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Paweł Paszak

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Chinese investment policy in Europe between 2011 and 2017 Challenges and threats to the security of European Union countries

Abstract

This paper aims to assess the impact of Chinese investments between 2011 and 2017 on the level of economic and political security of EU member countries. The size, structure and geographical concentration of the investments were subjected to an examination. In order to explain its underlying motivations and objectives, the author investigates the Chinese government's strategies, links between the private sector and authorities as well as selected transactions. The results of the study indicate that Chinese investments, despite possible short-term benefits, in the long-term perspective lead to the weakening of the EU's economic power and pose a challenge to political security. Technology transfer and the lack of reciprocity in the treatment of investors undermine the competitiveness of European economies and limit their development opportunities. Investments give Chinese companies access to strategic infrastructure and technologies that can be used by authorities to pursue their agenda. The expanding economic influences can also serve as an instrument of pressure on individual states to shape decision-making processes within the EU.

Key words: China, European Union, foreign direct investment, economic security, political security

Introduction

From the beginning of the 21st century, the gradual process of strengthening economic relations between China and the European Union has led to the creation of strong interdependence links. The Union has become the essential goods market for China as well as a vital source of capital, financial services and technology. However, since 2011 Chinese investments in the EU have surged to unprecedented levels. This historical shift aroused concerns among European governments and the public opinion about the potential security implications. In September 2017 the European Commission presented a draft of new screening mechanism designed to better address potential risks associated with investments in strategic assets. This development has been accompanied by the heated discussion about the increased presence of Chinese capital in Europe and its consequences. On the one hand, during the world financial crisis, many cash troubled European companies on the verge of bankruptcy were bailed out by Chinese investors. On the other hand, it has been argued that a rapid influx of capital from China comes with strings attached and can bring negative political and economic consequences. The article aims to examine the effects of increased investment activity of Chinese companies in the European Union on the level of economic and political security of its member countries. The period of 2011-2017 will be subjected to the study, as it has been marked by the unparalleled growth of capital inflow from China. An accurate diagnosis is crucial as it may determine the Union's power and security in the coming future. By its very essence, the state of security is impossible to measure therefore the threat

perception becomes of paramount importance¹ An erroneous assessment of objective reality (states of obsession or false security in the typology of Daniel Frei)² poses a real threat to the national security. Therefore, it is necessary to settle whether Chinese investments lead to improvement of development opportunities or rather pose a security challenge. Intending to resolve this issue, the author will examine the structure, size and geographical dispersion of the investments. This paper also attempts to identify underlying motivations by exploring Chinese national policies and selected transactions. Finally, based on acquired knowledge, impact on economic and political security of the EU will be assessed. This paper employs the concept of sectoral security advanced by Barry Buzan, Olle Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, which divides security into five sectors (military, economic, political, social, environmental)³. This approach helps to recognise risks and threats specific to each of the sectors and to precisely indicate its reference object (state, economy, the sovereignty of the decision-making process, political identity, values). A narrow, traditional approach limiting security issues to military threats in the case of investment analysis is only of limited use. Likewise, if we want to assess Chinese authorities' ability to influence the decision-making process in the EU, a traditional definition of security will prove ineffective. The dynamic growth of Chinese investment in the EU attracted

¹ J. Pawłowski, J. Marczak, K. Gąsiorek, *Definiowanie bezpieczeństwa narodowego (państwa)* [w:] J. Pawłowski (red.), *Podstawy bezpieczeństwa narodowego (państwa)*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Sztuki Wojennej: Warszawa, 2017, p. 32-33.

² J. Stańczyk, *Współczesne pojmowanie bezpieczeństwa*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN: Warszawa, 1996, p 17.

³ B. Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A new framework for analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1998.

considerable attention among scientific institutions, private analytical companies and think-tanks. Both in Poland⁴

⁴ A. Gwiżdża, *Globalna ekspansja gospodarcza Chin*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego: Bydgoszcz, 2013; *Współpraca inwestycyjna Chin kontynentalnych z zagranicą*, L. Pałys (red.), Instytut Badań Rynku, Konsumpcji i Koniunktur: Warszawa, 2014; Ł. Zamecki, P. Borkowski, A. Wróbel, *Wewnętrzne uwarunkowania aktywności międzynarodowej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej i jej relacje z Unią Europejską*, Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Uniwersytet Warszawski: Warszawa, 2013; Ł. Zamecki, P. Borkowski, *Relacje Unia Europejska- Chińska Republika Ludowa: uwarunkowania wewnętrzne i międzynarodowe*, Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych: Warszawa, 2011; *Unia Europejska -Chiny: dziś i w przyszłości*, red. Józef M. Fiszer, Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk: Warszawa, 2016; T. Kamiński, *Sypiając ze smokiem: Polityka Unii Europejskiej wobec Chin*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego: Łódź, 2015; R. Koszek, *Przejęcia europejskich firm jako przykłady chińskich inwestycji bezpośrednich*, „Prace Komisji Geografii Przemysłu Polskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego”, Tom. 31, Numer 4 (2017) p. 133-147; Idem, *Kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej wobec ekspansji chińskiej gospodarki*, „Prace Komisji Geografii Przemysłu Polskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego”, Tom. 30, Nr 1 (2016), p. 176-191; K. Bąkowska, *Próba zwiększenia kontroli napływu do Unii Europejskiej bezpośrednich inwestycji z zagranicy z krajów trzecich*, „Unia Europejska”, Numer 4 (2017); J. Sulmicki, *Przechodzenie Chin od portfelowych do bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Vistula”, Nr 34 (2014), p. 38-51; K. Koziół-Nadolna, *Uwarunkowania internacjonalizacji działalności badawczo-rozwojowej na przykładzie Chin*, „Studia i Prace WNEIZ US”, Tom 41, Nr 31 p. 119-130. M. Kaczmarski, *Niezbędny partner drugoplanowy. Europa w polityce Chin w okresie rządów Xi Jinpinga*, „Prace OSW”, Nr 56, Warszawa, 2016; J. Jakubowski, M. Kaczmarski, *Nietrafiona oferta Pekinu: „16+1” a chińska polityka wobec Unii Europejskiej*, „Komentarze OSW”, Nr 250(2017); J. Jakubowski, M. Kaczmarski, *Chińskie zagraniczne inwestycje bezpośrednie w ramach „16+1”: strategia, instytucje, rezultaty*, „Komentarze OSW”, Nr 191 (2015); A. Gradziuk, D. Wnukowski, *Rocky Road to a Level Playing Field in EU-China Investment and Trade Relations*, PISM Policy Paper, No. 8 (91), April 2014.

and abroad⁵ it resulted in numerous publications exploring different aspects of this new phenomenon. Sophie Meunier's works⁶ are of particular value as they address main features of Chinese investments in Europe, the effects they can bring on host states and their reception by the public. Meunier in her articles points to the increasingly cautious and sceptical attitude of governments and societies towards investors from China. Alongside the challenges and threats, her works show the potential benefits that Chinese capital can bring to the EU. Wiebke Rabe and Olivia Gippner⁷ also discussed the perception of Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure. In their article, they showed that investments from China in the UK and Germany began to be perceived through the prism of a potential threat to the security, prompting the governments to opt for new investment regulations. Research

⁵ P. Le Corre, *China's offensive in Europe*, Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2016; S. Rein, *The war for China's wallet : profiting from the new world order*, Berlin: De Gruyter Press, 2018; J.-P. Koch, *Chancen und Risiken von chinesischen Direktinvestitionen. Steuert Deutschland in eine Abhängigkeit von China?* München, GRIN Verlag, 2017. D. Jolly, B. Belloc, *Investissements chinois sortant de Chine : quelles en sont les motivations?* „Annales des Mines – Gerer of Comprendre”, Vol. 2, No. 124 (2016), p. 5-13. Ch. Fisch, J. Block, Ph. Sandner, *The impact of acquisitions on Chinese acquirers' innovation performance: an empirical investigation of 1545 Chinese acquisitions*, „Journal of Bussiness Economics”, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-018-0905-0>, (accessed: August 2018); F. Spigarelli, *Ping Lu, Chinese FDI in the EU: learning from the renewable energy sector*, „Columbia FDI Perspectives”, No. 179 (August 2016).

⁶ S. Meunier, B. Burgoon, W. Jacoby, *The politics of hosting Chinese investment in Europe- an introduction*, „Asia Europe Journal”, Vol. 12, No.1-2, 2016, p. 109–126; S. Meunier, *A Faustian bargain or just a good bargain? Chinese foreign direct investment and politics in Europe*, „Asia Europe Journal”, Vol. 12, No.1-2, 2016, p. 143–158.

⁷ W. Rabe, O. Gippner, *Perceptions of China's outward foreign direct investment in European critical infrastructure and strategic industries*, „International Politics”, Vol.54, No. 4, 2017, p. 468–486.

and analyses published by the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies and Rhodium Group⁸ provide another valuable source of information and allow to track quantitative and qualitative trends of investments. Research conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations⁹ offers valuable insights into relations between the European Union and the People's Republic of China. An evident scepticism towards Chinese activities in Europe and an inclination to perceive them as a challenge/threat to security is a common thread of these works. In the first section, the author will present the Chinese economic expansion in the world since the global financial crisis and the main features of FDI in Europe. In the second section, key motivations and determinants of Chinese investment activity in the EU will be discussed. In the third part, selected case studies of investments will serve as a starting point for a reflection on the impact of capital inflow from China on the economic and political security of the EU.

Chinese investment expansion in the world and European Union

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 has become a symbol of an ongoing shift in the global balance of power, so far based on the indisputable advantage of the United States and its allies. The crisis has initiated a new stage characterised by the growing role of rising powers, among which China plays an incomparably most substantial role. The economic meltdown

⁸ T. Hanneman, M. Huottari, *Record Flows and Growing Imbalances. Chinese Investments in Europe 2016*, MERICS Papers on China, No.3, January 2017; T. Hanneman, M. Huottari, *Chinese FDI in Europe in 2017. Rapid Recovery after initial slowdown*, MERICS.

⁹ F. Godement A. Vasselier, *China at the gates*, European Council on Foreign Relations, London 2017.

of 2007 in the first place affected the US market, and within a year other developed economies were locked in recession. The collapse of the financial markets resulted not only in an apparent decline in demand but also in the volume of investments directed to developing countries. While western economies have limited the number of direct investments, in China a reverse trend has become apparent. In 2007, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade¹⁰, the value of direct investment from China stood at \$26.5 billion. For comparison, in the same year entrepreneurs from the United States invested \$393,5 billion abroad¹¹. It illustrates a substantial asymmetry between the position of China and the USA in the investment market at that time. However, over the next years, the growing economic power of the Chinese economy, favourable international environment and government strategies have contributed to a gradual increase in the outflow of capital from China. During the 2007-2017 period, Chinese investors' share in global investment market expanded from 1.21% in 2007 (\$26.5 billion) to 12.61% in 2016 (\$183.1 billion). In 2007, the difference amounted to \$367 billion in favour of the US, but in less than a decade it fell to \$115.903 billion¹². As seen above, even though the gap between China and the US in the area of FDI remains substantial, it has also been significantly reduced. Shifting balance of power can also be observed in continual decline of OECD's share in global GDP (calculated as purchasing power parity). In 2008, its share dropped below 50% for the first time since

¹⁰ *Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016*, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740>.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Ibidem*.

the establishment of the organisation (in 1990, this ratio for OECD countries stood at 63.68%, in 2018 it fell to 40.75%)¹³. During 2008 while developed economies struggled with financial breakdown, China celebrated the summer Olympics and surpassing Japan's as the second largest economy in the world. In the subsequent years, the European debt crisis and the political failures in Georgia, Ukraine and the Middle East reinforced the Chinese in their belief that the western dominance on the global stage is coming to an end. At least since 2002, the authorities have been perceiving the international situation as the "window of strategic opportunities". It is defined as an unprecedented advantageous international situation allowing China to safely pursue domestic development and the status of a global superpower¹⁴. This perception of the international environment by the Chinese authorities is closely related to the activities of private and state-owned enterprises in the EU investment market. The global financial crisis and Eurozone crisis forced many underinvested companies to sell their shares in order to avoid bankruptcy. Chinese investors prompted by the government decided to seize this opportunity and strengthen their position in the global market. As early as 2010, the value of Chinese FDI in the EU stood at €1.6 billion. Over the next three years (2011, 2012 and 2013) the influx of capital from China tripled rising to €6-8 billion. However, the breakthrough came in 2014 when the inflow of Chinese capital into the EU amounted

¹³ *IMF Data Mapper*, International Monetary Fund, <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEO-WORLD>, Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016.

¹⁴ E.S. Madeiros, *China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification*, RAND Project Air Force, Santa Monica: 2009, xvi-xvii.

to €14 billion. The following years - 2015 and 2016 – have witnessed a further intensification of investments, reaching respectively: €20 and €35 billion¹⁵. The first slight decrease in the value of investments took place in 2017 when it dropped to €28.5 billion¹⁶, yet still a significant number. The presented figures illustrate that Chinese enterprises have firmly established themselves as important actors on the European market. However, to fully understand the ongoing process it is necessary to take a closer look at the qualitative features of the phenomenon. The structure of Chinese investments is dominated by M&A (mergers and acquisitions) which constitute a large majority of all transactions ranging from 86 to 95%¹⁷. What is more, as much as one-third of the capital invested goes to companies from the high-tech sector which are the main drivers of research and development activities¹⁸. Renewable energy, ICT, transport and infrastructure, areas defined as “critical” or “strategic” also play a considerable role in the structure of investments. Alongside the structural trends, geographical distribution of capital is another important aspect of investments. Chinese FDI focus on the largest and most advanced economies in the EU: Germany, UK and France. In the 2011-2016 they accounted for more than a half of total investment value on average

¹⁵ T. Hanneman, M. Huottari, *Record Flows and Growing Imbalances. Chinese Investments in Europe 2016*, MERICS Papers on China, No.3, January 2017, p 5.

¹⁶ T. Hanneman, M. Huottari, *Chinese FDI in Europe in 2017. Rapid Recovery after initial slowdown*, MERICS, <https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinese-fdi-in-europe> Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016, (accessed: August 2018).

¹⁷ J. Hellström, *China's Acquisitions in Europe: European Perceptions of Chinese Investments and their Strategic Implication*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI-R—4384—SE, December 2016, p. 13.

¹⁸ T. Hanneman, M. Huottari, *Record...*, p. 5.

(54,3%). If Italy is included in the estimation, the percentage will rise even further. High concentration of Chinese investments in leading economies becomes even more striking in comparison with the new EU members. In 2016 the collective value of cumulated investments in V4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), Romania and Bulgaria (€4,83 billion) was still significantly lower than in each of the biggest EU economies (France €11,46 billion, Germany €18,82 billion, Italy €12,84 billion, United Kingdom €23,63 billion)¹⁹. While these economies have to be regarded as the main target due to their technological advantage, Chinese investors will allocate their resources wherever they can acquire valuable assets. Takeovers of Swedish Volvo, Finnish Supercell, Hungarian BorsdomChem or various ports and container terminals in Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Greece provide examples of a typical asset-seeking FDI. So far greenfield investments constitute only a small share of all transactions, failing to meet expectations of Central-Eastern European Countries participating in “16+1” format. Likewise, Belt and Road Initiative hailed as the New Silk Road and the greatest investment endeavour since Marshall Plan has not lived up to its promises²⁰.

Motivations

The key to explaining the new dynamics of Chinese investments in the EU lies in identifying the primary motivations

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 10.

²⁰ K. Iwanek, O. Pietrewicz (red.), *Chiński projekt „Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku”. Retoryka a rzeczywistość*, Raport Ośrodka Badań Azji Centrum Badań nad Bezpieczeństwem Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, sierpień 2017.

of Chinese authorities and entrepreneurs. Yanting Wang and Lin Zhao²¹ point to a shift that has taken place in China's investment policy in recent years. In the first decade of the 21st century, Chinese FDI was predominantly motivated by investors' interest in accessing and exploiting natural resources²². In recent years, however, a new trend has emerged as investors started to change their targets in favour of high-value-added sectors²³. These changes have to be attributed to a complex interplay of internal and external factors, among which the most prominent role is played by the following: 1) striving to acquire knowledge and advanced technologies that will facilitate the modernisation of the Chinese economy and help it withstand internal and external pressures 2) the desire to improve and stabilise access to strategic markets by taking over companies with an established position and a reputable brand. 3) national strategies pursuing a technological advantage in strategic sectors, which will enable China to achieve the status of military and economic superpower. As shown in the previous section, the structure of Chinese FDI is dominated by M&A which leads to faster diffusion of technology and knowledge between developed European economies and China. Wang and Zhao further claim that investments serve as a useful tool for technological advance and enhancing operations of the investor in other markets²⁴. Presented motivations fit into the narrative of "Made in China

²¹ Y. Wang, L. Zhao, *Outward Foreign Direct Investment from China: Recent Trend and Development*, „The Chinese Economy”, No. 50, 2017, p. 359.

