from Syria.⁷³ According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report-2014, Turkey provided US\$ 1.6 billion for humanitarian emergencies, making it the third largest government donor of official humanitarian assistance after the United States and the United Kingdom, which gave US\$4.7 billion and US\$1.8 billion respectively. Turkey even surpassed Japan and Germany, which provided US\$ 1.1 billion and US\$ 949 million respectively.⁷⁴ The humanitarian assistance given by Turkey corresponds to 0.21 percent of its gross national income which ranks Turkey top of the list of donors. The same figure is 0.03 percent for the U.S. and 0.07 percent for the U.K. The most remarkable point is that Turkey has been “ethnic, religious and sect blind” when providing assistance to the people having fled into the country from its neighbouring countries.⁷⁵

While Turkey is fulfilling its collective humanitarian responsibility to protect people fleeing from ISIL, is also preventing the instability caused by this migration from spreading to Europe. Turkey’s conscientious policy that requires devotion and self-sacrifice should not be considered by international community that Turkey is Europe’s buffer state that has long been imposed on it. Another challenge for Turkey is the foreign fighters travelling to join Islamist militants in Irak and Syria. On January 2015, at a one-day conference in London, UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond has praised Turkey’s effort to stop the flow of foreign fighters on the sheer length of the border between Turkey and Syria, which is over 800 kilometers.⁷⁶ Turkey, having already signed readmission agreement with the EU on 16 December 2013, facilitates the EU countries’ borders problems as well. Turkey is also continuing to

⁷³ *Hürriyet Daily News* (editorial), New York, 28 February 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-urges-worlds-help-on-syrian-refugees-as-spending-reaches-6-billion.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78951&NewsCatID=359> (accessed:28.2.2015)

⁷⁴ Global Humanitarian Assistance Report-2014, pg.4, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GHA-Report-2014.pdf> (accessed:24.02.2015)

⁷⁵ Turan Yilmaz, ‘Turkey ranks 3rd generous donor country’, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 3 October 2014. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-ranks-3rd-most-generous-donor-country.aspx?PageID=238&NID=72519&NewsCatID=510> (accessed:24.02.2015)

⁷⁶ ‘UK praises Turkey’s efforts to stem flow of foreign fighters’ (World International), *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 January 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/uk-praises-turkeys-efforts-to-stem-flow-of-foreign-fighters.aspx?pageID=238&nID=77348&NewsCatID=359> (accessed:24.01.2015)

participate in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and recently contributed to EU Mission to the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) and EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya).⁷⁷

IV.c-Turkey's contribution to the EU's energy supply security:

Since January 2006 the energy crisis between the EU countries and Russia changed the EU's post Cold War attitude towards Turkey. Turkey's geopolitical position which was regarded as a significant asset for European security during the Cold War era, was not as important as it was after it. The EU's new understanding of the security after the post Cold War has been changed with Russia's advantageous position in the energy markets converting it into its foreign policy, attempting to gain power in the Central and Eastern European countries. The EU, in order to keep its unity and future, has adopted a new policy to diversify energy sources and routes not to be depended widely to Russia. The EU realized that it can only by pass Russia with the energy resources of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Iraq through Turkey. Since the energy security and the geopolitics are tightly intertwined, Turkey's geographical location in close proximity to more than 70% of the world's proven oil and gas resources gained importance.⁷⁸ Turkey, forming a natural energy bridge between the source countries, the Middle East and Caspian basin, and consumer markets, stands as a key country in ensuring energy security through diversification of supply sources and routes.

Turkey has a dual role with its east-west links and Russia's interest in Turkey's role in the north-south corridor to bypass Ukraine.⁷⁹ Russia's interest was announced by Putin's surprise move that Moscow was scrapping the South Stream gas pipeline that was set to pass through Bulgaria, citing EU objections as the reason. Putin said the alternative pipeline would run through

⁷⁷ European Commission Turkey Progress Report, *'Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015'*, October 2014, pg.1

⁷⁸ Burak Bilgehan Özpek, 'Securing energy or energising security: the impact of Russia's energy policy on Turkey's accession to the European Union', *Journal of Intentional Relations and Development*, 2013, 16, pg. 358-359.

⁷⁹ Mehmet Efe Biresselioğlu, *European Energy Security-Turkey's Future Role and Impact*, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers Limited, UK, 2011, pg.89.

Turkey and end in a hub near the Greek border during his one day visit to Ankara on 1 December 2014. The cancelled South Stream pipeline had been intended as a southern complement to the Nord Stream pipeline, which links Russia and Germany, bypassing the Baltic states. The EU leaders said that this decision would both increase European dependence on Russian gas and leave Ukraine dangerously exposed to Russian cut-offs as it was happened in 2006 and 2009.⁸⁰ The EU leadership's plan for energy union to knit together national systems seems to be hard because of the way the 28 member countries want to keep their sovereignty over national energy systems, since the EU energy governance structure is designed to have one single European governance system to coordinate national policies and oversee physical and economic integration.⁸¹ The close ties between Hungary and Russia show the fracture among the EU. Hungarian Prime Minister Mr. Viktor Orban announced that a 'political agreement' on a new gas deal was reached with Russian President Vladimir Putin's one-day working visit to Hungary on 17 February 2015.⁸² The autocratic drift of Mr. Orban caused uneasiness around the EU already in July 2014 when he declared that Hungary would remain a democracy but become an "illiberal state". Hungary has already taken a loan from Russia to renew its old nuclear power plant.⁸³ The past efforts to create a unified energy policy have also showed the deep division between the two core countries of the EU, France, which relies on nuclear technology for its power, and Germany, which is phasing out its reactors.⁸⁴ This creates an irony for the cooperation in the coal and steel sectors, which was originally intended more than half a century ago to create a European Union.

⁸⁰ Michalel Birnbaum, 'Putin cancels new natural gas pipeline to Europe in surprise move', *The Washington Post*, December 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-cancels-new-natural-gas-pipeline-to-europe-in-a-surprise-move/2014/12/01/c1955c90-73ee-11e4-95a8-fe0b46e875> (accessed:01.12.2014)

⁸¹ *European Voice*, Vol.21, No.7,19 February 2015, pg.11.

⁸² Pablo Gorondi, 'Hungary says agreement reached on new gas deal with Russia', *Associated Press*, 17 February 2015, <http://news.yahoo.com/hungary-says-agreement-reached-gas-195901828.html> (accessed:20.02.2015)

⁸³ 'Hungary and Russia, The Viktor and Vladimir show' (editorial), *The Economist*,14 February 2015, pg.21.

⁸⁴ James Kanter and Stanley Reed, 'E.U. leadership pushes for energy union', *International New York Times*, 26 February 2015.

On the other hand, Turkey stands equal to all possible projects that serve the EU energy supply security with its potential balance between Western and Russian interests could make it the major energy route in the Greater Caspian Sea regional matrix. Turkey does not want to use its geopolitical position as a weapon against any other country, but become a centre of attractiveness for pipelines and other energy projects. Turkey's aim is to create interdependencies among the countries in the region to prevent any possible conflicts among them.⁸⁵

Europe's efforts to diversify its energy supplies uninterruptedly and securely is possible through Turkey. This fact is overlapping with the European public's focus on material benefit when Turkey's accession to the EU is in question. Turkey's future accession to the EU will ensure reliable delivery of oil and gas. Consequently, the EU with Turkey can become a competitive player not only economically, but also politically in the world.