²² P.J. Buckley, J. Clegg, A.R. Cross, Xin Liu, Hinrich Voss, Ping Zheng, *The determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment*, „Journal of International Business Studies”, No. 38, Vol. 4, p. 504.

²³ Ibidem, p. 359.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 356.

“2025” strategy²⁵ adopted by the China Communist Party in 2013 and are congruous with the goals of the 5-year development plan for 2016-2020²⁶. Analysts believe that these policies pose a serious challenge for western economies since they aim to eliminate foreign technologies and replace them with those offered by local manufacturers. According to the strategy, the share of domestic components in total industrial production is expected to reach 70% by 2025²⁷. It also plans to boost the competitiveness of Chinese producers by increasing innovation in ten sectors designated as strategic. These include information technologies, robotics and automation, aviation, railway, shipbuilding industries as well as new energy vehicles and renewable energy. The ultimate goal is the transition away from labour-intensive industries, climb up the value-added chain and avoid being trapped in a so-called middle-income trap. If these plans succeed, China will become a “manufacturing superpower”, and export-driven economies in Europe will have to face tighter competition. Risks arise not only in the economic sphere, as acquisitions of high-tech enterprises can strengthen China’s military capabilities and contribute to the evolution of military power balance. Given the low standards of intellectual property

²⁵ *Made in China 2025*, State Council, July 7, 2015, <http://www.citadellascienza.it/cina/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IoT-ONE-Made-in-China-2025.pdf>, Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016.

²⁶ *The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of The People’s Republic of China*, Central Compilation & Translation Press, <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policyrelease/201612/P020161207645766966662.pdf>.

²⁷ J. Wübbecke, M. Meissner, M. J. Zenglein, J. Ives, B. Conrad, *Made in China 2025. The making of a high-tech superpower and consequences for industrial countries*. MERICS Papers on China, No. 2 December 2016.

rights protection in China²⁸, the tradition of industrial espionage²⁹, and the far reaching CCP's influence, it is justified to assume that at least some of the civilian technologies can be adopted for military purposes. In particular, this applies to software, nevertheless, other technological advances in the aviation, shipbuilding or nuclear industries can be adapted for similar use. What's more, access to telecom and energy networks opens the way to their infiltration and increases the risk of an attack on government websites and data of individuals and institutions. This significantly increases the power projection capabilities of PLA in cyberspace, which implies a decrease in the military, economic and political security of EU countries. The presented process should be seen as part of the broader strategy of the Chinese government seeking to weaken the United States and its allies and regain its 'rightful' place in the international system.

Chinese investments in Europe and their impact on the economic and political security of EU countries

In the 2011-2017 period, Chinese FDI in the high-tech industry has gained a strong momentum attracting substantial attention of politicians, academia and the public. During the coming years, numerous iconic European brands have become the property of Chinese investors. At the turn of 2010

²⁸ *Report on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries*, European Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, 21.2.2018 SWD (2018) 47; http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/march/tradoc_156634.pdf, Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016,.

²⁹ M. Hjortdal, *China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence*, „Journal of Strategic Security”, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2011), p. 1-24.

and 2011, the Swedish car manufacturer Volvo was sold to the Geely group for \$1.8 billion. In January 2011, for the sum of \$5 billion, Midea took over the leading producer of industrial robots - German Kuka AG. In 2015, a similar fate was met by the Italian tire manufacturer Pirelli, which became the property of the ChemChina as a result of the transaction worth €7.1 billion. In 2016, the Finnish game producer Supercell passed into the hands of the Chinese Tencent Holdings for \$8.6 billion. Attention was also drawn to the acquisition of 49% shares in the British Global Switch for £2.5 billion - the most significant European company dealing with data storage. In 2017, Swiss Syngenta AG, the global leader in the production of pesticides was sold for \$43 billion. The investments presented above do not exhaust the list of acquisitions, at the same time, smaller investments in innovative enterprises located in strategic sectors or market niches have been carried out. The observed phenomenon poses a potential threat to the power of EU countries on multiple levels. Firstly, it leads to the weakening of competitive advantage held by European companies. For China, the transfer of technology and building research and development capabilities constitute top priorities. To ensure that the investment relations work in favour of the Chinese economy, market restrictions and non-tariff barriers are kept in place by the government. The EU investment market is relatively open not only when compared with Chinese but also in comparison with American or Japanese ones. Without these favourable conditions, the investment expansion of Chinese enterprises would not be possible at such a rapid rate. This asymmetry in the treatment of investors leads to one-sided transfer of technology, which fundamentally differs relations with China from the relations between the EU and other economic

powers. That is why EU institutions have vastly increased their efforts to ensure a level playing field for European entrepreneurs. The report of the European Commission points out that “EU enterprises face numerous and permanent barriers in China, including requirements for joint venture investments, restrictions on market entry, the need to transfer technology or meet unjustified technical requirements”³⁰. So far attempts made by the EU have been mostly ignored by Chinese authorities, however, if they hope to finalise the ongoing negotiations on Comprehensive Agreement of Investment, an adjustment of their stance will be necessary. Statistics show that in the last few years EU FDI in China have experienced a steep decline. In 2013, investors from the member states invested in China over €21 billion, however, in 2015 and 2016 these values plunged to €6 billion, which illustrates a clear downward trend³¹.

The potential weakening of the EU’s economic power is just one of many security threats that investment from the Middle Kingdom may create. Another dimension of threats is associated with the overwhelming influence of the Chinese authorities on the behaviour of domestic investors. This leads to a far-reaching integration of economic policies with military strategies. To show the mechanism of action, an example of the behaviour of Chinese entities towards the Italian manufacturer of luxury yachts, the company Ferretti, will be used. In 2012, state-owned Shandong Heavy Industry Group

³⁰ *Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Trade and Investment barriers*, 1 January-31 December 2016, European Commission, p. 17.

³¹ *EU-China Economic Relations*, Eurostat, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20170601-1?inheritRedirect=true>, *Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016*.

acquired the controlling interest in Ferretti for €0.5 billion. Soon after the completion of the deal the new management of the Company decided to expand its business into military boats segment and created a new department - Ferretti Security and Defence. The new direction of Ferretti's activities soon gained a strong momentum as the company announced plans to partner military giants as Finmeccanica, Saab and Thales in building a range of naval platforms. Concurrently, in February 2017 a seemingly unrelated transaction took place. China State Shipbuilding Cooperation signed an agreement with the Italian shipyard Fincantieri for the construction of passenger crafts in Shanghai, involving also transfer of technology. Simultaneously, Fincantieri has made an offer to take control of the STX port, the largest manufacturer of passenger ships in the world, responsible also for the service of the French navy units. While the negotiations about the takeover of the port by Fincantieri were being held, in Abu Dhabi, Fincantieri and Ferretti began cooperation in the production of boats for military use. The sequence of events shows how transactions with a seemingly civilian nature, conducted by proxies can serve the implementation of military goals³². It should be noted that China State Shipbuilding Cooperation is a conglomerate of 58 companies subordinated directly to the Chinese State Council, and among the units produced by the company are atomic submarines, destroyers and frigates for the People's Liberation Army. Technologies acquired as a result of civilian deals can be converted to strengthen China's military power and it may happen despite the remaining EU arms embargo. Classifying Chinese

³² F. Godement A. Vasselier, *China at the gates*, European Council on Foreign Relations, London 2017, p. 41-42.

private enterprises as economic entities par excellence is unjustified and inconsistent with their behaviour. A number of studies indicate a strong correlation between economic success and the degree of linkages between entrepreneurs and the China's Communist Party³³. Since the 1990s, the authorities have taken measures to stimulate cooperation between the private and government sectors. In consequence, many former CCP members, owing to personal connections in the Party, made quick and profitable careers³⁴. It is symptomatic that in 2017 the collective wealth of 152 delegates to National Congress, according to Hurun report³⁵, amounted to \$650 billion, more than Poland's current GDP (\$524,51 billion in 2017)³⁶. The person of Ren Zhengfei, the founder of telecom giant Huawei, provides a great example of such linkages. Before the start of his business career Zhengfei worked in a military research centre and was also a delegate to the 12th CCP's National Congress. Incorporating private enterprises and economic policies into military strategies constitutes a definite trend in Xi Jinping's administration policy. On 19th National Congress Chinese President Xi called for deepened military-civilian integration: "We must place greater focus on combat, encourage innovation, build systems,

³³ H. Li, L. Meng, Q. Wang, L. An Zhou, *Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms*, „Journal of Development Economics”, No. 87 (2007), p. 299.

³⁴ B.J. Dickson, *Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party's Embrace' of the Private Sector*, „The China Quarterly”, No. 192 (Dec., 2007), p. 827-854.

³⁵ *Hurun Report Releases China Rich List 2017 in Association with 36G*, <http://www.hurun.net/EN/Article/Details?num=5A320E03FD31>, Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016.

³⁶ *GDP (current US\$)*, The World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>.

increase efficacy and efficiency, and further military-civilian integration”³⁷. However, the convergence of economic and military policies does not exhaust the list of potential challenges to EU security. Investments in the area of energy, logistics and telecommunications infrastructure have also gained a strong momentum driven by leading SOEs (state-owned enterprises). In May 2018, China Three Gorges offered €11 billion for the purchase of a block of shares in Energias de Portugal - the largest energy supplier in Portugal. The finalisation of the agreement will mean that the Chinese company will administer a significant part of the power grid in a member state of the European Union and NATO. The example of Energias de Portugal is not an isolated case, since between 2011 and through 2017, Chinese COSCO took control of the port of Piraeus, the terminal at Zeebrugge in Belgium, the port of Valencia and obtained a 49% of shares in the Italian port of Vado. In the telecommunications sector, the growing position of the Huawei group deserves attention. In the United States and India, for national security reasons, this group was excluded from government tenders for the supply of equipment and services. In Europe, the corporation is one of the leading providers of telecom services and equipment with a market share of 15%. Its products are used by leading service providers like Vodafone, Telefónica, Deutsche Telekom or Orange. In the face of the transformation towards the 5G Internet, the so-called “internet of things”, it

³⁷ X. Jinping, *Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era*, Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China October 18, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf, p. 21.

creates a risk of interference in the control over many technical aspects of life such as intelligent buildings, energy networks, or industrial plants³⁸. Even though the awareness of potential risks and challenges is growing, the inflow of Chinese capital was welcomed by some European governments. In many cases it prevented the bankruptcy of private enterprises giving a boost to several economies struggling with financial uncertainty³⁹. In fact, Chinese investments may be associated with short-term economic benefits in the form of modernisation of industrial plants, equipment, new jobs or better market access. This has been proved by previous examples of investments not only in Europe but also in Africa or Latin America⁴⁰. At the same time, the asymmetry of benefits between China and recipients of investment as well as the growing political dependence is widely documented in the literature⁴¹. For some EU members as Portugal, Greece, Hungary, Belgium and Sweden potential benefits outweigh the risk. In the opinion of Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister, EU countries are in “harsh competition” for Chinese

³⁸ A. Rot, *Zagrożenia wynikające z implementacji koncepcji internetu rzeczy w wybranych obszarach zastosowań*, „Studia Ekonomiczne”, Nr 341 (2017) p. 331-339.

³⁹ S. Meunier, *A Faustian bargain or just a good bargain? Chinese foreign direct investment and politics in Europe*, „Asia Europe Journal”, Vol. 12, No.1-2, 2016, p. 144.

⁴⁰ C. Mlambo, A. Kushamba, *More Blessing Simawu, China-Africa Relations: What Lies Beneath?* „The Chinese Economy”, No. 49 (2016), p. 257–276.

⁴¹ H. Li, *China's growing interest in Latin America and its implications*, „Journal of Strategic Studies”, 30: 4-5 (2007), p.833-862; N. Castaneda, *New Dependency? Economic Links between China and Latin America*, „Issues & Studies”, Vol. 53, No. 01(2017); W. Nowak, *Ekspansja handlowa azjatyckich gigantów w Ameryce Łacińskiej*, „Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia” nr 3/2016 (81), p. 201–212;

capital. This intra-European rivalry can be used by Beijing to influence decision-making processes in the European Union institutions. China's relations with the EU are not free from unresolved issues, and many key agreements are still in the phase of talks. These include China's human rights record, the EU arms embargo, and the granting of market economy status. What's more, negotiations regarding the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and investments screening procedures are still under way. Such a broad spectrum of issues involving differences of interest forces Chinese diplomacy to seek allies among the EU member countries. China may deploy "divide and rule" strategy and use investments as leverage to impede progress on screening mechanism or weaken EU's stances on China human rights record and the South China Sea dispute. It does not come as a surprise that an enormous rise in Chinese FDI caused negative reactions among EU officials and politicians of some Member States⁴². In August 2017 the former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel urged EU Member countries to maintain a unified position on China and warned: "If we do not succeed for example in developing a single strategy towards China, then China will succeed in dividing Europe"⁴³. Similarly, most of the statements emphasised the risk of using the gained economic position to influence the situation inside the Union. In February 2017 French, German and Italian ministers of

⁴² *European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2015 on EU-China relations* (2015/2003(INI), European Parliament; European Commission – Press release State of the Union 2017 – Trade Package: European Commission proposes framework for screening of foreign direct investments, European Commission.

⁴³ L. Poggetti, *One China- One Europe? German Foreign Minister's Remarks Irk Beijing*, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/one-china-one-europe-german-foreign-ministers-remarks-irk-beijing/>.

economy sent a formal letter to EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström. Ministers urged the Commission to take immediate measures with the aim of protecting strategic assets⁴⁴. Due to their efforts, in September 2017 the Commission officially presented the proposal of new legislation that would establish a common European screening framework⁴⁵. As the member states remain divided in their stances towards China, there is little indication that this proposal will win a majority in the Council. In June 2017, during the European Council summit, supporters of regulations sought to take a unanimous stance on the issue. Their plans were foiled by a coalition of traditional free trade supporters and countries that benefited from Chinese investments, including Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece⁴⁶. China's growing political influence has become noticeable in relation to normative issues such as the South China Sea dispute and the human rights record. On the 12th of February 2016, the International Court of Arbitration issued a ruling unfavourable to China, dismissing their claims to the South

⁴⁴ *Proposals for ensuring an improved level playing field in trade and investment*, Berlin, Paris, Rome February 2017, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/E/eckpunktepapier-proposals-for-ensuring-an-improved-level-playing-field-in-trade-and-investment.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4.

⁴⁵ *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union*, European Commission, Brussels, 13.9.2017 COM(2017) 487 final2017/0224 (COD), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2017:487:FIN>.

⁴⁶ L. Cerulus, J. Hanke, *Enter the dragon. Chinese investment in crisis-hit countries gives Beijing influence at the European Union's toptable*, „Politico”, <https://www.politico.eu/article/china-and-the-troika-portugal-foreign-investment-screening-takeovers-europe/>, (accessed: August 2018).

China Sea as unjustified. Despite remaining a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China stated that it does not intend to respect the Court's judgement⁴⁷. It took three days for EU member states to take a stand on the issue which is of fundamental importance for European values. Ultimately, the final resolution did not directly condemn China, due to strong opposition from Hungarian and Greek governments. It is worth noting that the difficulties with adopting resolutions were caused by the states maintaining friendly relations with Beijing. A similar situation took place on the UN Commission on Human Rights in June 2017 when the Greek government blocked a resolution criticising human rights violations in China. Examples of interventions, though still limited, are a phenomenon that should be further analysed as China expands its economic and political influences in Europe. These findings suggest that as China acquires more effective instruments of pressure, it can use them to shape the EU legislative and political processes.

Conclusions

The analysis of Chinese investments in the EU indicates that their long-term consequences can be detrimental to the economic and political security of EU countries. The structure of investments is dominated by acquisitions and mergers in the high-tech, knowledge-intensive industries, energy sector and the infrastructure that forms part of the global transport

⁴⁷ *China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea*, *The State Council*, http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2016/07/13/content_281475392503075.html.

and logistics chain. While Chinese investors focus on acquiring cutting-edge technologies, their own market remains highly restricted to investors from abroad. This asymmetrical and one-sided technological transfer leads to a relative decrease in EU scientific and technical potential. To a degree, the recent surge of capital inflow into Europe has to be attributed to the strategies and development plans introduced by Chinese authorities. These policies aspire to accelerate the transformation of the Chinese economy, improve its competitiveness and ensure stable access to foreign markets. There is also a high probability that Chinese enterprises, heavily linked to the government, will be used to implement its policy objectives. Acquired dual-use technologies can be used to modernise the People's Liberation Army. More powerful Chinese army will further contribute to changes in the global balance of power to the disadvantage of the West. Investments in digital infrastructure create an additional challenge for the security, as the obtained access to telecom networks and data may facilitate attacks on management systems and government websites. The expanding economic influence equips Chinese diplomacy with instruments fitted for deepening divisions within the EU whenever it is necessary to secure Chinese *raison d'état*. The risk of exerting pressure on EU countries through economic means limits the sovereignty of the decision-making process and is equivalent to lowering the level of political security. In the future, it is necessary to conduct further research that will take into account the quantitative and structural changes of Chinese investments as well as the degree of their instrumentalization by China's Communist Party.

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Sweden and the Muslim Brotherhood – is Islamism a natural part of a multicultural society or is it a threat to our civilization?

Abstract

A historical parallel of the mood of operation by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the way the organization is operating in Europe is identified. The organization has a very pragmatic ideological view allowing it to align with the political elite in EU and countries such as Sweden. It uses multiculturalism, the fight against Islamophobia and a claim of being representative for all Muslims as the three main bases to leverage influence. The Islamism it represents must be regarded as fundamentalist because it is advocating Islam as a total system encompassing all areas of life and demanding long-term subjugation.

In Sweden individuals from Muslim Brotherhood associated groups have entered high-ranking political positions and managed to channel significant governmental funds to build schools, mosques, relief services and “educating” newly arrived immigrants and prison inmates. Due to the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to create an Islamist parallel structure it controls, and at the same time try to facilitate governmental support for these efforts and lastly due to the fact that it advances an ideological position in conflict with core Western values, it must be considered a threat to Europe and civilization as we know it.

Key words: Muslim Brotherhood, Sweden, EU, Multiculturalism, Islamophobia, Islamism, political Islam, Integration

Introduction

*"Some think, wrongly, that Islam is limited to religious, spiritual and devout practice. As for us, we consider Islam as governing the temporal as much as the spiritual"*¹ – Hassan al-Banna founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The absolute best-organized Muslim group inside Europe is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). It's not just any other group instead it was the most important player during the Arabic spring and by democratic vote conquered the Egyptian presidency. It has spread to all countries in the Islamic world and established important associated groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. The road there was long though, they started in 1928, and has since step-by-step built a vast social movement on an Islamist base and controlling an array of social institutions permeating society. The different moods of operation this group has used are ranging from paramilitary, political assassinations, educational efforts, religious functions, mutual aid societies, democratic parties, alliances with liberals and the left, street protest, to lawyer court activists. In Egypt, the military finally stepped in and put an end to the Islamization for now.

In Europe, this group has instead used its pragmatism to form an alliance with high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats in support and advancement of multiculturalism and the combat of Islamophobia. With mass-immigration and particularly Muslim immigration how to handle Islamism is a hot topic; are they allies in the integration process or are they instead enemies because their goal is an Islamist Europe?

¹ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 63

This study will connect the Muslim Brotherhood's Egyptian history with recent findings in Europe and particular Sweden. Sweden is interesting among others for being the country in Europe that most upholds multiculturalism as a positive value and has seen the fastest increase of Muslim population. The number of Muslims was estimated to 8.1%, roughly 800 000 people, in 2016.² We will later describe traces of an institutionalized Islamism in the country advanced by Muslim Brotherhood associated groups and organizations. In Poland the situation is different, estimates say that less than 0.1% of the population is Muslim.³ Although the Liga Muzułmańska/Muslim League, which was founded in 2001 and now operates at least eight cultural centers around Poland and has an active student wing on many campuses, is associated with the Muslim Brotherhoods European umbrella organization.⁴ The Muslim League is also reported to be involved in a political struggle with the Lipka Tatars, who has since the 14th century been living in Poland, over who should be invested with the representative power over Muslims living in Poland today.⁵

Hypothesis

For this study we will use a clear-cut hypothesis – Muslim Brotherhood (from now on also called “MB” or “the brotherhood”) is a long-term threat to Western societies. To prove, or possible falsify, this hypothesis we will break it down in three supporting arguments or research questions.

² Hackett, C. (2017), *News in the numbers*/ Pew Research Center

³ Hackett, C. (2017), *News in the numbers*/ Pew Research Center

⁴ <http://islam-krakow.pl/eng/2014/02/06/about-muslim-league-in-poland/>

⁵ Wiktor-Mach, D. (2008), p. 34-35

a) *For MB moderate Islamism is an opportunistic position and not a principal position:* We will investigate if MB is in fact challenging Western values as such. If their position is Islamist in a principal or fundamentalist sense (Islam as a total system) or if their moderate string is in fact pragmatic in the sense that it permanently can accept to subjugate to Western society and its values.

b) *MB is building an Islamistic parallel structure in society “the Muslim community”.* [Building and maintaining a collective identity]: We will investigate evidence that MB is in fact building an infrastructure supporting an islamistic parallel society separated from the majority culture.

c) *MB is using existing structures and ideas to protect and advance their values and their infrastructure.* [Facilitating political opportunity structures]: We will investigate if MB is using existing societal structures such as parties, the court, NGO:s etcetera to support and advance Islamistic values and an Islamistic infrastructure.

We will answer these questions using sources from Sweden and a broader literature study. The findings in Sweden are intended for a common Western understanding of the issue.

Theory and methodology

As a methodical tool organizing empiricism is used, meaning that the present situation should be understood in the light of historical events. Empirical evidence from the current investigation will thus be related to other researchers historical description of MB. The underlying theoretical framework used to formulate the hypothesis is social movement theory and the assumption that a movement’s ambition is to transform

society in accordance with its belief structure, ea. a movements historical mission. The b) and c) questions above are derived from key concepts in this field of study such as collective identity and political opportunity structures.

Disposition

This paper will start with MB's history in Egypt; from it's founding to the taking of power and ultimately losing power. Thereafter we will cover the MB network in Europe. The ideological complexity of Islamism will be addressed and the positioning of MB in that context. Next the multicultural paradigm, EU and their relationship with MB will be investigated. Then we trace Islamism in governmental structures in Sweden and cover the major MB associated organizations operating there. We will end with a discussion about our findings and relate them to our hypothesis and suggested further research.

Once upon a time in Egypt...

*"The prophet is our leader. The Quran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our greatest hope"*⁶ – The Muslim Brotherhood motto

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood starts in an Egyptian city called Ismailia. This is not an ancient city, instead, it was founded in 1863 when the Suez Canal was built and is situated halfway between Port Said and Suez. Here the channel administrative headquarter was placed and in many ways, the city signals a new and modern Egypt. In fact, the city was named after the then Egyptian ruler Ismail Pasha

⁶ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 1

know for saying “*My country is no longer in Africa; we are now part of Europe. It is therefore natural for us to abandon our former ways and to adopt a new system adapt to our social conditions.*”⁷ As a ruler, he initiated modernizing and industrializing projects in the country.

Egypt, although an autonomous province under the Ottoman Empire until 1914 when it became a British protectorate, was in practice already controlled first by France and later by the British Commonwealth. For example in Ismailia itself a British military base was established in 1882. Regardless of foreign interference the local rulers such as Ismail maintained some areas of autonomous decision-making.

It was in this city a schoolteacher named Hassan al-Banna together with a small group of workers from the Suez Canal Company in the year 1928 decides to establish “*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*”, better known as the Muslim Brotherhood. Foremost it was a social and religious society and not necessarily a political one. The practical work concentrated around local projects such as building a mosque and some school and medical facilities. Al-Banna explained the foreign and capitalist domination of the Egyptian and Muslim population with Western influence on the Muslims themselves. He held the view that the abandonment of Sharia and the Muslim way was the root cause of the state of affairs. He taught that Muslims regardless of their personal beliefs, if they do not practice Islam practically private and in their social interactions then they are comparable to infidels.⁸

A recurring theme in Islamist circles was this anti-Western thought, that offered an explanation to the current state

⁷ Scham, S. (2013), p. 313-318

⁸ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 487-489

of affairs in their home countries saying that the native elite was under Western influence and this was the reason that the Muslim population was suffering. Islamist mobilization could thus be thought of a response to Western efforts to undermine the Muslim culture and society as such.⁹ There is a debate in what regard al-Banna could be described as an Egyptian nationalist that falls a little outside this study. Clear is that he considered Egypt as the natural leader of both the Arab and Muslim worlds.¹⁰

Three years after it's founding the groups headquarter moved to Cairo and a rapid growth started. In 1938 memberships were estimated to over one hundred thousand and by 1949 it was the largest popular movement in Egypt with perhaps half a million active members. It is believed that the organization's support with money, personnel and supplies to the Arab general strike in Palestine in 1938 established it as a movement with high social capital among the general population in the Arab world.¹¹ The social goodwill it leveraged in Palestine later made it possible to establish Hamas as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Entering the political realm

The most rapid growth took place between the years 1932 and 1952, which is interesting because it was at the same time the organization faced state repression.¹² Ziad Munson argues for that circumstances such as that the control of British government over Egypt created an rather alienated

⁹ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 48-49

¹⁰ Soage, A. (2009), p. 15-16

¹¹ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 488-489

¹² Munson, Z. (2001), p. 487-488

population vis-à-vis the regime, the collapse of the previous widespread support for the nationalistic Wafd party due to its cooperation with the British during the Second World War and lastly the establishment of Israel and Jewish settlers in Palestine which create a common conception of a unified goal for Muslims (in stopping this settlement). MB rhetoric became more and more directed against the British influence leading to the first ban of the organization. However, their main activities were aimed locally and consisted of practical endeavors such as building schools, mosques, clinics and different social institutes and social aid programs.¹³

By 1941 the organization openly challenged the government and thereby ultimately British rule. The Muslim Brotherhood demanded the expulsion of all foreign troops from the country not only in speeches and propaganda as before but it now also entered the election with their own candidates for parliament. After state repression started, leaders were imprisoned and meetings were banned. But these measures by the government were relaxed rather soon probably due to the Second World War that led to a lack of focus. During these days the “*secret apparatus*” was created, this was a paramilitary group connected to the Brotherhood in charge of protecting leaders and all military endeavors. As soon as the repression relaxed the Brotherhood put in a higher gear and was considered to be at the center of the popular unrests that peaked in 1947, this in combination with the findings of large arms depots forced the authorities to ban the organization once again and jail the leadership as well. As retaliation, the organization assassinated the Egyptian prime minister. The

¹³ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 495-499

Egyptian police answered with killing MB funder Hasan al-Banna.¹⁴

The organization formed a decentralized and federative structure with semi-independent branches, facilitating a three level membership structure; assistant, related and active.¹⁵ The process to integrate an active brother is said to take around 5-8 years. The view they have on societal change is mirrored in this process of gradual integration and indoctrination,¹⁶ with increasing responsibility and commitment in each step for the individual. It is argued that this federative structure made it possible to address different societal conditions that was very diverse in Egypt depending on region such as industrialized or agrarian or different urban areas, wealth and educational levels and social strata. MB often incorporated existing social network in its social branches as a way to advance forward and the federative structure made it possible to integrate these and at the same time offer some level of autonomy.¹⁷

The federative structure also helped the organization to withstand state repression; a system was evolved where direct operational control over the national organization was invested in different provincial leadership and in the case of police activity the leadership changed to another province according to a planned random pattern. As a consequence the Muslim Brotherhood maintained a functioning organization even when the state banned them and targeted repressions to combat them. As an indicator of the success of this model, in every single branch of the organization a rally was

¹⁴ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 488-489

¹⁵ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 497-498

¹⁶ Norell, M. (2016), p. 6

¹⁷ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 497-498

organized on the same day the organizational ban was lifted in 1951.¹⁸

Nasser dictatorship and state repression

The new MB leader was no less than a former High-Court judge named Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi. He managed to keep the organization functioning although more than 4000 of its members were imprisoned and the organization was formally banned. Social unrest continued however and in 1952 a group of officers known as the "*Free Officers*" took power. They had extended links to the Muslim Brotherhood and as soon as they took power the Brotherhood was allowed to restart their political and social activities. The honeymoon was short though; in 1954 a Muslim Brother tried to murder al-Nasser, the leader of the Free Officers. The move was not popular within the officer cadre and the Muslim Brotherhood was once again banned and thousands of its members were imprisoned or exiled.¹⁹ The new leadership of officers was nationalists and wanted to modernize the state and society. In the effort of consolidation power and make their ambitious project possible they aimed at creating an all-powerful state. The early Muslim Brotherhood probably realized that they needed to take the state as such in possession if they were to have any success with their goals, hence their bold move. But as soon as they set that ambition the full power of repression was directed their way and between the years 1954 and 1974 large parts of the leadership was imprisoned and tortured.²⁰ This triggered a great flight to Europe and

¹⁸ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 497-498

¹⁹ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 489

²⁰ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 45

many from the Muslim Brotherhood moved and continued their operation in exile. We will come in to greater length of this in the next chapter.²¹ The MB social infrastructure was though intact, with schools, clinics, mosques and social aid; in fact the Nasser regime found it necessary to maintain and fund the structure because it had become an important part of the Egyptian social and economical millue and if it stopped functioning the regime feared civil unrest.²²

In 1974 the MB leadership that had been imprisoned was released. The first thing they started to do was to establish their dominance in Islamist circles. This is probably a necessary step for a successful movement when the leaders are fully focused on internal fractioning and forcefully unites organizations, networks and individuals to one powerful movement.²³ The leadership of the MB concluded on a non-confrontational strategy vis-à-vis the regime in Egypt and started the building of a counter-hegemonic culture strategy. To do this they worked both practical and ideological. They evolved a worldview for Muslims on how to think and act and they spread this worldview or ideology through social intuitions and social work. In so doing they offered a concrete example of an alternative to the current regime.²⁴

The maxim *“Let us build on what unites us and forget what divides us”* was used by MB to create powerful alliances and relationships with different secular groups, unions and so on, many socialistic or liberal leaning and even feminist.²⁵ The MB is a very patient organization, their spiritual leader

²¹ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 2

²² Munson, Z. (2011), p. 501-502

²³ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 45

²⁴ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 46

²⁵ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 47

Youssef al-Qaradawi has stated that societies are established on cultural values and that it is first when these values has been established in accordance to the organization's beliefs it is possible to discuss politics. They targeted different organizations, parties, volunteer groups and so on to use these as socializing structures to spread their ideas. To be able to do this they had to rely on more loosely connected structures of activists and not only formal members that had been an easy target for the security agencies.²⁶ Direct alliances between MB and liberal parties have not been uncommon in the Middle East. It is proposed that these parties tried to capitalize on the popular support of Islam and thereby win votes and electoral seats with these alliances. For example the liberal al-Wafd in 1984 become the largest opposition party in parliament due to entering an alliance with the MB. Because of the fact that MB representatives later demanded that the party should implement Sharia regardless of the political program of the party the cooperation broke down but a new alliance was soon formed. This time with the socialistic al-Amal party who later was completely overtaken by the MB. This new alliance was complemented with a third organization, the liberal al-Ahrar party. Together they constituted the largest opposition group in parliament.²⁷

Mubarak alliance to counter radicals

During the Mubarak rule the Muslim Brotherhood would not speak about revolution, and it appears as if a deal was struck with the regime. Mubarak accepted the MB presence

²⁶ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 48-49

²⁷ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 50

in society although restricted from direct politics and in return they should fight militant Islamism.²⁸ The MB however did not lose focus on long-term goals and targeted among others teachers. This effort seems to have paid off: in a 1997 survey over 85% of elementary school teachers self-described as Islamists. MB targeted other professions as well and it is estimated that over 21 professional syndicates suffered the fate of a direct takeover.²⁹ The most important social institution was the mosques though. And the MB never seized to integrate with them. They constituted the prime area for socialization and the creation of feelings of belonging and commitment and hence also social conformity.³⁰

The regime was not calm however and the history and relationship with Mubarak is a pendulum. For example in 1995 all Islamist candidates to parliament were detained, and the MB “socialist” party al-Amal was later suspended. Court rulings about the protection of Islamic morals and customs, that MB advanced through its different legal bodies, was ignored by the state. Social institutions were taken over by the state on masse, including sixty thousand mosques. Thousands of MB individuals were imprisoned and their homes were raided. The state widened the definition of terrorism to include disturbance of public order to easier target MB associated operations.³¹

Despite all this, during the 1990th and 2000th MB emerged as a significant popular force and in 2005 it held the majority of the opposition seats in parliament, advocating a *“democratic, civil state with an Islamic frame of*

²⁸ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 46

²⁹ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 51

³⁰ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 52

³¹ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 521

reference".³² But due to state repression the scene changed fast and Mubarak himself described MB as a direct threat to Egyptian security. A new wave of confiscating assets, imprisoning of members and so on started. As a side note there are evidence that the Egyptian secret police helped the MB in the 2005 election, to use their popular support to relax US pressure on democratization of the country. The thought was that if democratization means Islamisation, US might accept looking the other way around.³³ All this has lead to a debate within the academia where some focus on MB:s ability and success of permeating societies social fabric and others on MB:s inability and failure to handle state repression.