IV.d - Progress made by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria:

i. Energy can be a facilitator to solve the long-standing Cyprus issue.

The recent findings of fossil fuel near the island can indeed be a significant opportunity for a long-sought solution. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu remarked in his speech at the 22 November 2014 closing session of the sixth Atlantic Council Energy and Economic Summit in Istanbul, "*Everyone will gain in Cyprus if both sides accept that natural sources around the island belong to all sides. Peace should be achieved without delay.*" And he called for restarting negotiations over the long standing

⁸⁵ Süleyman Elik, *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011, Conceptualising the dynamic of politic, religion and security in middle-power states*, Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, UK, 2012, pg.158.

problem, “Let’s use this opportunity for the solution of this issue”.⁸⁶ The findings of fossil fuel should be used first of all for the solution of Cyprus issue, then for the prosperity of the region. If both sides concur with Monnet’s proposal focusing on their mutual interests, energy can be a facilitator to solve the problem.

ii. Settlement process aiming at a solution of the Kurdish issue and its inevitable contribution for the protection of human rights in the country.

In 2004, the Turkish parliament adopted a law to ‘bring a stronger legal foundation to the settlement process’, which strengthens the basis for the settlement process and makes a positive contribution to stability and protection of human rights in Turkey. In 28 February 2015, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has announced at a historic joint press conference with the government representatives a call by the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) to hold a conference to discuss disarmament in Turkey. Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan said that silencing arms would contribute into democratic development at the same joint press meeting.⁸⁷ This call means that the PKK will lay down arms during the process. Both parties want a ‘reinforced cease-fire’ and the withdrawal of PKK militants before June 7 election. The settlement process is not an easy issue to solve immediately as we have already seen the examples in cases of ETA, in Spain and IRA, in Ireland. It will take time, but every affirmative initiative is important for the political solution. The overwhelming majority of Turkish people is supporting the settlement process.

⁸⁶ “Turkey will be the primary user of Cyprus gas, PM Davutoğlu says” (editorial), *Hürriyet Daily News*, 22 November 2014, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-will-be-the-primary-user-of-cyprus-gas-pm-davutoglu-says.aspx?PageID=238&NID=74673&NewsCatID=510> (accessed:23.11.2014)

⁸⁷ “Turkish government, mediator party mark start of Kurdish talks toward political solution, disarmament” (editorial), *Hürriyet Daily News*, 28.02.2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-mediator-party-mark-start-of-kurdish-talks-toward-political-solution-disarmament.aspx?PageID=238&NID=78999&NewsCatID=338> (accessed:28.02.2015)

IV.e - The support of Turkish public for EU membership:

The surveys indicate that Turkish people supported for EU membership with 62% even during 1998 and much of 1999 when the tensions between Turkey and EU peaked. On 3 October 2001, when the Turkish parliament adopted 34 amendments to Constitution necessary to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the public support was nearly 75%. In 2003, when the new variables concerning 'sensitive issues' (see pg.12) and the impact of leadership in guiding mass support for EU membership were into account, Turkish voters surprisingly showed that the degree of Euro-skepticism ceases to have a significant negative impact, while pro-EU attitudes continue to have a significant positive impact on the likelihood of voting in support of EU membership.⁸⁸

In December 2014, a 'Survey of Social-Political Tendencies in Turkey' conducted by Kadir Has University presented the support for the EU membership rose 20% which is a rise from 51.8% in 2013 to 71.4% in 2014.⁸⁹ It is very interesting to see the public support for the EU membership among the Turkish people is still 71.4% despite the discouraging discourses by the leadership of both parties. In summary, the results of surveys demonstrate that neither sensitive issues nor discouraging discourses from both sides don't have substantial influence on Turkish people who have already made its choice towards the Western civilization which was introduced by Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey, 92 years ago.

Conclusion:

Turkey's strategic geography created joint interests between Turkey and the EU. But, both parties failed to develop the joint interests to build a common future.

⁸⁸ Çarkoğlu, 'Societal perceptions' pg. 36-37.

⁸⁹ Verda Özer, 'Turkish people are afraid and want the West', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 24 January 2015 <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-people-are-afraid-and-want-the-west.aspx?pageID=449&nID=77360&NewsCatID=466> (accessed:25.01.2015)

Back to 1990s, Turkey's perception was an indebted country with high inflation, high public deficit, mediocre growth performance, having fragile economy but a strong army. The salient point of Turkey's perception was, a "security" provider of Europe. The irony is that yesterday's enemies of Western Europe, Warsaw Pact's members, are today's EU members. Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, whose contribution to collective defense was to line up its forces on the southern front against some thirty Soviet divisions to prevent the Warsaw Pact's countries from maximizing their forces on the western front during the Cold War is still waiting for the EU full membership. Conversely, today's Turkey is the 16th largest economy in the world.⁹⁰ Given the economic developments since 2000s, the economic dimension of the EU-Turkey relationship has fundamentally changed (see pg.19). Turkish EU Affairs Minister, Volkan Bozkır, has recently declared that Turkey has a better outlook than 22 European countries and Turkey is the second country that fits the Maastricht criteria, the other country is Germany.⁹¹

In December 1999, when Turkey became as a candidate State to join to the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States, the EU and the Eurozone seemed to have stable conditions. Conversely, today's EU is struggling with economic and political fragmentation due to uncertainties after the Greek-related economic crises and the political cleavage between member countries. For example, the close relations between Hungary and Russia and divisiveness among the member states for a unified energy policy. Furthermore, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron's January 2013 speech presents the divergence between member states. Cameron referring to the wafer-thin democratic consent in Britain to the EU committed, should he win the general election in 2015, an in/out referendum would be put to the

⁹⁰ IMF Country Report No.13/364, Selected Issues Paper, December 2013, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13364.pdf (accessed:09.12.2014)

⁹¹ Şakir Tanrıver, 'EU affair minister: Turkey capable of closing all EU accession chapters in two years' *Today's Zaman*, 30 January 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_eu-affairs-minister-turkey-capable-of-closing-all-eu-accession-chapters-in-two-years_371303.html (accessed:30.01.2015)

British people.⁹² Today's EU is also facing the existential challenges beyond the economic and political crisis. According to the economic and demographic indicators, the EU generates 1/4th of the global GDP, but only constitutes 7% of the global population. This proportion will drop to 5 percent by 2040 and the EU's total GDP will be reduced to half of its current level. China and India's total population is already 35% of the global population and each has annual growth rate between 7 and 10%.⁹³ This means that global balance of power will be inevitably changed by then. Consequently, the unavoidable choice for the EU is to think about its future not to be perished, probably its self re-invention under the light of the demographic and economic indicators.