The Brothers take power and then lose it

The Arabic Spring in 2011 consisted of popular protests demanding a change in the political participation in many Arab countries. From West these activities were many times considered to represent a democratization and liberalization process. The protests were broad and incorporated different thoughts and agendas. Probably a large driving force was even non-ideological and more populist with resentment of what was considered a corrupt political class. It soon however became clear that the dominating player and the most well structured organizational block inside these protests was no other then the Muslim Brotherhood.

Their multileveled membership structure and federative organizational model made it possible to negotiate different forms of commitment with different persons and groups and

³² Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 521

³³ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 55

this step-by-step introduction by individuals offered an introduction to their network with very low initial thresholds. By facilitating an easy incorporation and smooth passover in each individual case the ideological and socialization process could start.³⁴

The Arabic Spring marked the end of Mubaraks power and he was forced to step down. After an interim period with the military that promised to facilitate democratic elections the Muslim Brotherhood managed to get their own candidate, Mohammed Morsi, elected as president in 2012. The reign was short; already a year later a military coup was carried out bringing general Sisi to power. This was a very brutal takeover that included the Rabaa massacre where more than 1000 of Muslim Brother members and supporters were killed.³⁵

The Arab Spring has lead too what has been described as a twin shook for MB with the formation of the Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the military coup in Egypt by general Sisi. This has also lead to an ideological split according to some observers inside the MB. The Arab political system has shown itself reluctant to incorporate Islamist participation in the political structure. Hence a tension has arisen between the old guard of gradualists and reform focus with a younger generation of leaders more revolutionary oriented. Interesting here is that it is this new generation who combines a more cross-ideological view with a revolutionary agenda. This new generation has now taken power over the organization, helped by Egypt's regimes harsh treatment, arrests, and even some deaths of previous leadership segments.³⁶ Some might protest to that last description and

³⁴ Munson, Z. (2011), p. 500-501

³⁵ Hamid, S., McCants, W. & Dar, R. (2017), p. 4

³⁶ Hamid, S., McCants, W. & Dar, R. (2017), p. 1-5

point to the fact that more radical MB leaders inspired by ideological streams influenced by Salafist was advancing already before the Arab Spring. For example in 2010 key positions was concurred by this new generation in the powerful MB Guidance Council.³⁷

The harsh treatment followed in more Middle-Eastern countries, and in Saudi Arabia as well as in the United Arab Emirates MB was designated a terrorist group. In Tunisia the MB party Ennahdas sat in a coalition 2011-2013 when it voluntarily stepped down from power in the aftermath of a social turmoil. Many grassroots became alienated because MB remained in support for the regime. In Kuwait the parliament dominated by Islamists was dissolved twice in 2013. In Jordan the MB party PJD is struggling with an alienated base of supporters thanks to its loyalty stance towards the king.³⁸ How to facilitate the integration in the state without threatening the ruling elite and at the same time keep credibility in the broad based social movements they are steering, demanding social change and an Islamist agenda, is a question not easy to answer, as it seems.

Brothers in Europe

*“Islam will return to Europe as a conqueror and victor, after being expelled from it twice [...] I maintain that the conquest this time will not be by the sword but by preaching and ideology.”*³⁹ Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

³⁷ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p.522

³⁸ Hamid, S., McCants, W. & Dar, R. (2017), p. 5-10

³⁹ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 166

During the 50s and 60s we saw a great movement of Egyptian and Arabic students and political refugees to Europe and particularly West Germany. After Nasser established diplomatic relations with East Germany, West Germany thought it was a good idea to welcome the fleeing Islamists and offer a safe harbor.⁴⁰ Some proposed that the belief that Islamism eventually would take power and hence a good relationship might facilitate profitable economic deals was a driving force.⁴¹ This was happening at the same time as a broader immigration from the Muslim world to Europe started.⁴² But the creation of the different Islamist organizational bodies initially consisted of political refugees and students. Seeing the harsh treatment in the Arab world their focus started to shift and the building of transnational movements with primary focus in the West started.⁴³

Key element in the building of these organizations was individual leaders. One such leader was Said Ramadan who had lead the Brotherhood paramilitary troops in Palestine, had served as al-Bannas personal secretary and later even married one of his daughters. This man moved to Geneva in 1958 and founded or co-founded Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland (IGD), the Muslim World League and Islamische Zentrum Genf (IZG).⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 2

⁴¹ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 66

⁴² Vidino, L. (2009), 166

⁴³ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 64-65

⁴⁴ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 2

A trans-European network evolves

In Geneva many important organizations and international positions are situated and access to this infrastructure made it possible to also put pressure on Nasser and the Egyptian government via Western governments and international organizations connected to UN. With this a process started that changed the Islamist movement: before they were very much involved in a nationalist logic such as in Egypt but in the West they became transnational operators.⁴⁵

Said Ramadan served as IDG:s president for its first ten years of existence. The IZG was later taken over by his sons and the IGD was headed by one Ghaleb Himmat. Across Europe Said Ramadan helped and supported the creation of Islamist structures and organizations. In Ireland we have the Dublin Islamist society (DIS) for instance that received his help and in return they helped with donation for the creation of the construction of a mosque in Munich. The DIS was created by Ahmed Elkadi, who later also became an important figure in the US and consolidated many organizations there.⁴⁶ The DIS was originally described as a local initiative to help students practice their Islamic belief and study Islamic literature but the focus on global perspective and the involvement in a global network of Islamists seems to be existing from the beginning. Today the European Council for Fatwa and Research lead by Yusuf al-Qaradawi is operating with the Irish city as its base.⁴⁷ This development took part in many European countries, and the Irish case is just one of many examples.

⁴⁵ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 64-65

⁴⁶ Khan, A. H. (2011), p. 490

⁴⁷ Khan, A. H. (2011), p. 486-491

Saudi funding and terrorist allegations

From the very beginning financial flows from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have contributed to MB projects and the building of mosques.⁴⁸ The Irish DIS eventually constructed a mosque with the help from the Saudi King Faisal's personal funds, opened schools and later changed name to the Islamic Foundation of Ireland.⁴⁹ The credit to make this financing happen is given to a diplomat named Salem Azzam. He later directed large funds from primary Saudi Arabia to found MB organizations and activities all around Europe. His family was represented in the early MB leadership through one of al-Bannas close companions named Abd al-Rahman Azzam.

With an international supporting network, local facilities such as mosques, intellectual support and cash MB fast appeared as the main organizing force in Europe for Islam as such. This was done through among others the organization Islamic Council of Europe (ICE) and later the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) – the latter is represented in all European countries and function as the MB:s European umbrella organization.⁵⁰

Himmat Ghaleb who was the IGD leader after Ramadan founded the Bank al Taqwa which is considered to be the Muslim Brotherhood's bank. Through this bank and a series of companies strategically positioned for tax purposes intelligence agencies have accused Himmat for having channeled considerable funds to groups such as Hamas and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front besides being one of the main financiers of different mosques and Islamic centers

⁴⁸ Lebl. L. (2013) p. 111

⁴⁹ Khan, A. H. (2011), p. 492-495

⁵⁰ Khan, A. H. (2011), p. 493-495

throughout Europe including the official magazine of the Muslim Brotherhood named *Risalatul Ikhwan*. In 2001 the US state agencies designated him as a terrorist financier and he stepped down as president from the IGD because of that.⁵¹ This organization is described as the most influential in Germany, founded by MB leader Said Ramadan as described above, and is considered to continually promote MB ideology.⁵² Worth mentioning is the growing presence of Sharia finance supporting parallel societal structures. It has peculiarities such as it prohibits investments in western defense industry and all transactions are submitted a 2.5% Jihad tax called *zakat*. *“I don’t like the word donations, I like to call it Jihad with money, because God has ordered us to fight enemies with our lives and our money”* as MB:s spiritual leader al-Qaradawi simply put it.⁵³

An elite group directing local organizations

It has been commented that the many Muslim and Islamic organizations operating in Europe both locally and internationally may be governed by a very small elite group of MB associated Islamists. Evidence suggests that this sometimes creates local friction with what has been described as *“corporate imams”*. The power of these local structures such as in Ireland has shifted from the local members and a democratic processes to international umbrella organizations controlled by the MB.⁵⁴ From the beginning it might be the case that the flight to Europe and the establishment

⁵¹ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 2

⁵² Khan, A. H. (2011), p. 490

⁵³ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 114-115

⁵⁴ Khan, A. H. (2011), p. 497-498

of organizational structures in Europe was done with the intent of creating pressure and accumulating support for the return to their home countries and to take power there. But this has changed and from at least the 80s focused shifted for the European MB to strive to create a structure for Islamizing Europe as such. To do this they describe themselves as advocates and champions for the Muslim population and Muslim interests in Europe.⁵⁵

The understanding of Muslims in this context has been described as “*neo-ethnic*” because it predisposes that all immigrants who have some roots in an Islamic context, regardless of active beliefs and different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, are considered to be part of this unified block of Muslims in Europe. This is a perception so called identity politics activists and Islamist leaders are both in favor of it. The latter aspiring of a leadership position over a unified Muslim political and cultural block.⁵⁶

Infact MB sometimes contests that they are an organization saying instead that they represent a current of thought.⁵⁷ “*We do not have an international organization; we have a organization through our perception of things*”.⁵⁸ This is probably an effect of the learning process from Egypt where a decentralized organizational structure was a prerequisite not to be shut down by the government. Now it’s used as a tool in the process of more effective integrating in European structures. This leads to the effect that personal and financial ties, ideological statements and actions must be considered

⁵⁵ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 69-72

⁵⁶ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 45

⁵⁷ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 109

⁵⁸ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 173

to understand the organization's influence and reach.⁵⁹ The organizational model for the international Muslim Brotherhood has as a consequence been described as situated half-way between a pyramidal hierarchical organization and a flexible network. The structure has even been compared to a franchises business.⁶⁰

Among researcher however there is an consensus that the organization de facto exists in Europe.⁶¹ Some have pointed at similarities with the FIOE organizational structure and the MB in Egypt. It is worth noting that it is hard to advance inside the brotherhood and they select for certain traits and ideological "clearness". They even expect that an aspiring member should incorporate psychological predispositions in certain ways as well as adapt their individual identity in a Muslim brotherhood understanding.⁶² The international MB has stated on its international webpage "*There are entities that exist in many countries all over the world. These entities have the same ideology, principles and objectives but they work in different circumstances and different contexts. So, it is reasonable to have decentralization in action so that every entity works according to its circumstances and according to the problems it is facing and in their framework*". But MB members are notorious known for being vague of their belongings both ideological and organizational.⁶³ Worth mentioning is also that Europe already has a state influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood – the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina called the Federation of Bosnia

⁵⁹ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 110

⁶⁰ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 69

⁶¹ Norell, M. (2016) p. 14

⁶² Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 32-37

⁶³ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 35-36

and Herzegovina making up half of the country. MB played a large part in creating international support for military intervention towards Serbia in the 90s and is now an integral part of the state structure itself.⁶⁴

Islamism and its roots

*"I pledge with God to abide by the rules of Islam and Jihad for Allah's sake, and to fulfill and commit myself to the conditions and obligations of the Muslim Brothers, and to listen and obey its leadership whether willingly or not as long as he succumbs to Allah. I swear by God on that and he is the witness on my pledge"*⁶⁵ – the Muslim Brotherhood oath.

Islamism is a belief that the political realm should be built on an Islamic base. It is not an own form of Islam but one practiced in a political sphere. It's this base that should govern the state and society. It has been described as Islam as a total system a view with deep historical roots.⁶⁶

Islamism in its modern sense appeared in the 19th century in the writings of intellectuals such as Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935)⁶⁷ followed by Abul Ala-Maududi (1903-79), Hassan al-Banna (1906-49), Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) och Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-).⁶⁸ Some researchers consider Islamism as an *"invention of tradition"* and not a part of Islam as such even if it is based on the

⁶⁴ Magnusson, K. (2018), p. 26-31

⁶⁵ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 26

⁶⁶ Norell, M. (2016) p. 3p

⁶⁷ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 44

⁶⁸ Norell, M. (2016) p. 4

Islamic belief.⁶⁹ Others point to an older tradition with Islamic teachers such as Taymiyyah (1263-1328) and Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703-92).⁷⁰ But even in the Muslim world itself Islam many times is understood as a total system and the difference between Islam and Islamism is faded regardless of this is a traditional view or a view imposed by Islamist propaganda. In the case of MB they see Islam as a total system.⁷¹ Islamism bears with it the idea of a golden age and believes that during the time of Prophet Mohammed an uncorrupted society and way of life was present.⁷²

It is actually first with the establishment of MB itself that an effective embodiment of Islamism was created. Ideologies are normally ineffective until a strong movement represents them.⁷³ Mainstream Islamism favored by MB advocates a reform-oriented view called *islah*, starting with the individual. The idea is that Islam should step-by-step permeate society and that process can be started here and now at an individual level. However this individual change should lead to a wider societal shift in Islamist direction.⁷⁴ MB is known for advocating a strategy of avoiding confrontation with the system and instead penetrates it from within. They have done this with a flexible and pragmatic attitude towards policies when dealing with the political establishment in Europe. The result is striking; they are operating with governmental support in many countries.⁷⁵ To do this, MB intellectuals have described the European territory as “land of

⁶⁹ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 17

⁷⁰ Norell, M., (2016) p. 4

⁷¹ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 17-18

⁷² Norell, M. (2016) p. 4

⁷³ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 44

⁷⁴ Hamid, S., McCants, W. & Dar, R. (2017), p. 5

⁷⁵ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 171

preaching” in what seems to be the creation of a new legal category in Islamist thought. By this they mean that because the Muslim minority is free to advance Islamism interests it is not the “*land of war*” and while it is not Islamic it cannot be “*land of Islam*” either.⁷⁶ Although worth remembering is that non-Muslims are supposed to convert or submit, otherwise this fact in it self is considered as violence directed towards Islam and force is then considered as acceptable as a self-defense measure in this case. The ultimate goal being to govern the whole world as an Islamic state and obstacles in the way, if permanent, must be removed.⁷⁷

Jihad incorporates not only fighting but also da’wa, which is the conversion and proselytizing activities. This is a pragmatic choice rather than principal and can confuse observers. War is only necessary against those how resist Islamization in the long run.⁷⁸ MB is in practice advocating and advising for the creation of Muslim ghettos and the creation of parallel societies,⁷⁹ making it clear that their vision of Europe is another Europe than the existing one.