On the other hand, by 2023 Turkey and Korea, among the OECD countries are expected to exhibit the strongest growth during the next decade at 4.4% and 4.3% per annum respectively, according to OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014-2023. The forecast of the population is also in favor of Turkey, since Australia, Mexico and Turkey have the highest projected population growth rates among the OECD countries.⁹⁴ Consequently, it is time for Turkey to think about the conditions of its accession negotiations to the EU. Turkey should establish its potential membership negotiations with the EU on a prospective rather than retrospective basis. When we evaluate the EU's history, we notice that EU experienced copious institutional changes. These new rules were not present when the EU started negotiations with Turkey. The then debate on membership did not cover such future institutional changes. Hence, the new institutional changes raise questions about the legitimacy of the new accession conditions imposed on Turkey. Therefore, Turkey must be associated with the possible re-invention process of the EU as an 'equal'. Some

⁹² Tim Oliver, 'To be or not to be in Europe: is that a question? Britain's European question and an in-out referendum', *International Affairs*, Vol.91, No.1, January 2015, published by Wiley & Sons, pg.77.

⁹³ Pascal Fontaine, *Jean Monnet: actualite d'un batisseur de l'Europe unie*, cited by Özdem Sanberk, 'Turkey needs to decide where it sees itself in the future', pg.2. <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3845/turkey-needs-to-decide-where-it-sees-itself-in-the-future.html> (accessed:16.12.2014)

⁹⁴ OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014-2023, *Macroeconomic and Policy Assumption*, pg.24-25. https://www.embrapa.br/documents/1024963/1025740/OECD-FAO_Agricultural_Outlook_2014-2023/20082926-0f88-4159-970a-2a1c65795c47 (accessed:02.03.2015)

alternative directions such as ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ membership⁹⁵ or ‘two speed’, ‘three-or-four speed’ Europe that aim an EU which has inside member states for all purposes, and outside members for some purposes seem to be far away to meet Turkey’s expectations. It would not be plausible even to discuss them with the EU facing with the fallouts from the eurozone crisis, the cleavage in energy policy, the Euroscepticism in the UK, and the move from ‘consensus’ to ‘dissension’ over the European integration. Because, the EU’s history demonstrates that the end destinations of these alternative directions may remain permanently different.⁹⁶ Turkey should be in the decision making process and make proposals to the EU with the perspectives of 21st century. Of course, it is at EU’s discretion whether to listen to Turkey’s ideas and recommendations on the prospective EU’s re-invention formation.

Since 2005, Turkey benefited enormously from the EU and has experienced tangible benefits to its citizens daily life such as more democracy, the state of law, freedom of speech, human dignity, financial and economic credibility. Turkey’s rising power status that provided high economic growth came from its harmony with EU values. Other alliances like ‘Shanghai Five’ expressed by the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,⁹⁷ during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey on 1 December 2014 only distance Turkey from its path of a secular and pluralistic democracy. The remarks by the President of Turkey should be considered as a reflection of the EU countries’ blockage of negotiating chapters for political reasons. There is no other country determined and persistent as Turkey whose motivation is to obtain the EU values and standards rather than money. Therefore, there is no serious alternative to Turkey’s membership to the EU. But, any form of membership proposals other than the full membership would trigger mistrust and uncertainty in Turkey-EU relations. However, it cannot be ruled out that

⁹⁵ Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, ‘The European Union and Turkey’, *Survival*, Vol.41, No.1, Spring 1999, pg.52-54.

⁹⁶ Derviş, ‘Turkey and Europe’, pg.4.

⁹⁷ Semih İdiz, ‘Does Europe’s future really include Turkey?’, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 3 February 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/does-europes-future-really-include-turkey.aspx?pageID=449&nID=77784&NewsCatID=416> (accessed:17.02.2015)

Turkey may redefine its EU accession bid if the EU countries insist on its depreciation of full membership.

EU countries would also benefit enormously from Turkey's economic dynamism which will bring buoyancy to its sluggish economy. Furthermore Turkey's multicultural richness will be an asset to the Union, since the multiculturalism which was one of the keystones of the foundation ideology of the EU has failed.⁹⁶ The cultural xenophobia against Islam is now sweeping through Europe. Turkey in Europe would ensure that a religious fault line will not be developed in the vast area from Mediterranean to Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia and also will contribute to eliminate the Islamophobia in the West. The accession of Turkey to the EU would show the Muslim world that Europe is not an exclusively Christian club and is open to peoples of all religions and cultures. This would be an opportunity to build trust between Christian and Muslim world. Turkey, the only pluralist democracy in the Moslem world will be the hope of its southern neighbours for their democratic and more prosperous future.

Recent developments in energy sector proved that pipelines can become tools of political leverage of both peace and conflict. Turkey, with its historically close ties to the West and the East has the potential to shape the balance in favor of stability. Therefore, Turkey with its dynamic economy and its geostrategic location should be in Europe for the well-being of both parties and their neighbourhood. I want to conclude this paper assuming the similar philosophy of Jean Monnet, that the interdependency of the countries is reigning in our global village.

⁹⁶ George Friedman, 'Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism', *Geopolitical Weekly-Stratfor-global intelligence*, 19 October 2010, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/european-union-nationalism-and-crisis-europe#axzz3Py0MBfTv> (accessed:26.01.2015)

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Challenges to American Hegemony: Realizing and Responding

Abstract

This article analyzes the challenges to American hegemony in the contemporary world order. It will demonstrate that the rise of the rest including China and India, the possibilities of a massive military attack and an economic collapse on American soil are merely exaggerated challenges to American hegemonic position. The challenges that have great potential to cut into American hegemony are very internal including American domestic and psychologic problems. Looking at the future of American hegemony, the article highlights that the United States still has overwhelming power to sustain its hegemony in the foreseeable time. Yet it is crucially important for American leaders to realize and effectively deal with the imminent challenges to its power. Also, six policy recommendations are made for the United States to endure its hegemony in the contemporary world order.

Keywords: *American hegemony, domestic problems, psychologic problems, emerging powers, power diffusion.*

INTRODUCTION

In a rapidly changing and unpredictable world, some may question how long American pre-eminence in military, economic, political, cultural and technological endures. Some even hold the old Paul Kennedy line that the United States has been declining.¹ The chief argument of this article is that American hegemony has been and remains one of the greatest realities of our time, but how long this last remaining superpower since the speedy disintegration of the Soviet Union can sustain its hegemonic position in the international system depends on whether its government is able to realize and respond to the real challenges to its supremacy. The rise of the rest of the globe, including China and India, the possibilities of a massive military attack on American soil, and a collapse of American economy are argued not to be threatening to American hegemony, as they are seemingly exaggerated challenges. The real challenges to American hegemony come from within the United States itself, including its domestic and psychological problems (overreaction and neo-isolation).

To this end, the paper will first begin with examining the ideas of American hegemony and hegemonic cycles, and will follow to analyze both exaggerated and real challenges to American power. This aims to demonstrate on what the United States needs to focus its resources if it wants to prolong its hegemony. The article goes on to draw on the future of American hegemony. It highlights that the United States has overwhelming power to sustain its hegemony in the foreseeable future. Yet it is crucially important for American leaders to realize and respond to the imminent challenges to its power. The conclusion sets out six policy recommendations for the United States to prolong its hegemony in the contemporary world order.

¹ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers-Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, (New York: Random House, 1987).

AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND HEGEMONIC CYCLES

The term “Hegemony” stemming from Greek, *hegemonikos*, means having capacity to command. Oxford dictionary explains “Hegemony” as a word used to refer to “leadership, or dominance, especially by one state, or social group over others.”² Politically, this term was first used by Thucydides, a renowned Greek historian to describe the status of Athens in the mid-fifth century BC. With the largest fleet in the Mediterranean and a prosperous economy, Athens was the hegemon during that early time in human history. However, Athens’ hegemonic position was overthrown by its powerful rival, Sparta after fighting twenty-seven years bitterly. Thucydides hoped that his analysis of the great hegemonic war between the Athenians and the Spartans would provide “an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it.”³ He added “In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.”⁴

His work on hegemonic war has been the analytical foundation for many generations of scholars to develop their own research on the durability of hegemony. George Modelski is one of such scholars. His 1978 article entitled: **“The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State”** examined the lifespan of great powers in the international system **and pointed out that the cycles of hegemony begins to end when the hegemon’s legitimate control over the international system absolutely declines. According to Modelski, Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and the United State are the hegemons since the establishment of the modern world system by the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.**⁵

² Angus Stevenson, *Oxford Dictionary of English*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 814.

³ Thucydides, Translated by Richard Crawley, *The History of The Peloponnesian War*, (New York: Modern Library, 1951), 14.

⁴ Thucydides, Translated by Richard Crawley 1951, 15.

⁵ George Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol.20, no.2 (1978): 214-235.

⁶ Modelski 1978, 233.

Modelski observed that: “The average duration of known historical cycles has been something over a hundred years. Moreover, for some reason not now evident the cycles have coincided quite closely with historical centuries, so that to each recent century (e.g. the nineteenth) roughly corresponds a distinct cycle (e.g. the British Empire).”⁶ He added that there are about three generations in a century, and it might be said that one generation builds, the second generation reinforces and the third generation loses control. This means that a hegemonic cycle normally includes two phases: the ascending and the descending. Based on the analysis of the hegemonic cycles of the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British; and the United States as the current hegemon in the modern world system, Modelski underlined that:

The ascending phase has its sources in the disorder and disintegration from which a global war originates... The ascending phase continues for a time, on past record for a generation, only to experience a gradual exhaustion of energy. Global problems arise that remain unattended to or are taken up by rising new leaders and competitors; conflicts are generated that do not seem to yield to solutions. At some point the curve turns and begins to descend until such time as the disintegration of authority and the unrestrained assertion of narrow interests lead to a new global conflagration. The destructive aspects of this process mark the lowest point of a long descending phase.⁷

Modelski's long cycles have been echoed by Gilpin's (1981) hegemonic transition theory, Thompson's (1988) leadership long cycle theory, and Doran's (1989a) theory of relative power cycles.⁸ These theories are mutually

⁷ Modelski 1978, 233.

⁸ See, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers-Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, (New York: Random House, 1987); William Thompson, *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); and Charles Doran, “Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 33 (1989a):371-401.

⁹ George Modelski. 2012. Long Cycles and International Regimes. *E-international Relations*, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/15/long-cycles-and-international-regimes/>, (accessed August 29, 2015).

complementary and supportive, and this complementarities and mutual reinforcement offer historical patterns of analysis of the global authority structures of the world system, and the way that the hegemony in such structures begins and ends. The past patterns underlined that the international system evolution is an increasingly complicated global political process. An international system is created when a global hegemon comes and that system collapses with the end of the global hegemon. What should be highlighted in these scholars' works is that: "For the past half-millennium, that pattern, or rhythm has been driven by a succession of globally-oriented nation-states."⁹

The most recent "globally-oriented nation-state" is the United States which has taken a leading role in establishing the crucial elements of the contemporary world order by providing public goods, enhancing multilateral cooperation and at the same time engaging in confrontations with perceived challengers. To put it differently, in contrast to much of conventional wisdom on international system, the contemporary world order has not been in anarchy in the sense that it lacked a global hegemon. The twentieth century witnessed the impressive completion of American hegemony in 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Cold War ended. At the top of the international system, the United States had no serious challengers for its global leadership. This international system was described by Charles Krauthammer as unipolarity, the most prominent feature of the post-Cold War world. He put forth that: "No doubt, multipolarity will come in time...But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment."¹⁰ This raises the question about the duration of American hegemony.

The twenty-first century opened with terrorist attacks on American soil, global financial crisis and the rising of new powers. Terrorist threats, economic depression and challenges posed by emerging powers have been warned as forces which have great potential to undermine American hegemony and

¹⁰ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, vo. 70, no.1 (1990): 23-33, 24.

¹¹ Krauthammer 1990, 24.

destabilize the international system. If this is true, it means that the “unipolar moment” lasted merely one decade. It did not take one generation or so to see the unipolar world order being replaced by a multipolar one. This implies that Charles Krauthammer’s prediction: “In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era”¹¹ needs to be reconsidered.

Ultimately, it is inevitable that American hegemony will be challenged. But how long has been the long cycle of American hegemony? In the second decade of the twenty-first century, there are few facts indicating that America has begun declining, or that it will begin in the foreseeable time, and the world order will be similar to the pre-World War I era. The United States still enjoys unrivaled capacities in military, economic, technological and geographical terms. Especially, the international institutions, namely the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization inspired and led by the United States have been firmly embedded in the international system and have been providing global goods for a long time. On the whole, the United States has been the single most significant actor in global affairs, a powerful economy, a superior military and influential diplomatic factor, a source of advanced research and development. Stephen Sestanovich reflected this in his well-researched book, “Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama,” by whatever measure, the United States “has been a power like no other.”¹²

This underlines that American hegemony remains a prominent reality in the contemporary international system and American leading role in the world is vital. Short-term, or relative decline should not be interpreted into long-term trends. It is no doubt that American leadership has waxed and waned since 1991, but its hegemonic control over the international system has never been eclipsed. Yet, it should be noted that the world is not a static place. Changes

¹² Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama* (New York: Knopf, 2014), 325.

take place in the daily life as well as the in international politics. These changes may directly, or indirectly impact American power. In this changing world, the long run of American hegemony will be disrupted if American government is unable to classify the sources of challenges to its hegemonic position and coordinate responses to them. When scoping out the imminent challenges to American hegemony, it is crucially important for the United States to distinguish exaggerated challenges and real challenges to American hegemony.

EXAGGERATED CHALLENGES

Many scholars argue convincingly that the United States would begin to lose its legitimate hegemonic control over the international system because of the emergence of new powers, the possibilities of a massive attack on U.S. soil and an overall collapse of U.S. economy. It is true that some new nations are taking a bigger role in the global economy, their emergence needs to be examined more closely, and when such an examination is conducted it shows that the rise of the rest of the globe, including China and India, will not constitute a big threat to U.S. hegemony as these nations' emergence is still hemmed by several hurdles.

Let us take China and India as examples: both of them are estimated to become economic powerhouses in a foreseeable time, and seem to be equipped to translate their economic achievements into social, political and military influence that will allow them to exercise greater power in the world affairs. Indeed, China and India enjoy advantages in terms of geography, size, population, and potential for economic growth. Yet, one can be deeply skeptical that either China, or India is able to reach the hegemonic status. *First*, unlike the United States, which is surrounded by a favorable regional environment with friendly neighbors and vast oceans, China and India are located in the Asia-Pacific region where regional actors are greatly ambitious

and wary about Chinese and Indian intentions. Many nations of the Asia-Pacific region have welcomed U.S. increasing economic, political, military, diplomatic and cultural engagement in the region as a counterbalance to the emergence of China and India.¹³ This means that neither China nor India simply can emerge as a regional hegemon they aspire to become. *Second*, both China and India are extraordinarily ill-equipped in military terms. From the realist approach, the military might enable a nation to maintain its hegemony. U.S. defense budget is still far bigger than that of China and India combined¹⁴. In terms of nuclear capability, the United States possesses 7,100 warheads while China has 250 warheads and India 100¹⁵. Military strength is also reflected by a state's ability to dominate oceans and skies. The latest statistics shows that the U.S. naval and air power are much greater than China's and India's. For example, the United States possesses up to 20 aircraft carriers while China has one aircraft carrier and India has two. The United States possesses 920 attack helicopters while China has 169 attack helicopters and India has 20.¹⁶ Indeed, U.S. military power remains obviously far more advanced than China's and India's that it is not possible yet for those emerging powers to challenge the U.S. and thus depose it from hegemonic status. *Third*, China, India, and other emerging powers are depending economically on the international financial and economic system which has been led by the United States. With these continued structural advantages, the United States is able to exert great influence on Chinese and Indian economic growth. *Last*, China and India have certain national problems. Their socio-political cultures and traditions, ethnic divisions, and demographic diversity tend to limit their freedom of action, and thus reduce their influence in the world politics.

¹³ Jacob Zenn. 2012. *US Presence Evolves in Southeast Asia*, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ND04Ae01.html, accessed August 1, 2015.

¹⁴ Staff Writer. 2015. *Defense Budget by Country*, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-spending-budget.asp>, accessed July 21, 2015.

¹⁵ Daryl Kimball, 2015. *2015 Estimated Nuclear Warheads*, Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>, accessed August 12, 2015.

¹⁶ *Global Firepower*, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/>, accessed July 14, 2015.

It might be an exaggeration to say that a massive attack on U.S. soil is likely to shake the U.S. hegemony. If this was made possible, the current international system would crumble and with it the United States would crumble. This line of argument seems to have stronger hold after the 9/11 attacks and the global financial crisis. Yet, the truth is that there had been terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil before September 11, 2001. Terrorist attacks are certainly shocking and frightening, but they do not constitute a kind of massive attack that could knock the United States down. The 9/11 rhetoric has lost the ground as Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011 and the United States has gained wide supports for its efforts to counter revisionist states and violent extremist organizations (Al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) that are challenging the regional and global security¹⁷.

Similarly, the argument that there can be an overall collapse of U.S. economy resulting in the demise of American hegemony seems unconvincing. Even people with little knowledge of economics and history can see that it is almost impossible for the U.S. economy to be knocked down. It is too big to fall. With a per capital GDP of 54,800, the U.S. economy is the most technologically powerful economy on earth. Many U.S. companies are at the forefront of technological advances, particularly in IT technology, medicine, aerospace engineering, and military technologies.¹⁸ The ultimate sources of U.S. economic power are comprised of its economic dynamism, the pro-trade approach of its political system, its rich natural resources, the remarkable stability of its constitution, and its control of the major trade and financial institutions in the world economy.


Many may take the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 as an example to argue in support of the likelihood of U.S. economic falling. Yet, the facts speak

¹⁷ Tina Kaidanow. 2015. *Expanding Counterterrorism Partnership: U.S. Efforts to Tackle the Evolving Terrorist Threat*, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/236305.htm>, accessed July 12, 2015.

¹⁸ The World Book Fact, CIA, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>, (accessed July 11, 2015).

for themselves. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 merely indicated how resilient and strong the U.S. economy is. It has been six years since the United States began recovering from its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.¹⁹ Despite the economic comeback is slow, it began much earlier than expected. The steady recovery of the U.S. economy can be seen in the acceleration in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. As the United States is in the recovering process, its quarter-to-quarter growth has been uneven, but the trend is very positive (Figure 1).

Figure 1. US Quarter-to-Quarter Growth in Real GDP




U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Source: <http://bea.gov/newsreleases/glance.htm>, viewed on June 23, 2015.

Also, according to Euromonitor, the GDP per working age person in the United States has been on the rise since 2009 and is projected to be upward. Similar trends can also be seen in other advanced economies which are U.S allies and friends. The U.S. economy has performed well to gradually overcome the crisis.

¹⁹ Peter Ryan, 2015. *Slow Start to the Year Stalls United States' Economic Recovery Six Years after Global Financial Crisis*, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-30/slow-start-to-year-stalls-united-states-economy/6433894>, (accessed July 30, 2015).

Figure 2. GDP per Working Age Person in Advanced Economies since 2007

Source: <http://blog.euromonitor.com/2014/11/the-recovery-from-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2008-missing-in-action.html>, viewed on June 27, 2015.

Indeed, this together has shown the gap between the perception and the facts. The U.S. economy has continued to recover and grow. And it is said that “what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.” Applying this to the United States, it just means that the global financial crisis just reinforced the U.S. economic strength. Undoubtedly, the United States has many economic problems; however, it remains very powerful and especially very resilient. It is somewhat bizarre to predict that a comprehensive economic fall can happen to the United States and thus shake its hegemony.

THE REAL CHALLENGES

Successive U.S. administrations have been committed to the perpetuation of U.S. hegemony. The rise of the rest, the possibility of massive attacks on U.S. soil and the likelihood of U.S. comprehensive economic collapse have

been on the radar screens of U.S. policy makers. Yet, these do not represent real threats to U.S. preponderance as they seem to be exaggerated. The United States has retained formidable economic, military, political, technological and institutional assets. Indeed, U.S. policy makers need to take into account the rising of the rest, U.S. economic absolute fall and massive military attacks on the U.S. However, they should know that the real and immediate threats to U.S. hegemony are psychological and domestic. These internal problems once ignored, or inadequately dealt with are likely to undermine American hegemony.

Psychological Problems

The highlighted psychological problems facing the United States include overreaction and neo-isolationism. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity resulted in the dramatic shifting of power in U.S. favor. The current unipolar system has persisted longer than many anticipated since the end of the cold war.²⁰ The stability of the current unipolar international system has depended considerably on whether the major powers are happy with the status quo. With the psychological tendency to worry about the perpetuation of its preponderance, the United States has sought to resist any forces that it perceived as threatening U.S. hegemony. The United States fears that China, India, or the rest of the globe in general increase their relative capabilities to the extent that they can transform the current international system. In parallel, the United States has been concerned about its own capabilities and even believed that it is in steep decline. In 1970, seeing the signal of U.S. relative decline, President Nixon even envisaged and encouraged the development of a multi-polar world in which the main pillars (the European Community, the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and China) represented equal forces and

²⁰ See, Christopher Layne. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," *International Security*, vol. 17, no.14 (1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, vo.18, no.2 (1993): 44-79, and Christopher Layne. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited," *International Security*, vol.31, no.2 (2006): 7-41.