Yusuf Al-Qaradhwai, the spiritual leader of MB, has expressed the view that Muslims in Europe has a unique position and the possibility to be the leading force in the Islamic future. In Europe they are free to advance the Islamist quest in contrast to most Middle-Eastern countries where Islamists are kept in check by a forceful state and severe repression.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 172

⁷⁷ Norell, M., (2016) p. 3-4

⁷⁸ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 109

⁷⁹ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 172

⁸⁰ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 172

The Salafists – the face of radical Islam

The thinker, writer and former MB leader Sayyid Qutb had time to contemplate MB:s failure while in Egypt jails for 20 long years, probably suffering from torture as well.⁸¹ He started to describe Muslim rulers as infidels (kafir) because they did not implement Sharia in a strict sense. In so doing they denied, in his opinion, the authority of God and it is thereby justified to conduct Jihad and armed rebellion directed at the state. These thoughts later merged with the Wahhabite school focusing on Muslim rulers duty to be loyal to fellow Muslims and dissociate from non-Muslims. This version of Islamism was evolved and defined in the numerous training camps that were set up in Afghanistan and Pakistan and from which al-Qaida emerged. It was here that the shift from the near enemy to the far enemy took place. The fight against US, Israel and “*Christianization*” takes prominence before the fight against the “*infidel*” Muslim rulers. In Egypt there is nevertheless an increase in violence directed towards the military from Salafist groups. Regardless of focus they agree on the need of establishing a global Islamic state, the Caliphate and the fight against all “*cross-worshippers*”. A disturbing point is that these groups do not believe that Islam makes a relevant distinction between military and civilian hence accepting also civilian targets.⁸²

The Salafist has had some presence in Europe since the mid-1980s but was primarily divided in small groups. This started to change in the 90s when al-Qaida appeared as a Salafist power center and in that way helped to consolidate

⁸¹ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 45

⁸² Hamid, S., McCants, W. & Dar, R. (2017), p. 26-28

different groups. With veterans from places such as Afghanistan and Chechnya integration processes started developing a European network of Salafists. The London Mosque in Finsbury Park is considered to be the number one Salafist radicalizing platform in Europe.⁸³ The Dutch domestic security agency wrote a report warning for the spread of al-Qaida ideology inside European Islamist groups. In the UK alone MI5 stated there are some 4000 suspected terrorists and over 200 Islamist networks.⁸⁴ In Sweden the domestic security agency, SÄPO, is reporting an increase in violent islamists from 200 in 2010 to several thousands in 2017. SÄPO is “crediting” IS propoganda this new situation where these milieus also are more or less integrated and not fragmented on small groups as before.⁸⁵

Another large group is the so called quietist Salafist or peaceful revolutionaries The largest organization operating in Europe advocating radical Islam is Tahrir al-Islami who advocates the creation of a global caliphate and the overthrow of democracy, but they are not themselves developing capacity to violence as it seems. The question of whether or not they advocate violence in trusted small groups has been debated; several researchers and defectors have stated that this is in fact the case.⁸⁶ But they are not themselves as an organization involved in violence. In Egypt, Salafist movements have started to partake in elections and thus accepting some democratic principles. There are at least four Salafist parties in Egypt and they differ mostly in what degree they want to

⁸³ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 168

⁸⁴ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 170

⁸⁵ Baas, D., “Skräcksiffran: tusentals radikala islamister i Sverige”, *TT/Expressen.se*, 16th of June 2017

⁸⁶ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 171

give the state a purely religious function.⁸⁷ An example of a Salafist group that also has moved towards the MB position is Ajnar Misr. It seems to accept Egypt as a nation-state and refers to the regime as tyrants instead of, as before, the much more uncompromising term *kafir*.⁸⁸

The “moderate” Muslim Brothers

It is argued that one of the prime marks of MB ideology is its lack of distinctiveness (that in a Muslim context appears as non-extremist) always trying to position itself in the Islamic mainstream and addressing everyday issues in Muslim life.⁸⁹ An important element in their ideology is also the presence of an anti-Western theme preoccupied with Western influence in Egypt – poverty and declining morality are normally understood in that context. The solution the Muslim Brotherhood proposes is the general acceptance of Islamic teaching and a belief that the Muslim community is one single unit that needs to resist Western influence.⁹⁰ The organization teaches that individuals themselves must practice the change and via the large number of social institutions they consistently show the millions of Egyptians that they are contributing to end poverty, combat diseases and so on.⁹¹ The similarity with the work in Europe is not too distant where MB is offering Muslims a cultural and religious safe haven creating a Muslim infrastructure to preserve their identity and ability to live their original culture.

⁸⁷ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 525

⁸⁸ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 531

⁸⁹ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 504-505

⁹⁰ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 489-490

⁹¹ Munson, Z. (2001), p. 501-502

As presented for the public in Egypt a “*democratic, civil state with an Islamic frame of reference*” is advocated by MB and by that is understood basic separation of power, rotation of power and some general political rights combined with Sharia. For instance, the MB considers it the states responsibility to uphold Islamic social norms.⁹² But the Arab Spring has lead to a need to rethink these analytical categories.⁹³

The brotherhood was not able to govern Egypt or at least was not prepared for the deep state and the following state coercion. President Morsi deferred from radical reforms also in the army, and instead he tried to promote General al-Sisi who was already the head of military intelligence. It seems like they believed that by cultural power or personal inspiration this would make the military accept them. This unpreparedness by the previous leadership created doubts among the members about their capabilities and the effectiveness of chosen strategies. A younger generation of leaders stepped in and took charge of MB in Egypt, and these were in favor of cross-ideological cooperation and more accepting to pluralism, but at the same time confrontative and revolutionary oriented.⁹⁴ This new youthful leadership has openly questioned the organizations principles of non-violence, supporting revolutionary measures instead of evolutionary ones, which has lead to a shift where the previous Salafist and MB ideological dividers are eroded.⁹⁵

The shift in the official rhetoric that has occurred is dramatic although it draws its strength from the organizations

⁹² Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 520-522

⁹³ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 519

⁹⁴ Hamid, S., McCants, W. & Dar, R. (2017), p. 6

⁹⁵ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 519-520

history itself. In an statement on MB:s official Arabic website in 2015 we read: “*We must prepare our selves.. for a lengthy, uncompromising jihad, in which we seek to become martyrs*”.⁹⁶ The same article refers to al-Bannas “*Secret Apparatus*” that fought in Egypt and carried out assassinations and to the Jihad Brigades who fought Jewish settlers, but also the MB rovers which was a physical preparation program/subdivision, aimed at giving Muslims the physical and mental mindset they needed to conduct jihad. On the English website the rhetoric is normally not that explicit. Although, they have for example referred to a Fatwa that describes the overthrow of the Egyptian regime as a legal duty.⁹⁷ The Sisi-regime has often been called butchers and a call for vengeance has been addressed several times on the webpage. This can be interpreted as MB accepting a religious reference and legitimization upon the use of violence, and with that a broad range of options directed against the regime and all its personnel is then justifiable in their eyes.⁹⁸

Moderate as in opportunistic

The researcher Lorenzo Vidino has proposed a model where Islamism is understood as a tripartite pyramid. In the top we have the violent Jihadists, second the so-called peaceful revolutionaries or quietists and at the base the MB:s seemingly democratic version of Islamism. The point he makes is that the different ideological positions give mutual support instead of being conflicting positions. The base represented

⁹⁶ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 529

⁹⁷ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 529-530

⁹⁸ Ranko, A. & Nedza, J. (2016), p. 529-530

by MB is hence working to radicalize the European Muslim population.⁹⁹ While it is true that al-Banna believed that parliamentary democracy was compatible with Islam,¹⁰⁰ the Muslim Brotherhood also advocates Islam as a total system built on religion, life and state.¹⁰¹ It is not far fetched to suspect that they have a purely pragmatic and opportunistic view on where inside the Islamist spectrum they position themselves. MB seems to accept to act as a conveyor belt for radicalizing individuals who later can be recruited by terrorist organizations.¹⁰² It has been suggested that the only thing that is keeping mainstream Islamism from supporting ISIS is excesses in brutality and terror and not necessary any contradicting view of core ideological positions, such as the creation of a state around Islam and Muslims, implementation of Sharia and so on.¹⁰³ Researchers have also suggested that in times of Islamist terror politicians are looking for Muslim counterparts to conduct a dialogue with. In Sweden as in most Western countries this mean the MB, hence, Salafist terror is used to leverage influence by MB. Their different strategies, in some ways, enhances each other.¹⁰⁴ We are then, as it seems, in the area of Islamist opportunism.

I propose that MB is opportunistic in its attitude towards others and are happy to form alliances and reframe their way of communication. Calling MB moderate Islamist then appears to loose meaning; the moderate part becomes a tactic and a situational approach and do not affect core values.

⁹⁹ Vidino (2009) p 166-168

¹⁰⁰ Soage, A. (2009), p. 15-16

¹⁰¹ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 68

¹⁰² Lebl, L. (2013), p. 111

¹⁰³ Hamid, S., McCants, W. & Dar, R. (2017), p. 22

¹⁰⁴ Norell, M. (2016) p. 20-21

Instead the relationship to the moderate/radical paradigm is pragmatic and opportunistic, because their goal is already set.

Multiculturalism, EU and Islamophobia

"What has preserved the Jewish character over the past centuries was their small community that was unique in its ideas and rituals and was known as the Jewish ghetto. Try to have your own Muslim ghetto then" – Yusuf al-Qaradawi, spiritual leader of MB.

Multiculturalism as a policy

Bottom line, multiculturalism teaches that all cultures are equally worthy of respect. This leads to the position that a minority culture should have the same status as the majority culture. The one upholding Western values becomes an offender who does not respects the rights of other cultures,¹⁰⁵ and some even propose that this multicultural perspective recreates a colonialist and Eurocentric pattern.¹⁰⁶ As a working definition I will use Mats Wikströms take on multiculturalism as *"a political idea of how an ethno-culturally diverse liberal-democratic polity ought to accommodate and manage diversity. [...] (i) ethno-cultural diversity should be publicly endorsed for the greater good of the whole of the polity; and (ii) minority groups (immigrant and domestic) should be formally recognized as minorities and protected from discrimination and assimilatory pressure..."*¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 107

¹⁰⁶ Aman, R., (2012) 1019-1024

¹⁰⁷ Wickström, M. (2015) p. 513

EU strife towards a global leadership position in human rights and multiculturalism. At the same time EU tries to break down the different national identities and replacing them with a common European one. It is suggested that for now this European identity is to weak both to attract second and third generation Muslim immigrants and it is to weak to support any commitment from the native populations fighting threats against society's core values. EU policy has also worked to strengthen parallel societies and weaken national identity both in its patriotic and nationalist forms. Multiculturalism seems to be used by EU as a unifying concept to overcome nationalism.¹⁰⁸

The underlying reason is probably that the current European elite recognizes its lack of democratic support and hence implements technical measures to advance European integration. The assumption is that people would resist if they understood. The doctrine of the EU project is then not democracy but European integration as such.

Europe has seen a change in rhetorics about multiculturalism among several European leaders now criticizing the concept. But multicultural policies actually expanded nevertheless. Between the years 2000 and 2010 twelve countries expanded its multiculturalism legislation and policymaking and in only three a decreased level of multiculturalism was noticed. Further the correlation between multicultural policies and immigrant naturalization is high.¹⁰⁹

EU is combating its lack of democratic legitimacy with references to moral authority and as an advocate of human rights vis-à-vis the member states. EU institutions forcefully

¹⁰⁸ Lebl, L. (2013), p.104-106

¹⁰⁹ Bloemraad, I. (2015), p. 599

combat any critique of the chosen path and anti-immigration parties in the member states are labeled as extremists. At the same time they fail to give Muslims a possible way forward towards assimilation in Europe.¹¹⁰ As a measure of the level of assimilation success it is enough to consider that most of the Islamist in Europe are second-generation immigrants.¹¹¹

The discussion is mirrored in the academia and it is not uncommon to find political statements that a priori denounces a nation's right to uphold its culture *"If social identities are an important part of a person's overall identity and a source of self-respect and self-esteem, as suggested by SIT, then it seems harsh and rather demeaning to expect immigrants to abandon their own culture. In line with this, most immigrants appear unwilling to accept a process of assimilation in order to be regarded as citizens."*¹¹² We will look at Sweden more closely later on but it is evident that actual policies in Sweden took this perspective. Assimilation was viewed as a violation towards the immigrant. They were not thought to be able to maintain happiness if they could not fully express their cultural uniqueness. Later this was rationalized as a way to also enrich the host culture under the term cultural-enrichment.¹¹³

EU as the Brothers bride

Islamists when in Europe had to recognize the dominant political values and taking a favorable position vis-à-vis democracy. This was a prerequisite to establish themselves as

¹¹⁰ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 107

¹¹¹ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 169

¹¹² Reijerse, A. et al. (2013) p. 615

¹¹³ Tawat, M. (2014), p. 215

speaking partner to the political elite.¹¹⁴ In aligning themselves to multiculturalism they presented a model of integration without assimilation and have been to some extent successful because their members are normally well educated and they promote a concept of a good Muslim as a person who radiates social success.¹¹⁵

MB is very effective in using various proxies to integrate at the European level, and the two most known are the already mentioned Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) and the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations (FEMYSO).¹¹⁶ The former appears to have a coordinating function for the MB associated network in Europe together with the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) who develops interpretations on Sharia, so called fatwas, in a European context.¹¹⁷ The MB is tailoring its strategy after the EU integration and multicultural policies and positions itself with advisors and as spokesperson for the whole Muslim community.¹¹⁸ Another organization on European level worth mentioning is the European Institute for Human Science (EIHS), sometimes referred to as the Chateau Chinon, it's purpose is to produce and educate imams serving the Muslim communities in Europe.¹¹⁹

Worth nothing is that FIOE has as one of its stated goals to work for that individual Muslims are promoted and advanced inside EU and governmental structures.¹²⁰ EU is on their part advocating a "*post-national*" position in the effort

¹¹⁴ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 66

¹¹⁵ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 74

¹¹⁶ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 5

¹¹⁷ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 24

¹¹⁸ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 5

¹¹⁹ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 25

¹²⁰ Norell, M. (2016), p.19

to supplement the underlying nation-states. In this effort they have been accepting towards the MB as their agendas overlaps although the goals might be quite different. The MB has its own Islamist version for Europe, a Europe governed by Sharia law.¹²¹ The FIOE clearly states as a goal for all its member organizations to build up Islamic institutions and infrastructure in Europe such as schools, mosques and welfare institutions.¹²²

Islamophobia as a tool

On an international level MB has received help in advancing their agenda from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an international governmental organization consisting of over 50 member states. They want Europe to implement and enforce prohibitions of criticism of Islam.¹²³ OIC is funded among other by Saudi Arabia and the country is considered to be the driving force behind the organization. The goal for the organization is to 1) promote Islamic teaching, 2) combat defamation of Islam and 3) safeguard Muslim minorities rights. The organization has an office in Brussels and has opened an “*observatory of Islamophobia*”.¹²⁴

MB tries together with OIC to divide the concept of human rights and multiculturalism, they have for instance been very successful in implementing the word Islamophobia in EU and its member states. This has been an effective tool to silence critics of Islam and Islamism. People find they risk prosecution and at the same time face the possibility

¹²¹ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 101-102

¹²² Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 40

¹²³ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 101-102

¹²⁴ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 112-114

of violent retribution such as in the case of the murder of Theo Van Gogh, the Charlie Hebdo massacre and violence connected to the Danish Muhammad cartoon publications.¹²⁵ They also by the targeting of what they consider to be Islamophobic expressions, has managed to smoothly align themselves with different anti-racist groups and government bodies working against similar issues.¹²⁶ This call EU has willingly observed and implemented legislation to counter so called hate speech.¹²⁷

It seems like the ambition to form a positive view of Islam in the general public is a cause MB is dedicated to. The problems facing Muslims is understood in terms of the majority society's negative view towards Islam, hence effort is invested in cooperation with EU and other governmental agencies to change this view. What is conceived as a negative interpretation of Islam is labeled as Islamophobia. In so doing critics moral and psychological disposition is question instead of answer to raised questions given. In so doing they are turning the discussion from societal change policies to individual Muslims, and critique against Islam is consider as an attack on these and not part of a political or ideological debate.