power to sustain the structure of peace in the international politics.²¹ He called for a transformation from predominance to partnership and affirmed the importance of enhancing economic and political cooperation in international relations. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States went to war with Afghanistan and then Iraq, which turned out to be the most costly wars in U.S. history.²²

Take one more example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (the AIIB). The Obama administration initially attempted to block AIIB's creation. This reaction was deeply rooted in U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War: ensuring that no state would emerge to the extent that can challenge U.S. global preponderance. Yet, the reality is that on June 29, 2015 China and 49 nations comprising most of closest American friends and allies signed the Articles of Agreement of the AIIB. The successful establishment of the bank shows that: "The initial U.S. response had no possible upside but did promise - and delivered - a great deal of downside."²³

Indeed, U.S. overreaction in attempting to preserve its hegemony may be counterproductive. President Nixon's vision of a multi-polar international system would naturally lead to the emergence of new powers as they are invited to take a bigger role in the world affairs. The costs, materially and mentally, of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terror launched by President Bush, have led many to question U.S. capacity either to take the lead in the world, or to obtain support for its policies at home and abroad. President Obama's concern about China's phenomenal growth resulted in U.S. objection to the AIIB's establishment. This reaction did not prevent many nations including U.S. allies and friends becoming the AIIB's founding members.

²¹ Richard Nixon. 1970. *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s. A New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the Congress*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>, accessed April 1, 2015.

²² Mark Thompson. 2015. *The True Cost of the Afghanistan War May Surprise You*, <http://time.com/3651697/afghanistan-war-cost/>, accessed August 1, 2015.

²³ Robert Keatley. 2015. "China's AIIB Challenge: How Should America Respond," *The National Interest*, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-big-strategic-blunder-not-joining-chinas-aiib-12666>, accessed August 1, 2015.

Again, the question about U.S. ability to lead and to gain support can be raised. Overreaction does no good to the United States. It even undermines U.S. credibility and threatens U.S. predominance. The foundation of the U.S. hegemony is firm as it is far ahead other nations in both hard and soft power. As a very powerful nation in the international system, the United States can employ various means to preserve its preponderance. Clearly, changes are normal in our human life and so are in world affairs. The United States has to adapt to changes to sustain its hegemonic status. It should be noted that wrong ways of adapting will certainly put the United States in unfavorable position. Overreaction means choosing an inappropriate way to adapt to changes. The history record has always proved that overreaction surely causes unfixable consequences. Thus, U.S. practices in the international affairs have to be very carefully calculated to avoid cutting into American hegemony. It is underlined that: "The structural and contingent features of contemporary unipolarity point plausibly in the direction of a revisionist unipole, one simultaneously powerful, fearful, and opportunistic."²⁴ If the United States is too fearful of changes in the world affairs, it will fall prey to its own overreaction.

Another psychological problem that really threatens U.S. preponderance is the tendency of neo-isolationism. Isolationism was deeply established in the history of U.S. foreign policy. This extreme thinking says that the United States should "be isolated from all external forces and lives its own solitary life."²⁵ This means that the United States would not entangle itself in any international issues. In the post-Cold War world, neo-isolationism stems from isolationism but it is somehow modified to be less extreme. Neo-isolationism holds that the United States should selectively, or passively participate in international politics. In other words, the United States should not be isolated from *all* external forces. It still needs to engage with the wider world, and intervene in

²⁴ John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William Wohforth. *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011), 14.

²⁵ John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd, 1950), 18.

²⁶ Carrie Dann. 2014. Obama Rules Out 'Military Excursion' in Ukraine, *NBC News*, <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/obama-rules-out-military-excursion-ukraine-n57081>, accessed June 1, 2015.

international affairs; however, the extent to which its engagement and intervention are allowed should be limited. One example can be found in U.S. decision to lead from behind in the Libyan war. Another example is U.S. strategy in Ukraine. President Obama made it clear that the United States is not being dragged into a military excursion in Ukraine. What the United States is going to do is to use all of its diplomatic resources to build a strong international coalition that would send a clear message, which is that Ukraine should choose its own destiny.²⁶

By playing a supporting role, the United States hoped not to be directly entangled in a foreign conflict. *U.S. strategies in the Libya war and in Ukraine* are a manifestation of neo-isolationism which would certainly diminish U.S. influence and lessen its ability to shape the global affairs to U.S. benefits.²⁷ To accept the idea of neo-isolationism is to invite decline and defeat. Nothing that would make decline, and defeat more certain for the United States than the Americans to see what is going on around them with indifference and to sit idly by while other states proactively act. The United States may choose to go on living their own lives in peaceful isolation, but that kind of peace may not last long and it may finish U.S. hegemony. The neo-isolation approach seems not a smart choice in the modern world politics as it may not help to protect U.S. national interest. It, by contrast, may weaken the United States and eventually strangle the United States.

Domestic Problems

Though the United States is a great power in the international system, it still has many serious domestic issues. For instance, according to a report released by Oxfam International, the gap between the rich and the poor in the United States has grown at a faster rate than any other developed country, the

²⁷ Charles Krauthammer. 2011. "The Obama Doctrine: Leading from Behind," *The Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-doctrine-leading-from-behind/2011/04/28/AFBCy18E_story.html, accessed on July 15, 2015.

richest one percent of Americans have possessed 95% of the wealth produced since 2009 while the bottom 90% of Americans have been poorer and poorer.²⁸ Dealing with widening inequality is vital to promote a nation's strong and sustained growth. The substantial disparities in the income growth and net worth reported in the Federal Reserve System's survey of consumer finances present a very serious problem for the United States.²⁹

It is also highlighted that average income increased since 2010 for the following social groups: house owners, non-Hispanic white household and families headed by a person with a college degree. Average income dropped for renters, nonwhite and Hispanic households and families headed by someone without a high-school diploma.³⁰ In other words, education is the key to tackle the problem of the rich and poor gap. Ironically, the Americans voice serious doubts about college affordability. Washington Post Miller Center shows that around three-quarters (77%) of respondents in a September 2013 survey said it has become more difficult for people like them to pay for a college education.³¹ In a November 2013 Alstate/National Journal poll, 47 percent of Americans said that it would be "not very", or "not at all" realistic for them to pay for college.³² The U.S. government clearly sees the appalling consequences of these problems. President Obama even warned that fragile

²⁸ Marc Morial. 2014. "The Great Divide of Income Inequality: A Domestic Crisis on the World's Stage," *The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marc-h-morial/income-inequality_b_4688614.html?ir=Australia, accessed July 25, 2015.

²⁹ Ben Leubsdorf. 2014. Fed: Gap Between Rich, Poor Americans Widened During Recovery. *The Wall Street Journal*, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-gap-between-rich-poor-americans-widened-during-recovery-1409853628>, accessed August 12, 2015.

³⁰ Leubsdorf 2014.

³¹ Drew Delsiver. 2014. State of the Union 2014: Where Americans Stand on Key Issues, Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/27/state-of-the-union-2014-where-americans-stand-on-key-issues/#comments>, accessed July 30, 2015.

³² Alstate/National Journal poll. 2013. <http://heartlandmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Heartland-XIX-Topline.pdf>, accessed August 20, 2015.

³³ Obama Barack. 2013. "Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility," *The White House*, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility>, accessed June 18, 2015.

³⁴ Obama Barack. 2014. "Immigration, the White House," <https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration>, accessed August 1, 2015.

growth and frequent recessions are taking place in nations with greater inequality.³³

Furthermore, illegal immigration has become such a serious problem that President Obama has to admit that America's immigration system is not working effectively. It is being broken when too many undocumented migrants are being hired, and about 11 million people are "living in the shadows."³⁴ This is detrimental to U.S. economy in particular and the United States in general. Illegal immigration has caused numerous and severe problems for the United States. It hurts American economy and strains American welfare system. It also weakens the United States' legal and national security environment as pointed in the Heritage Foundation's report: "The fact that three out of every 100 people in the United States are undocumented, or documented with faked papers represents a serious security problem. These people might not pose a direct threat to U.S. security, but the presence of millions of undocumented workers led to distortion of the law, distraction of resources, and effective creation of a cover for terrorists and criminals".³⁵

Political representation, racial problems, social security, and unemployment can also be added to this list of U.S. domestic problems. All of these domestic problems are interconnected and have a domino effect. In order to handle the widening rich and poor gap, it is crucial for the American government to develop an educational system which is affordable for everyone. An unaffordable education is closely associated with other social problems such as inequality, social security, and unemployment which have been worsened by illegal immigration. Indeed, U.S. domestic problems, from socio-economics to politics, could potentially impact its hegemonic position in the world.

It is miserable not to realize the problems to deal with. It is even more miserable to realize the problems facing us but fail to deal with them. Although

³⁵ Tim Kane and Kird Johnson. 2006. "The Real Problem with Immigration... and the Real Solution," *The Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/03/the-real-problem-with-immigration-and-the-real-solution>, accessed June 29, 2015.

it is important to take into account the rise of the rest of the globe, the possibilities of a massive military attacks on American soil and a collapse of American economy, the United States is unable to achieve anything without a strong domestic base, and currently that base has been shaken by U.S. domestic problems. Apparently, the United States should spend more time and energy to solve these problems.

The Future of American Hegemony

The existing reality of American dominance in the international system has undoubtedly reflected successive American administrations' efforts to scope out challenges to American power and handle them. Yet, the twenty-first century has already proved different. The Bush administration and Obama administration have struggled with the war on terrorism, economic crisis, global anti-Americanism and military adventures "that the United States found easy to start, impossible to win, and extremely difficult to end."³⁶ Especially, in the current information age technological advances have empowered a broader range of actors. This means that state actors, or national governments are no longer the only players in the world affairs. Non-state actors ranging from individuals, private organizations, corporations, non-governmental organizations to criminal, or terrorist groups have had the instruments and power to directly influence the world affairs. That non-state actors have been empowered to have a direct role in the world affairs is defined by Joseph Nye as the diffusion of power.³⁷ This global trend certainly undermines American ability as a state actor and a superpower to shape the world events to American advantages.

³⁶ Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama*, (New York: Knopf, 2014), 4.

³⁷ Joseph Nye. 2011. *Two Power Shifts Occurring This Century: Power Transition and Power Diffusion*, <http://www.praguepost.cz/opinion/7539-two-power-shifts-occurring-this-century:-power-transition-and-power-diffusion.html>, accessed August 15, 2015.

³⁸ William Martel, *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

The duration of American hegemony depends on how able American governments are to manage the challenges to its power and its legitimate control over the world system. It is suggested in Martel's 2015 book entitled "Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy" that over the course of 200 years, American power has been built on three major principles: The first one is to establish American domestic power (political, military and economic), the second one is to restrain the sources of disorder and disruption in the international system, and the third one is to build alliances and partnerships. Among these principles, the very first one, building a formidable domestic power is arguably crucial to prolonging American hegemony.³⁸ The fundamental logic is that only with unrivalled political, military and economic power can the United States forge alliances and partnerships as well as prevent the sources of disruption in the world order. No nation, with weak domestic power which means lack of political, military and economic resources, can obtain regional and global influence. If American hegemony does wither it is be due to American failure to maintain its strong domestic foundations.

The United States still has much more power than any other state in the international system, at present and for the foreseeable future. Yet, the world is not entirely static. Thus, the United States needs to see clearly the threats to its global preponderance. To "know your enemy" has always proven sound advice. The United States should not only focus its formidable resources on exaggerated threats like the rise of the rest of the globe, the possibilities of a massive military attack on American soil and a collapse of American economy. These undeniably represent challenges to American hegemony; however, they can be controlled by American economic, military and institutional power. The very real threats to American hegemony are right at home: psychological and domestic problems. In the face of such challenges and the global trend of power diffusion, hopes and confidence in its traditional narratives of liberty, human dignity and freedom seem insufficient for the United States to sustain its

hegemony. As the world entered the new millennium, the United States would have to realize the imminent challenges to its hegemony; this realization would help it avoid miscalculation and mismanagement in the world politics. It is certain that challenges to American hegemony would change from time to time and require new policy responses. Smart policy responses are really what the United States must work out to first reinforce its domestic foundations (economic, political, social, cultural and military) and then deal with the aspirations of the emerging powers as well as adjust to the diffusion of power in the current international system. At present and in the foreseeable future, the world remains rapidly changing; new global trends and global challenges will emerge. Implicitly, American global leadership would be tested. In the near future, the United States will still be a hegemon partly because of the fact that no nation will be able to surpass it in material capacity and no nation, or a group of nation is willing, or able to undertake the global responsibilities at the costs and the risks that the United States has assumed by the end of the Second World War. The answer to the question “how long will American hegemony endure?” seems to never be adequate because the question posed itself is not a right one to ask. The right question here would be what American leaders can do to manage the challenges to U.S. global leadership and statesmanship? From the foregoing analysis, some recommendations are made for the United States to sustain its pre-eminence.

Do homework. Like any other nation in the international system, the United States has its own domestic problems as analyzed above. The United States needs to identify clearly its basic internal problems and examine strategies to solve these problems. Dealing effectively with the thorny domestic problems will reinforce not only domestic base at home but also American credibility abroad.

Strengthen domestic confidence. Maintaining that the United States is declining causes psychological problems such as overreaction and retrenchment. Overreacting to, or partially isolating from what is happening around the United States are detrimental to its hegemonic status. Building self-confidence in not only the American policy making circle but also the American public is critically important to sustaining American hegemony. The Roman Empire was overthrown because of its own internal problems not because of an oversea challenger. The historical lesson from the collapse of the Roman Empire is that a superpower could be rotten from within itself when its institutions are malfunctioned, its administration is inefficient, and its public and elite confidence in government dropped. Domestic discontent and nasty politics could undermine the economic, social and political foundations of American power.

Prepare for the future. As the world is not a static place, the United States needs to assess the past and the present constantly to decide what developments it wants to see in the future. The United States must invest time and energy in the future to ensure that the future changes will be in American favor. The United States should not start a military campaign such as the Iraq war without thorough consideration into its future strategies for nation-building and regional stabilization. The United States must outline concrete scenarios of its intervention and engagement in order to achieve its desired goals and handle effectively the unintended consequences. Naturally, it is hard to predict the future as no one knows exactly what will occur tomorrow, but everyone knows that preparation for the future has always proven necessary to reduce the possibilities of failure and increase the chances of success.