In Sweden, particular the Islamist youth wing, has appropriated more terms from the radical left such as structural racism, white privilege and so on. This is a very important strategic position because MB can fall back on being misunderstood and misinterpreted by a misogynic surrounding, as a permanent victim with no own responsibility for the situation. In so doing they are also tapping in to a larger discourse

¹²⁵ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 110

¹²⁶ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 74

¹²⁷ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 116

about integration problems arising from Islamophobia in the majority population, with this discourse functioning as a secular support for the MB.¹²⁸ In so doing they are protecting an Islamist agenda in a multicultural structure of a unified Muslim minority where critique of for example Sharia is seen as critique of the Muslim community as such.¹²⁹

The MB network proposes in public materials that minorities should be on an equal level with the majority and that a pluralistic system where majority beliefs and culture are not allowed to dominate the minorities should be advanced.¹³⁰ It is noted that the MB associated organizations is using islamophobia in a very defined way and in according to FIOE guidelines. Researchers are attacked with the epitet and they try to ban lectures about Islamism from universities with this method. They characterizes even Sweden as a hostile country for Muslims, a position they have some resonance for from governmental institutions.¹³¹

The term is criticized for being analytically weak and because it is used in a way to diminish the distinction between hate, fear and rational arguments about Islam and Islamism, the term is better understood as a tool for political activism than for any analytical purposes. As such it poses a democratic problem because critiques of Islam is not able to discuss their arguments – instead they risk ostrachism and to be personally questioned on a psychological or moral ground. It is also proposed that this victimhood that the threat from Islamophobia is implementing on the Muslim population in Europe is a very strong emotional factor in an

¹²⁸ Norell, M. (2016), p. 21-22

¹²⁹ Norell, M. (2016), p. 26

¹³⁰ Norell, M. (2016), p. 26

¹³¹ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 49

ongoing radicalization process.¹³² The European left has taken it on itself not only to promote anti-racism but also anti-Islamophobia, and it is shown in countries such as UK and Sweden that the left is targeting researchers who challenges an Islamist worldview as Islamophobic. In so doing they are supporting an Islamist understanding of the Muslim minority as well as restrict freedom of speech and silence researches.¹³³

In Sweden it is well known that campaigns are carried out directed towards researches that try in public to debate Islamism. These are collective campaigns aiming at intimidating and ostracizing, contacting journalists, person's managers, colleagues or rental agencies describing them as racist and Islamophobic and in that way creating a very effective pressure. In Sweden this kind of description of a researcher, journalist, civil servants or politician might be very problematic leading to a self-imposed censure. "*I can't afford being labeled a racist*" is one Swedish civil servant supposed to have said as a response to why he did not challenge an Islamic leader on a public meeting, who stated that Islamic laws trumps Swedish laws and that he always would follow the Islamic law if there was a conflict.¹³⁴ This has according to Aje Carlbom created a millue in Sweden where Islamist are able to change the public discourse without even facing criticism due to the fear of being labeled a racist. Muslims, even when they are stating something contradictory to Swedish culture or beliefs, are not challenged.¹³⁵

¹³² Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 48-52

¹³³ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 53-58

¹³⁴ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 53-58

¹³⁵ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 55-60

Representing all Muslims

In EU the MB is describing itself as representing the whole Muslim minority. As advocates for multiculturalism and moderate Islam their organizations are perceived as best choice for EU officials and different governments. The fact that they also are internationally organized helps as well and they are an convenient partner in making backdoor deals, a practice common in EU due to lack of democratic support. MB:s uplifted position vis-à-vis the EU establishment is in the next step used by MB to leverage influence among the Muslim population and a spiral of increased influences starts.¹³⁶

The Muslim population in Europe is increasing fast due to both immigration and high birth rates. Many are living in worn down and criminal struck areas, which give extra fuel to radicalization and a longing for a more traditional way of life and identity might be close at hand. In some countries we have even seen the advent of Islamic parallel societies and the demand to locally implement Sharia. In a process of exclusion Islamist can drive away non-Muslims and step-by-step take control over an area.¹³⁷

The EU does not have any strategy to counter this development with parallel structures. Instead EU policies support this development.¹³⁸ The European Muslims are not homogenous; they have diverse backgrounds and different relationships to Islam. Islamism is an ideology supported by a minority of Muslims. Even the Islamist organization themselves are in some way divided along ethnic lines. The MB is dominant in the Arabic community, Millis Görüs (ICMG) dominates among

¹³⁶ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 111

¹³⁷ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 103

¹³⁸ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 104-105

the Turks and in UK the South Asian dominated Islamist organization Jamaat-i-Islami is powerful.¹³⁹ The connections are though vast between the organizations and Millis Görüs is a big factor in Germany and the cooperation with the MB:s IGD is good. Financial activities with the by US designated terrorist Himmatt is known and the Bundesverfassungsschutz has described the organization's goals as "*the establishment of an Islamic state and social system*". Nevertheless their political advancement is not halting and the German establishment seems open to affiliate with these organizations. A striking example is the case when the Berlin Catholic Academy invited Ibrahim el-Zayat, Himmatt's successor as IGD president, to represent the Muslim view. In Germany the Islamists have also created an umbrella organization called the Zentralrat der Muslime, so these three interlocking organizations, Zentralrat, IDG and ICMG representing the same Islamist ideology are together charged with representing the Muslim minority in Germany and seems to have more or less free access to politician and journalists.¹⁴⁰

In France we find the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF), even charged with official functions in the country¹⁴¹ and in Italy it is the Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (OII) as the dominating organization, both MB linked.¹⁴² In UK we have the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).¹⁴³ In Belgium the Ligue Islamique Interculturelle de Belgique (LIIB) and in Switzerland we find three main organizations LMS, CIG and FCI.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁹ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 109

¹⁴⁰ Vidino, L. (2005), p. 3

¹⁴¹ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 68

¹⁴² Vidino, L. (2005), p. 5

¹⁴³ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 173

¹⁴⁴ Amghar, S. (2008), p. 68

The MB is offering a dual strategy of radicalizing and penetrating, which becomes very effective due to the fact that they manage to position themselves as the favorite Muslim partner for most European governments. By these governments they acquire legitimation and power in the Muslim community and this leveraged position and influence they use to radicalize the same community.¹⁴⁵ In an alternative UN report 17 different Muslim organizations in Sweden prompted, most with known MB connections, that Muslims in the country should be considered as one minority. Not different ethnic or national groups but one distinct minority with one interest.¹⁴⁶

Sweden – best in class

”I ask the Swedish people to open their hearts [...] It will cost, we will not be able to afford much else but it really is humans who flee for their life.”¹⁴⁷

Fredrik Reinfeldt, Prime Minister 2006-2014.

Multiculturalism as nationalism

Sweden was an ethnically homogenous country more or less up to the mid 60s. The social-democratic vision of society, the so-called *“folkhemmet”*, (lit. people’s home) stipulated that the social welfare and equality in the nation was dependent on ethnic and cultural homogeneity. For instance the social-democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander, in parliament, as

¹⁴⁵ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 173-174

¹⁴⁶ Norell, M. (2016), p. 25-26

¹⁴⁷ Eriksson, N. & Karlsson, P., “Fredrik Reinfeldt: Öppna era hjärtan”, Aftonbladet, 16th of August 2014

late as 1965 saluted and cherished the racial homogeneity in Sweden, seeing it as a key factor for social stability and progressiveness.¹⁴⁸

The societal and intellectual changes that Sweden's post-war immigration has led to is nothing less than a revolution: both the constitution of the population as well as the very concept of Sweden was changed.¹⁴⁹ Today all mainstream parties and major media corporations in Sweden forcefully support multiculturalism.¹⁵⁰ The shift represented a complete turn of the policies towards immigrants who were no longer Swedes in the making but minorities whose ethno-cultural differences should be maintained and protected.¹⁵¹ Sweden is as a consequence today internationally known for its equality, solidarity and democracy as well as for generous immigration policies and a welfare state governing it all.¹⁵² Sweden is actually in the absolute top among countries adopting multicultural policies and naturalization among immigrants – only Canada and Australia can compare.¹⁵³

These three countries were also the early adopters of multiculturalism; Canada (1971), Australia (1973) and Sweden (1975). The changes were driven and implemented by a domestic elite and did not correlate to the majority vote.¹⁵⁴ Ethnic minority activists seem to have been contributing to the implementation.¹⁵⁵ In Sweden the first big debate started in a 1965 article in Sweden's most influential newspaper by a

¹⁴⁸ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 515-516

¹⁴⁹ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 512-513

¹⁵⁰ Schall, C. E. (2014), p. 371

¹⁵¹ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 526-527

¹⁵² Dahlstedt, M. & Vesterberg, V., (2017) p. 228-229

¹⁵³ Bloemraad, I. (2015), p. 599

¹⁵⁴ Bloemraad, I. (2015), p. 600

¹⁵⁵ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 524-525

member of the Jewish minority named David Schwarz arguing for multiculturalism. Leaders from the Finnish and Estonian minorities soon joined Schwarz in this campaign. They argued that it was a natural step in the progressiveness for society to leave behind authoritarian and reactionary models. The implementation of the idea went via the academia aligning a core group of academic activist who managed to depoliticize the concept.¹⁵⁶

Ten years later the Swedish parliament unanimously accepted proposition 1975:26 (*Regeringens proposition om riktlinjer för invandrar- och minoritetspolitiken m. m.*) and changed the constitution to include that Sweden should become a multicultural society.¹⁵⁷ In fact already a year before proposition 1974:28 (*angående den statliga kulturpolitiken*) had been passed and was a clear promotion of multiculturalism and a celebration of ethno-cultural diversity.¹⁵⁸ It has been pointed out that multiculturalism in these days was understood as an intra-European concern, a diversity of people sharing very similar cultures and an adherence to the liberal democracy, and these policies were in Sweden as well as in Canada and Australia pushed by minorities sharing the same Western civilization.¹⁵⁹ The current discussion with concerns about minorities challenging moral and civilizational concepts was not an issue when multiculturalism was introduced in Sweden.¹⁶⁰ The term in Sweden, multiculturalism (*mångkultur*), has been supplemented with diversity (*mångfald*) probably to remove the term from the immigration

¹⁵⁶ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 518-522

¹⁵⁷ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 512-513

¹⁵⁸ Tawat, M. (2014), p. 203-204

¹⁵⁹ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 522

¹⁶⁰ Wickström, M. (2015), p. 525-526

issue but also in a more postmodern sense to be able to include different kinds of identities such as homosexuals and others. These are concepts very hard to criticize in the public debate in Sweden¹⁶¹ and empirical studies are more or less absent.¹⁶²

The Swedish national day can be given as an example, today instrumentalized to celebrate diversity, to put focus on multiculturalism as a core value and identity of the country.¹⁶³ In fact it has been suggested that the Swedish attitude towards national identity is very ambivalent. The national day itself is a new creation and only became a public holiday in recent years. At the same time nationalism is considered un-Swedish and what in fact happens is a “*process of multicultural iteration, where Sweden’s relationship to diversity is restated and refined.*”¹⁶⁴ The waving of the Swedish flag or singing the Swedish national anthem is sometimes considered as a provocation and is problematic outside a strict sports context. Swedish practical integration problems often differ from a very unproblematic and positive picture that political policymakers are trying to create.¹⁶⁵ The advancement of multicultural policies also impact Swedish schools that have been criticized by the government school agency for not enough using “*mother-thong*” language for educational purpose in their curriculums.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶¹ Norell, M. (2016), p. 24

¹⁶² Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 14

¹⁶³ Schall, C. E. (2014), p. 355-356

¹⁶⁴ Schall, C. E. (2014), p. 369-370

¹⁶⁵ Schall, C. E. (2014), p. 357

¹⁶⁶ Nilsson, J. & Bunar, N. (2016) p. 409

Muslim Brotherhood and the Swedish model

Knowledge about the Muslim Brotherhood and even Islamism has been limited in Sweden. A report from the home defense agency (MSB) states that Islamism has not been allowed to be discussed in the academia and at the same time Islamists through the MB has positioned themselves as the main representatives of Muslims living in the country.¹⁶⁷ MB was present in Sweden from the late 70s due to immigration and in the beginning of the 80s the brochure “*to understand Islam*” was published. It was published by the main Muslim association at the time and has been described as a “*blue-copy of MB polices towards societal change.*”¹⁶⁸ Apparently this brochure was produced in cooperation with the Swedish immigration agency¹⁶⁹ and the editor was a self-described MB activist.¹⁷⁰

In Sweden the power over MB is exercised in a council called a “*Shura*”, lead by an “*Amir*”. The leadership rotates on a regular basis and the whole council often consists of a dozen people. Next level and also the lowest level is the family or “*Ursa*”, consisting of five to ten people. The latter meet on a weekly basis.¹⁷¹ MB in Sweden has worked in a masked way and normally never acknowledges their organizational or ideological belonging. Instead it is the Islamska förbundet i Sverige (IFIS) that is the main organizational body and many organizations have arisen in a way to both interact

¹⁶⁷ Norell, M. (2016), p. 7

¹⁶⁸ Norell, M. (2016), p. 9 original in Swedish ”en avskrift av MB:s generella policy för samhällsförändring.”

¹⁶⁹ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 20

¹⁷⁰ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 38

¹⁷¹ Norell, M. (2016), p. 9

with the Swedish society and receive government funding. It is believed that the Swedish MB also has administrative control over the MB branches in Norway and Finland. The organization IFIS denies any organizational bounds to MB but acknowledges an ideological inspiration.¹⁷²

The home defense agency (MSB) states that MB has established a complete dominating position in the Muslim civil society in Sweden. This position was facilitated by millions in governmental funding; the amount is not known and consists of local, regional and national parts. Swedish taxpayers in this way are funding the world's largest Islamist organization to establish itself as a significant factor in the country. It is believed that the position as representative for the Muslim community and speaking partner to the authorities has gone the furthest in Sweden.¹⁷³

The most known organization in Sweden besides IFIS and their youth wing Sveriges Unga Muslimer (SUM) are a) Islamic Relief, channeling Swedish foreign aid to Muslim receptors b) Studieförbundet Ibn Rushd, educational federation receiving large funds to facilitate studies in Islam and Islamophobia for instance, c) the Stockholm Mosque, one of the largest and the absolutely most centrally positioned mosque in Sweden. IFIS headquarter is here and politicians and authorities normally visit and communicate with this mosque in questions concerning Muslims.

Extensive social contacts have been established with the elite.¹⁷⁴ This mosque is describing sharia as a set of fixed principles that govern society.¹⁷⁵ And IFIS itself states that

¹⁷² Norell, M. (2016), p. 10

¹⁷³ Norell, M. (2016), p. 10-11

¹⁷⁴ Norell, M. (2016), p. 11-12

¹⁷⁵ Norell, M. (2016), p. 16

“the one who reduces Islam to only ritual and worship lacks an understanding of its total nature”¹⁷⁶ and adds that the Islamic belief encompasses all areas of life. But to the Islamist their view is described as simply Islamic.¹⁷⁷

Also in organizational logic IFIS bears similarities to traditional MB structures and way of operation, a member needs to act in accordance with Islamic customs and beliefs to be admitted and also be loyal to the organization’s goals and directives. The organization’s goals are describe as to spread knowledge of Islam, preserve a cultural and religious Islamic identity and construct Muslim civil infrastructure. All goals are in alignment with MB in Egypt and the FIOE. We have in the history chapter described the kind of social institutions MB has been able to construct and it is sometimes described as an Institutionalized Islamistic parallel society controlled by the brotherhood themselves.¹⁷⁸ The Swedish researcher Aje Carlbom has even stated that the alignment of IFIS policies to original MB policies is “*surprising*” although he seems to mean that the absence in Europe from a repressive state makes the original MB goal of taking over the state as such superfluous.¹⁷⁹

We have covered FIOE, the European umbrella organization that collects 28 national organizations, and the Swedish IFIS is a formal part of it. In fact it was money from the Swedish state department that financed a big pan European Islamist conference establishing the youth wing FE-MYSO. Connections to the global Islamist scene are also vast

¹⁷⁶ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 20 original in Swedish ”reducerar islam till bara rituellt dyrkan saknar förståelse för dess totala natur”

¹⁷⁷ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 20-21

¹⁷⁸ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 40-41

¹⁷⁹ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 43

with everything from study exchanges and conferences to engagements with Hamas¹⁸⁰ or even with Islamist militia in Syria.¹⁸¹ Also, the governing law of IFIS confirms its adherence to FIOE, it state itself as one of its founders and grants it the right to send representatives with the right to address the General Meeting, some of the policy documents produced on a European level is also said to represent their organizations ideology.¹⁸²

It has also been shown when categorizing articles in the Swedish Islamist paper Salaam that MB-ideologues such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Yusuf al- Qaradawi och Sayyid Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (former leader of MB associated Jamat i-Islami) appear frequently. That the kind of islam that is proposed to the readers is islamist in the sense of a total system covering both society and state.¹⁸³

A fatwa for the Green Party

Before the election in 2014 a fatwa, a religious binding instruction, appeared in Sweden advocating “*all muslims to take a stance against racism and islamophobia*” by voting for the green party, Miljöpartiet. The fatwa was later removed from the web and Imam Sheikh Abu Raad said that the recommendation to vote green was part of a pre-study and not the fatwa itself.¹⁸⁴ This man had some years before received government financing for “*building bridges and fight against*

¹⁸⁰ Norell, M. (2016), p. 14

¹⁸¹ Norell, M. (2016), p. 12

¹⁸² Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 12

¹⁸³ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 20

¹⁸⁴ Sheikh Abu Raad, “Förtydligande om min fatwa, www.gavle-moske.se , 9th of September 2014

islamophobia". He received almost half a million euro to build an informational webpage that among other stated that it was forbidden for Muslims to be friends with non-Muslims and that homosexuals should be killed.¹⁸⁵ The same mosque has also been known for celebrating IS-warriors but when the local newspaper wrote an article about it they became targeted in a lawsuit and started to be described as islamophobic.¹⁸⁶

Nevertheless, how come this fatwa appeared? Why the Islamist positive view on Miljöpartiet? We can probably find the main reason in the man Mehmet Kaplan, member of the Green Party governing board and since 2006 member of parliament who right after the election in 2014 took office as the Swedish minister of housing. The Iman in the main MB mosque in Stockholm Mahmoud Khalfi described it to Arabic media as a "*breakthrough*" for islamists in Sweden and said he was very happy for the normalized relationships between the Swedish political elite and Swedish MB close organizations.¹⁸⁷

Mehmet Kaplan is the previous chairman of the MB associated Muslim youth organization SUM. The political commentator Mohamed Omar (previous islamist leaning) has reported how he as early as 2007 had been invited to the Swedish parliament to have dinner with Kaplan and the MB leadership in Sweden together with representatives from the Turkish embassy. One of the rooms was temporary converted

¹⁸⁵ "Gavleimamen ansvarig for radikal hemsida", Gefle Dagblad, 1th of July 2015

¹⁸⁶ Gullberg, A., "Här är fem frågor som GD vill att imamen i Gävle att svara på" Gefle Dagblad, 20th of July 2015

¹⁸⁷ Norell, M. (2016), p. 20

to a mosque.¹⁸⁸ During a demonstration in Stockholm 2014 Mehmet Kaplan made the Muslim Brotherhood sign holding up four fingers and said *“I want to greet you all with the salute that has become the symbol for the people’s will in Egypt, namely rabia.”*¹⁸⁹

He is also reported being very close to the Turkish government and the ruling AKP, an MB associate party. The Turkish government has appointed another Miljöpartiet member, a man called Rafet Candemir, to be their promoter of people of Turkish descendants in Sweden. They are active in trying to advance the careers of people like this and are throwing in government support with the hope of both advancing the Turkish diaspora and bringing it closer to the Turkish government outlook. Kaplan and Candemir have been appearing together in different public functions astonishing 17 times between the years 2013-2016, both in Sweden and in Turkey.¹⁹⁰

He is not an isolated example in the party, for instance local politician in Miljöpartiet and youth leader in Gothenburg (the second largest town in Sweden) on live TV also made this MB sign not long after the scandal with Kaplan.¹⁹¹ Mohamed Tamsamani, president of Förenade Islamiska Föreningar i Sverige (FIFS), an organisation founded by Mehmet Kaplan,¹⁹² and local politician for Miljöpartiet in the municipality Solna,

¹⁸⁸ Omar, M., “MEHMET KAPLAN - ETT ISLAMISTISKT TROLL I SVERIGES REGERING?”, Det goda samhället, 13th of June 2015

¹⁸⁹ Forsberg, O. & Dickson, S., “Forskare: Miljöpartiet kan ha infiltrerats av islamister”, Aftonbladet, 22th April 2016

¹⁹⁰ Jönsson, O., Lundström, K., & Dahlin, M., “Kaplan umgås med Erdoğan’s man i Sverige” svt.se, 18 april 2016

¹⁹¹ Svensson, O. & Nygren, S., “MP-man gör omstritt tecken I SVT-sändning”, Aftonbladet.se, 22th of April 2016

¹⁹² Westerholm, J. “Stackars miljöpartiet”, Ledarsidorna.se, 1th of May 2016

did an internship in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.¹⁹³ And Yasri Khan who was known for his refusal to shake any woman's hand, was by the election board to the governing board of Miljöpartiet proposed as a member. But after public pressure he withdraw his candidature.¹⁹⁴ Another Miljöpartiet member Kamal al-Rifai made headlines when he invited the world famous Imam Salman al-Ouda, know salafist and alleged for being one of Osama Bin Ladens inspirations.¹⁹⁵

Mehmet Kaplan was later forced to resign from being housing minister for Sweden but this was not due to the islamist connections; instead he had been accused of meeting “*right-wing*” extremists.¹⁹⁶ A narrative better fitting in Sweden for creating indignation among the medial elite. He had appeared on the same dinner as the Swedish leader of the so called “*Gray Wolves*”, a pan-Turkish nationalist organization previously known for political murders of left leaning activists and minority groups such as Armenians and Kurds. The group seems to have good connections to the ruling party AKP and may also has moved in an islamist direction and seems well integrated in the Swedish islamist millue.¹⁹⁷ The affiliation with this group was commented as “*having angered people not normally critical to Kaplan*”.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹³ Fröjdth, G. “Miljöpartiets ljusskygga bröder” frojdh.se, 23th of April 2016

¹⁹⁴ Holmqvist, A., Wågenberg, J., & Karlsson, P., “Yasri Khan lämnar politiska uppdrag efter kritikstormen” aftonbladet.se 20 april 2016.

¹⁹⁵ Jeppsson, J., Karlsson, P., “MP-politiker bakom kritiserad inbjudan” Aftonbladet.se, 27th of April 2016.

¹⁹⁶ Jeppsson, J., Svensson, O., & Karlsson, P., “Kaplan: Jag väljer att kliva åt sidan” Aftonbladet.se, 18th of April 2016

¹⁹⁷ Svensson, N, “Politikerna åt middag med högerextrema Grå Vargarna” Expressen.se, 13th June 2018

¹⁹⁸ “Ramberg: Löfven lät mer bekymrad än Kaplan”, Ekot/Sverigess radio.se, 18th April 2016

Lars Nicander, head of the department of asymmetric threats at the Swedish Defense Academy concludes *“I see a similarity to how Soviet communism acted during the Cold War when they attempted to infiltrate various democratic parties, and that methodology we can see examples of today when people close to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is an Islamic party, apparently received a large foothold within the Green Party.”*¹⁹⁹

A back-room deal with the Social-Democrats

The Social democratic party has a former Christian branch called *“Broderskapsrörelsen”*. Today it is called *“Socialdemokrater för tro och solidaritet”* and brings people together of many faiths in support for the social democratic party in Sweden.²⁰⁰ In 1999 an agreement was reached between Broderskapsrörelsen and the Muslim Brotherhood in the form of Sveriges Muslimers Råd (SMR). They agreed on the construction of a parallel society and advancement of Muslims in the party structure.²⁰¹ The agreement was the results of multiple conferences and meetings that had started all the way back in 1994 but took more formal form two years later and on at least one of the conferences representatives from the Muslim Brotherhood’s European umbrella, FIOE, were present together with high-ranking social democrats.

The man Mahmoud Aldebe was one of the Muslim representatives, he later in 2006 wrote a letter to the members of parliament demanding parallel judicial structure for the

¹⁹⁹ “Forskare: ‘Miljöpartiet kan ha infiltrerats av islamister’” tv4.se/Aftonbladet.se 22 April 2016

²⁰⁰ <http://trosolidaritet.se/> visited 20 June 2018

²⁰¹ Norell, M. (2016), p. 20

Muslim population. Some key points from this collaboration according to themselves in their project report is the transformation of Broderskapsrörelsen to a multi religious organization also encompassing Muslims, education of imams and secular Muslim leaders in the Swedish organizational framework, facilitating high ranking contacts, and a high rate of Muslims voting Social democratic. But the whole document is ending in “*Strategy and goals*” where different numbers of Muslims in the Swedish governmental structure on a social democratic mandate is given.²⁰²

One such Muslim we may suppose was Omar Mustafa president of Islamska Förbundet, a MB associated organization, and elected member of the Social-democrats governing board. He entered as a member only in 2010 and three years later he was elected to the most powerful board in the party. He was forced to step down after only 6 days due to a media campaign where it had come to the public’s knowledge that he had been arranging conferences with Muslim lecturer advocating anti-Semitism and the like. But the Social democrats never condemned him or his views but only stated that his “*method*” of inviting people with these views was not acceptable.²⁰³

Liberals and the Muslim schools

During the years 2010 and 2014 a man named Abdirisak Waberi was a member of parliament for Nya Moderaterna, the largest center right party. This man was president of IFIS

²⁰² “Delaktighet identitet & integration”, Rapport 4/99, Broderskaa rörelsen och Sveriges Muslimska Råd

²⁰³ Näslund, L., “S: Därför tvingades Omar Mustafa avgå”, svt. se, 17 April 2013

up until his entry in the parliament.²⁰⁴ But also during these years he publicly appeared with FIOE on gatherings with for instance EU-dignitaries.²⁰⁵ He even assumed the position as vice president of the FIOE and head of their PR department.²⁰⁶ He is reported having said, "*Islam has only one definition*"²⁰⁷ The party found it reasonable to nominate him to the defense committee, a position he also assumed and held for all four years in parliament.²⁰⁸

Between the years 1998 and 2010 he was headmaster of Römosseskolan in Gothenbourg and 2006 to 2011 president of Sveriges Islamiska Skolor/ Swedens Islamic Schools.²⁰⁹ Recently he open another Islamic school in the town of Borås.²¹⁰ ²¹¹ The Muslim Brotherhood is by Swedish researcher Magnus Norell considered to have built a large school cooperation called "*Framstegsskolan*" operating different Muslim schools.²¹² This "*Framstegsskolan*" (eng. Progress School) is actually the same organization as "*Sveriges Islamiska Skolor*" who has changed name.²¹³ The operation is financed by the Swedish government and on their webpage they list six member schools and five more cooperating schools. Waberis

²⁰⁴ IFIS press memo: IFIS rådsmöte nr 5, 2nd of October 2010

²⁰⁵ FIOE press memo: "FIOE celebrates the New Hijri Year in a gathering of dignitaries in Brussels", 23th of November 2012

²⁰⁶ FIOE press memo: "FIOE held celebration in Brussels on the occasion of Hajj and blessed Eid-ul-Adha", 23th of November 2011

²⁰⁷ Norell, M. (2016), p. 20

²⁰⁸ Riksdagen.se (Swedish parliament) register over MP:s assignments

²⁰⁹ CV from Abdirisak Waberis official web page

²¹⁰ Netskar, S., "Rektor: Vi känner oss utpekade", svt.se/väst13 th of February 2018

²¹¹ Stjärnered, P-O., "Muslimsk friskola får öppna I Borås" svt.se/väst, 13th of February 2018

²¹² Norell, M. (2016), p. 30

²¹³ <http://framstegsskolan.se/om-oss/> visited 20th of June 2018

preVIOUS school Römosseskolan is listed as a member but the new school in Borås is not yet listed so including the new Borås School twelve schools may be considered open associated with the structure.²¹⁴

Institutionalized Islamism?

Already in 2011 it was identified more than 50 cases in the US where conflict of law issues were addressed between Sharia and State law, because mostly MB linked legal groups tried to advance Sharia based judgments.²¹⁵ The number today is unknown. Also in Egypt the court was targeted and they made efforts to use existing laws for their purposes.²¹⁶

A recent case in Sweden concerned nämndeman Ebtisam Aldebe from Centerpartiet, a liberal/centrist party. This woman is the wife of Mahmoud Aldebe who made the original deal with the Social-democrats about advancing Muslims inside the party structure. She was high profiled in media in 2018 when a case regarding a man hitting a woman became public. She had let him go free in what seems as references to sharia law.²¹⁷ This was all part of the official court protocol. Several cases were later identified where she had as a “*political judge*” deterred from normal procedure.²¹⁸ She has also been reported when as a member in “migration court” she declined Christian converts asylum.²¹⁹ The

²¹⁴ <http://framstegsskolan.se/> visited 20th of June 2018

²¹⁵ Lebl, L. (2013), p. 118

²¹⁶ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 53

²¹⁷ Sidenvall, J., “Sharia I domstolen”, Smålandsposten, 5th of March

²¹⁸ Skoglund, K., “Nämndemannen har gått emot juristdomaren tidigare”, expressen.se, 5th March 2018 /

²¹⁹ Janzon, E., “Nämndemannen var med och fällde konvertiter”, Världenidag.se, 6th March 2018

Christian newspaper *Världen Idag* reported already in 2011 about several cases connected to Aldebe where she had tried to decline Muslim converts to Christianity asylum.²²⁰ Centerpartiet did not take any measures until 2018.

The perhaps biggest Muslim event in Sweden each year is *Muslimska Familjedagarna* (eng. Muslim family days) arranged in coordination with *Islamiska Förbundet (IFIS)*, *Ibn Rushd* and *Sveriges Unga Muslimer (SUM)*. They state that more than 5000 are visiting the event.²²¹ Often several radical speakers are invited and in 2018 one of them was Nouredine Khademi, known as a strong believer in implementing sharia who has on several occasion advocated for his followers to go to Syria and fight as part of jihad.²²²

Ibn Rushd has institutionalized its connections to the Swedish government as a “*studieförbund*” (eng. Federation of education) taking on some semipublic functions. For instance they have access to the asylum seekers to give them a “*meaningful occupation*”, all funded by the government.²²³ Other projects give them access to prison inmates for educating them in Islam.²²⁴ This is happening at the same time as the 58-year-old Swedish citizen Tarif al-Sayyed Issa, MB activist, was killed in Syria while fighting the Syrian government. His death was saluted by the Muslim Brotherhood

²²⁰ janzon, E., “Nämndeman tveksam till religionsbyte”, *Världen idag*, 4th of April 2011

²²¹ <https://www.muslimskafamiljedagarna.se/> visited 20th of June 2018

²²² Westerholm, J., “Imam Jihad gästar de Muslimska Familjedagarna i Kista”, *ledarsidorna.se*, 30th of March 2018

²²³ <http://www.ibnrushd.se/asylverksamheten/> visited 20th of June 2018

²²⁴ <http://www.ibnrushd.se/vara-projekt/> visited 20th of June 2018

and they described him as a “*martyred brother*”.²²⁵ This man was a known Muslim Brother in Sweden and joined the Fath-army who collaborated with al-Qaida and took part in ethnic cleansings of Christians. Three of his sons are active Islamists and one former president of Sveriges Unga Muslimer (SUM), another is employed by this same educational federation – Ibn Rushd.²²⁶

Islamic Relief is another organization heavily financed by the Swedish government. They have a strong presence in Syria and states that they have helped over four million people.²²⁷ This organization is actually labeled as a terrorist organization by the United Arab Emirates because it has so strong MB ties.²²⁸ SIDA (the Swedish relief agency) has granted financing for Islamic Relief on many occasions, for instance in Tchad²²⁹ and Gaza.²³⁰ Islamic Relief is also listed as one of three public sponsors for Muslimska familjedagarna together with Framstegsskolan and a travel agency specialized in Islamic pilgrimage.²³¹ In 2013 SIDA announced that Islamic Relief is one of their “*strategic partners*”.²³²

²²⁵ Andersson Lundberg, H. & Hamadé, K., “Svensk medborgare död efter dåd med bilbomb i Syrien” *expressen.se*, 3rd of March 2018

²²⁶ Westerholm, J., “Muslimska brödraskapets utbredning i Sverige inte okänd”, 3rd of March 2018 /

²²⁷ Islamic relief press memo: “Sju år av krig i Syrien – detta har Islamic Relief gjort”, 16th of March 2018 <http://islamic-relief.se/sju-ar-av-krig-i-syrien-detta-har-islamic-relief-gjort/>

²²⁸ “Islamska förbundet terrorstämplas”, TT, 15th November 2014

²²⁹ Islamic relief press memo: “Sida beviljar insats i Tchad”, 22nd of June 2010 <http://islamic-relief.se/sida-beviljar-insats-i-tchad/>

²³⁰ Islamic relief press memo: “Stöd från Sida för insatser i Gaza”, 22nd of June 2010 <http://islamic-relief.se/stod-fran-sida-for-insatser-i-gaza/>

²³¹ <https://www.muslimskafamiljedagarna.se/> visited 20th of June 2018

²³² Sida.se “OM SAMARBETET MED DET CIVILA SAMHÄLLET: Stöd till humanitärt bistånd genom civilsamhället” updated 23rd of June 2016

To end with we can mention that public Muslim prayers from Mosques are now become a reality in Sweden. Both in Västerås and in Karlskrona the authorities have given permission for the local mosque to make their prayers in speakers outside addressing the public nearby.^{233, 234}

Discussion and conclusions

“Tolerance is the patient endurance of an evil” Tomas ab Aquino

State coercion and the counter-hegemony strategy

The difference between islamistic groups is not so much a question about their goals but instead a question about political method.²³⁵ And they can study history as well as we. The coercive capacity of the Egyptian state has shown that a counter-cultural strategy is not enough. This is actually also what Antonio Gramsci thought; the counter-cultural strategy was intended to culminate in a physical takeover. Much of moderate Islamist thought represented by foremost the Muslim Brotherhood has been preoccupied not with directly challenge the ruling elite but with building from beneath structures permeating society and leading to its gradual Islamization.²³⁶ In his 2011 analysis Hazem Kandil wrote clear-sighted *“the likely outcome of culturally successful*

²³³ Sjögren, N., “Nu är det klart – premiär för böneutrop i Växjö” svt.se/Småland, 25th of May 2018

²³⁴ Hallberg, M., “Ja till böneutrop i Karlskrona” svt.se/ Blekinge 18th of May 2018

²³⁵ Norell, M. (2016), p. 13

²³⁶ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 37-41

counterhegemonic strategies is heightened repression, and thus failure to take power [...] My analysis emphasizes how control over the organs of repression remains the final arbiter of political power."²³⁷

To uphold their hegemonic position modern rulers use consensus-enhancing mechanisms. So the opposition needs to 1) attack the current hegemony 2) build a counter-hegemonic position, an ideology 3) develop an organizational structure aimed at infiltrating or penetrating social structures and 4) judge when the moment has come to take power, ruthlessly violent and overthrow competing elites or the ability to use coercion.²³⁸ For Gramsci the cultural, social and intellectual position of the movement must be supplemented by force and the power to suppress opposition. In fact in one of the last writings of al-Banna he states that it would be "*a crime [...] not to seize power from the hands of those who violate Islam*".²³⁹ What holds for Europe in that regard, where all countries seem to lack the capacity or at least the will to use state coercion toward these groups?