Accept the burden of regional and global responsibilities. To sustain its hegemony, the hegemon has to assume certain regional and global responsibilities. This enables it to lead the world in the direction that advances

its strategic interests. Preparing itself materially and mentally to shoulder the burden of global leadership is vital to the United States. Yet, the United States has to be aware that “leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.”³⁹ It, therefore, has to develop an appropriate strategy to avoid this trap. Accepting the burden of regional and global responsibility also leads the U.S. government to sometimes intervene in the other nations’ internal affairs, but it does not imply that the United States will involve in the business of invasion and occupation. Joseph Nye has made it clear that:

In an age of nationalism and socially mobilized populations, foreign occupation is bound to breed resentment. Eisenhower wisely reached that conclusions in the 1950s, but what takes its place? Using force, but with limits, is an answer, but, particularly in the Middle East where revolutions may last another generation, smart application of force will be essential. Seen in a longer perspective, a Kennan-like policy of containment may have more promise than efforts to occupy and control.⁴⁰

Apart from that, accepting the burden of regional and global responsibilities means that the United States has an active role to play in establishing and strengthening institutions, building networks, and making policies for dealing with such new transnational issues as financial crisis, cyber security, terrorism, pandemics, climate change which cannot be solved with military power but with networks of cooperation. In the current world, no single country, a group of countries, or a coalition is able, or willing to take the risks and costs of global responsibilities. The global leadership assumed by the United States, the most powerful nation in the international system, is vital to providing global public goods. Taking the lead in the world will give the United States the power to influence the world affairs in favor of American interests.

³⁹ Layne Christopher. 2009. *The Waning of US Hegemony, Myth or Reality?*, <http://www.rochelleterman.com/ir/sites/default/files/Layne2009.pdf>, (accessed July 27, 2015).

⁴⁰ Joseph Nye, *Is American Century Over*, (California: Polity, 2015).

Reinforce smart power. Smart power is a combination of hard and soft power. It allows the United States to retain its credibility and legitimacy in the international system and to have a leading role in international institutional reforms. Military force continues to be of great significance to sustaining American pre-eminence. This means that it is vital for the United States to invest in military technology and maintain its cutting-edge level in this field. Yet, Nye warned that military force is “a blunt instrument”, and equating leadership with unilateral military action is a mistake.⁴¹ He added that those who stressed the significance of U.S. military presence to the politico-economic success of Europe, Japan, and South Korea ignore the fact that U.S. military are welcome because there was an apparent external threat and even then it took over 30 years for democracy to be established in Korea.⁴² In the current international environment, with the emergence of new powers and new transnational issues, American leaders must not see military force as the main instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals and advance its strategic interests. Robert Zoellick, the former World Bank president, pointed out that, there are at present chances for the United States to harmonise the world with U.S. interests in way which does not require using U.S. troops.⁴³ This is to underline the increasing importance of soft power in American foreign policy agenda. Soft power is understood as the ability to get what you desire to have “through attraction rather than coercion, or payment.”⁴⁴ It is also viewed as the ability to influence others through “the co-optive means” of agenda setting, persuasion and elicitation of positive attraction to achieve desired outcomes.⁴⁵ Arguably, soft power presents a significant component of American power. Increasing the attractiveness of American values (namely human dignity,

⁴¹ Nye 2015, 123.

⁴² Nye 2015, 124.

⁴³ Robert Zoellick. 2014. A Presidency of Missed Opportunities. *Wall Street Journal*, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/24471/presidency_of_missed_opportunities.html?breadcrumb=%2Ftopic%2F168%2Feconomics_of_national_security, accessed August 13, 2015.

⁴⁴ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), x.

⁴⁵ Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 8-9.

democracy and freedom and expanding American culture, education) continues to wield influence for the United States in the world politics. In other words, it is the overwhelming smart power that allows the United States to influence the course of events in the world politics. If the United States is unable to maintain the superiority of its hard power and the attractiveness of its soft power, its hegemonic position will certainly be shaken.

Consolidate alliances and partnerships. The duration of the U.S. pre-eminence is substantially dependent on its alliances and partnerships. It is true that the United States has performed and will perform the best when it can surround itself with friends. It is the friendly states that give the United States larger markets and improve burden-sharing. The time that the United States could live in real isolation ended long ago; what the United States has to acknowledge is that working with others to secure stability and to advance prosperity will contribute to reinforcing its hegemonic position in the world.

Martel observed that the United States must intensify alliances and partnerships, both old and new, to address global challenges “with a sense of shared responsibility among nations.”⁴⁶ American leadership has to accept the reality that U.S. resources were finite and the United States is no longer able to do everything and to go everywhere all of the time for the rest of the world.⁴⁷ The United States was willing to take global responsibilities for many years from winning in the First World War, and the Cold War to enhancing security against terrorism after 9/11. However, in the context of national economic difficulty, the United States should ask for a fairer share of burden from its allies and partners.

⁴⁶ William Martel, *Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 359.

⁴⁷ Martel 2015, 359.

⁴⁸ Joseph Nye, *Is American Century Over*, (California: Polity, 2015).

CONCLUSION

At the present time and in the foreseeable future, American “absolute decline⁴⁸” is still a myth. Salvatore Babones’ recently published article, “American Hegemony is Here to Stay,” strongly confirms this most salient feature of the modern world system: American hegemony is “as firm as, or firmer as it has been,” and will continue to be so for many years to come.⁴⁹ Yet, if American leaders, policy makers and analysts continue to focus national resources on the exaggerated threats without recognizing the very real threats to American hegemony, they could easily end up making the myth a reality. Too many scholars over the past years have talked of the rise of new powers, the possibilities of a massive attack on the United States and a comprehensive collapse of American economy while ignoring the self-evident fact that the United States has absolutely military, economic and institutional advantages over any other country in the world. These therefore are hardly the imminent threats to American hegemony. The imminent ones are internal including its psychological and domestic problems. The future of American hegemony depends on how able American leadership is to scope out the imminent challenges to its power and to formulate appropriate policy responses to such challenges.

Much attention is lavished on exaggerated threats to American hegemony, often with historical rise and fall of Rome and Britain. The smart leaders in the American government have to know that the contemporary international environment is totally different from those in the Roman and British eras, and that American hegemonic position sustained by not only its overwhelming material might, but also by its superior soft power. Especially, the international institutions that the United States have led and the international network of alliances and partnerships that the United States have

⁴⁹ Salvatore Babones. 2015. “American Hegemony is Here to Stay,” *National Interests*, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089?page=2>, accessed July 22, 2015.

maintained have underpinned the world's relative stability and prosperity. This gives the United States the advantages over the other states in the world system. Henceforth, the rise of the rest of the globe, including China and India, the possibilities of a massive military attack on American soil and a collapse of American economy are not the real threats to American hegemony. In a world in which power is diffusing and interference is increasing, American leadership has to focus on dealing with its domestic problems and psychological problems (overreaction and neo-isolation). The combination of suggested policy responses, (do homework, strengthen domestic confidence, prepare for the future, accept the burden of regional and global responsibilities, reinforce smart power and consolidating alliances and partnerships), should be taken into consideration to deal with the challenges to American power and ultimately to endure American hegemony.

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