The naïve question at hand – can a purely counter-cultural hegemony strategy be successful? The evidence of Egypt points in the other direction. The presumption is that the ruling elite somehow voluntarily will step down under cultural pressure. This the MB has had a lot of time to evolve thoughts around. The successful Islamists have instead combined a counter-cultural strategy with strategies who at least neutralizes the states coercive power, for example Pakistan (1977), Iran (1979), Sudan (1989), Turkey (2002) and other cases where Islamist needed to conduct prolonged warlike

²³⁷ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 40

²³⁸ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 41-42

²³⁹ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 43-44

conflicts before they could take power such as Afghanistan (1989), Lebanon (1989), Somalia (1991), Iraq (2003) and Palestine (2006).²⁴⁰ An objective to change politics in a fundamental way, as in the case with Islamists, inclines the necessity to determine how to confront state institutions of repression because these will be used against them if successful. In fact the cultural strategy never in it self can face the coercive effort by the state, instead preemptive counter-coercion ability has to be created.²⁴¹

But some researchers such as Samir Amghar suggest that MB do not target state control, that it has learnt its lesson and instead *“like any social movement [...] aims to influence social change and to bend the behavioral rules dominant in society in order to impose its own values.”*²⁴² This he suggests is founded on the idea of changing the world without taking power. Some go even further such as Irene Bloemraad who suggest *“multicultural accommodation not only produce nested identities, but perhaps also generates even stronger attachment to the state.”*²⁴³ But in the same paper she has to admit that there are no positive effects of multicultural policies regarding trust among immigrants from the second generation and onwards.²⁴⁴ It is hard not to consider some of this research as consisting of wishful thinking. A discussion about wheter the European MB has changed ideological to encompass multiculturalism or if it is a tactical maneuver due to their minority position needs to be based

²⁴⁰ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 59

²⁴¹ Kandil, H. (2011), p. 57

²⁴² Amghar, S. (2008), p. 76

²⁴³ Bloemraad, I. (2015), p. 597

²⁴⁴ Bloemraad, I. (2015), p. 600

on realistic assumptions.²⁴⁵ In fact multiculturalist policies are not very far from the tactics that MB has used from the beginning with its focus on re-islamisation on the individual level and gradually pushing its beliefs on families, groups, the state and society. The model is from a MB perspective a mean to islamisation and not a model for integration²⁴⁶

It has been suggested by Lorenzo Vidino that the future social harmony in Europe regarding its Muslim minority rests on the ability to remove the appeal to Muslims in Europe of the lower levels of the pyramid which otherwise acts as catalysts and conveyor belts for more radical expressions. The higher levels of the pyramid must forcefully be targeted with suitable legal means.²⁴⁷ He touches on the view that the Muslim Brotherhood is conducting a counter-cultural strategy and at the same time supports or gives energy to more radical elements that can confront the state as such if needed.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a long-term threat

We proposed three supporting arguments in determining if MB is to be considered a long-term threat to Western societies. First “*a) For MB moderate Islamism is an opportunistic position and not a principal position.*”

In the chapter of Islamistic roots we have covered the opportunistic view the MB seems to hold toward belief structures that is not Islamists. They seem to be happy to collaborate as long as Islamist positions can advance. We will conclude with a quote: “*We believe in the totality of Islam. [...]Islam] is not satisfied unless it controls society and*

²⁴⁵ Norell, M. (2016), p. 17-18

²⁴⁶ Norell, M. (2016), p. 27-28

²⁴⁷ Vidino, L. (2009), p. 175

guides every dimension of life, from entering the toilet to the construction of the state and the establishment of the caliphate" Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁴⁸

"b) *MB is building an Islamistic parallel structure in society "the Muslim community".*" [Building and maintaining a collective identity]: We have shown that the Muslim Brotherhood both in Egypt and in Sweden is trying to create parallel structures with schools, educational centers, mosques etcetera and they are actively trying to implement the belief that the Muslim population is one and obviously best represented by the Muslim Brotherhood.

"c) *MB is using existing structures and ideas to protect and advance their values and their infrastructure.*" [Facilitating political opportunity structures]: The multicultural agenda and commitment to combat islamophobia in Europe is a political opportunity structure for MB.²⁴⁹ They are not waiting for things to happen by themselves and for example in the case with the alternative UN report backed by 17 Islamic national organizations a clear message of repression of free speech is delivered, focused on restricting criticism towards Islam and Muslims.²⁵⁰ As we have shown they have managed to channel government funds to their structures both in Sweden and in relief efforts in the Muslim world. In this way they are able to build status among Muslims globally thanks to Swedish taxpayers. We have also seen instances of Sharia in the court of law and high-ranking officials using their positions to advance Muslim countries and Muslim persons interests.

²⁴⁸ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 18

²⁴⁹ Norell, M. (2016), p. 24

²⁵⁰ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 56

The conclusion can only be one – The Muslim Brotherhood is a threat to Europe. MB is actively trying to change the civilization towards an Islamistic one. It has been suggested that relevant conclusions is hard to draw from comparing MB in the middle east with the activism in Europe. The underlying assumption is that a shift of enemy might have occurred and hence also a shift in ultimate goals.²⁵¹ However it is clear that the organization is showing consistency in ways of operating and also ideological consistence, given the elements of ideological pragmatism, historic evidence of violence and current evidence such as verbal in Egypt and physical such as in the case in Hamas, a shift to a violent perspective can be expected when Islamism do not longer advance in Europe on a voluntarily and /or entristic way.

We need to know more about how deep the institutionalized Islamist penetration has gone in countries such as in Sweden. We need to stop the funding of groups like MB using government means and we need to develop strategies to counter them. In the case of Sweden parties need to be prepared for how to counter infiltration and they have to resist the temptation to win Muslim votes by making alliances with islamists. We also need to form a realistic view of these organizations. Furthermore it is also necessary to better understand the need of a unified and dominant cultural expression in a country giving the overall framework for the societal interactions.

²⁵¹ Carlbom, A. (2018), p. 13

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Współpraca państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w publicystyce „Rzeczy Wspólnej” i „Nowej Konfederacji” (Cz. II)

Abstract

Cooperation between countries in East-Central Europe in the articles published in the “Rzeczy Wspólne” and “Nowa Konfederacja”

The aim of the article is to discuss the attitude of Polish republican circles to the issue of cooperation between countries in East-Central Europe. The articles published in the “Rzeczy Wspólne” and “Nowa Konfederacja” magazines, which were published in 2010-2017, have been analyzed. The ideas of region integration have deep roots in Polish political thought. Their origins can be seen in the tradition of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the concepts of Marshal Piłsudski. The ineffectiveness of the activities of the politicians of the Third Polish Republic in this field became the reason for criticism in republican articles. An important role in the analyzed visions was played by countries located outside the EU - Belarus and Ukraine, for geopolitical reasons considered as desirable allies. The slogan of deepening the integration of the Visegrad Group and strengthening the Eastern Partnership initiative was also popular. However, this cooperation was to take place between fully sovereign states.

Key words: East-Central Europe, Intermarium, Visegrad Group, Eastern Partnership

Polska *soft power*

Sojusz państw Międzymorza oparty miał być nie tylko o działania w zakresie zapewnienia regionowi bezpieczeństwa energetycznego czy militarnego. Istotną rolę odgrywać miały również czynniki takie jak bliskość kulturowa państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, a w przypadku krajów Pomostu Bałtycko-Czarnomorskiego odwołania do spuścizny przedm rozbiorowej Rzeczpospolitej. Zdaniem republikanów, narody regionu łączą wspólne wartości – wspólnym mitem mogącym je zjednoczyć powinno być dążenie do wolności i wyębicia się na podmiotowość¹. Jak stwierdziła Ewa Thompson, Europa Środkowa musi dokonać tego ostatniego także na polu wartości, przypomnieć światu o swej historycznej roli, dokonać mentalnej dekolonizacji².

K. Szczerski pisał w 2015 r., że należałoby przeciwstażwić się próbom rozbijania jedności Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Jej integracji sprzyjać ma szereg wspólnych inicjatyw „od infrastruktury do kultury”, wzmacniających więzi regionalne. Konieczna miała być tu wymiana kulturalna pomiędzy krajami regionu, a nawet wspieranie turystyki. Rola Polski w tym procesie określona została jako „kluczowa”³. Wśród szczegółowych postulatów wymieniało tak ambitne projekty jak utworzenie Uniwersytetu Środkoeuropejskiego, który kształciłby elity krajów regionu czy wprowadzenie do programów nauczania „kursów

¹ K. Szczerski, *Do kogo należy Europa Środkowa?*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2013, nr 2 (16), s. 38–49.

² E. Thompson, *Historia Europy Środkowej jako narracja postkolonialna*, „Rzeczy wspólne” 2012, nr 2 (8), s. 26–35.

³ K. Szczerski, *Możemy być liderem Europy Środkowej*, „Rzeczy wspólne” 2015, nr 1 (19), s. 36–47.

poświęconych historii, kulturze i tożsamości Europy Środkowej”⁴.

Podobnie ambitną była wizja wpływania na elity krajów wschodnioeuropejskich, rozwinięta przez Piotra Trudnowskiego na łamach „Nowej Konfederacji”. Pośród zaś proponowanych rozwiązań wymieniał on wprowadzenie wymogu przeznaczania 25% otrzymywanych przez partie polityczne subwencji na działalność w krajach Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Jak pisał Trudnowski, „ostatecznie lepiej, by młodzieżówka partyjna PO imprezowała w Kijowie z młodzieżówkami ukraińskich, proeuropejskich partii, niżby te same pieniądze wydawano na imprezy we własnym gronie w warszawskim lokalu go-go, już bez Ukraińców. Zakładam jednak, może naiwnie, że zobligowani do wydatkowania dużych środków na politykę na Wschodzie politycy spróbują chociaż stworzyć poważne, silne instytucje i zaplecze eksperckie dla swoich formacji”. Każda polska partia powinna więc pozyskiwać bliskie sobie światopoglądowo elity w krajach wschodnioeuropejskich. Trudnowski widział tu rolę nawet dla Twojego Ruchu Janusza Palikota, który miałyby zajmować się zjednywaniem dla polskich interesów partii liberalnych obyczajowo⁵. Zważywszy na dokonania polityczne tego typu środowisk, można powątpiewać czy byłyby one zainteresowane walką o polską rację stanu, choć przyznać należy, iż wcielenie w życie pomysłu Trudnowskiego musiałyby przyczynić się do pogłębienia powierzchownego

⁴ M. Kędziński, *Czas na Międzymorze*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 3 (54), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/czas-na-miedzymorze/>

⁵ P. Trudnowski, *Jak partie mogą budować polską soft power na Wschodzie*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2015, nr 3 (57), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/jak-partie-moga-budowac-polskie-soft-power-na-wschodzie/>

na ogół zainteresowania polskiej klasy politycznej sprawami Wschodu.

Jak wspomniano, szczególne miejsce w tego typu wizjach zajmowały kraje dawnego państwa polsko-litewskiego. K. Szczerski pisał wręcz o szerzeniu cywilizacji łacińskiej w tych krajach⁶. Zdaniem jednego z autorów, zaplecze dla polskiego biznesu należałoby budować także poprzez wspieranie polskiego *soft power* (na polu kultury). Pisał on w tym kontekście o bardziej rozsądnym, efektywnym podejściu do programu stypendiów dla ukraińskich studentów⁷. Dawid Wildstein, zwracając uwagę na istotną rolę *soft power*, której świadome są Niemcy i Rosja, uznawał, że Polska miałaby problem w promowaniu swoich konserwatywnych wartości, bowiem w oczach Zachodu (a wbrew faktom) to właśnie Rosja Władimira Putina uchodzi za ostoję tradycji. Mimo to, Warszawa, zbyt słaba by zdominować region militarnie i ekonomicznie, powinna podjąć wysiłki w tym kierunku np. wykorzystując pozytywny wizerunek Polski i Polaków na Ukrainie. „Budujmy szkoły i uniwersytety – pisał Wildstein – wiążmy ze sobą finansowo elity intelektualne i medialne. Oferujmy stypendia, granty badawcze, współpracę na poziomie uniwersyteckim, naukowym, kulturowym. Twórzmy fundacje. Za tym pójdą realne wpływy, kontakty...”. Jak dokąd dawał, także na wypadek, w którym (w nieokreślonej przyszłości) Ukraina miałaby stać się dla Polski rywalem, należy wiązać z Polską elity ukraińskie⁸. Padł również pomysł

⁶ K. Szczerski, *Polska w Europie. Doktryna asa trefl*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2011, nr 3 (5), s. 104–113.

⁷ M. Kuź, *Machiavelli na Majdanie*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 9 (21), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/machiavelli-na-majdanie/>

⁸ D. Wildstein, *Światło dla Europy... wschodniej*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2015, nr 3 (21), s. 44–53.

powołania uniwersytetu polsko-ukraińskiego, działającego w obu krajach oraz inicjacji otwartej, społecznej (obejmującej nie tylko historyków) dyskusji mającej na celu wyjaśnienie trudnych spraw z historii⁹.

Nie mniejszym zainteresowaniem cieszyła się Białoruś. Już przed przejściem władzy przez PiS (i odwilżą w stosunkach na linii Warszawa-Mińsk) uznawano, że należy rozszerzać relacje polityczne z Białorusią, niezależnie od faktu, że panuje tam dyktatura¹⁰. Środowiskom, które z tej przyczyny sprzeciwiały się współpracy z Mińskiem, zarysowano nawet analogię historyczną z XIV wiekiem, kiedy to Polska połączyła się z Litwą, pomimo że ta druga wcześniej ją nieustannie najeżdżała. Chodzić więc ma o realny rachunek zysków i strat¹¹.

Jeden z autorów postulował uświadamianie polskiego społeczeństwa o wspólnych korzeniach, wspólnym dziedzictwie historycznym, popularyzację wiedzy o dziejach stosunków polsko-białoruskich. Odzywający na Białorusi mit Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, pozostającego w braterskim związku z Polską, miałby być niebagatelny czynnik ułatwiający zbliżenie polsko-białoruskie¹². Konstatowano, że spośród narodów graniczących z Polską od wschodu jedynie Białoruś sını skłónni są widzieć w unii polsko-litewskiej pozytywny element historii regionu. Zwracano uwagę na szereg działań ze strony białoruskich władz, mających legitymizować rządy

⁹ W. Tomaszewski, *Pozycja Polski w wariantach geopolitycznych*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2015, nr 1 (19), s. 22–35.

¹⁰ Idem, *Białoruś: Putin u bram*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2015, nr 2 (20), s. 152–161.

¹¹ A. Michalak, *Przeprosiny z Łukaszenką*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2016, nr 11 (77), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/przeprosiny-z-lukaszenka/>

¹² A. Kałużny, *Białoruś. Zapomniany przyjaciel*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 16–17 (28–29), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/bialorus-zapomniany-przyjaciel/>.

Aleksandra Łukaszenki poprzez odwołania do historii Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, którą to narrację do niedawna (jako nacjonalistyczną i opozycyjną wobec postsowieckiej mitologii) aktywnie zwalczano. Dla publicystów „Nowej Konfederacji” może to być szansa na zbliżenie z Polską¹³. Konkretnych postulatów w zakresie współpracy kulturalnej Polski i Białorusi jednak nie rozwinięto.

Wzmocnienie wewnętrzne państwa drogą do podmiotowości

Dużą uwagę przywiązywano do faktu, że państwo mające ambicje animować współpracę krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej musi mieć odpowiedni potencjał¹⁴, którego to dzisiejszej Polsce brakuje. Na łamach opisywanych czasopism jawi się to wręcz jako warunek *sine qua non* efektywnej współpracy regionalnej. K. Szczerski, zwracający uwagę na konieczność wzmocnienia siły państwa polskiego i polskiej gospodarki, pisał: „Musimy przywrócić potencjał Polski i regionu, częściowo utracony w wyniku transformacji po 1989 r., ale bez kwestionowania wspólnych podstaw w postaci demokracji i rynku, tyle że musi być to demokracja substancjalna, a nie proceduralna i rynek uczciwych zasad, a nie nadużyć”¹⁵.

Zdarzały się głosy podkreślające dysproporcję pomiędzy retoryką polskich rządów a brakiem prób wzmocnienia siły państwa. Charakteryzującą rządy III RP nieudolność

¹³ A. Michalak, *Polska – Białoruś: Synchronizacja Pamięci*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2017, nr 2 (80), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/polska-bialorus-synchronizacja-pamieci/>

¹⁴ M. Staniszewski, *Ukraina nie zostanie szybko strategicznym sojusznikiem Polski*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2014, nr 4 (18), s. 36–45.

¹⁵ K. Szczerski, *Możemy być liderem...*

na arenie międzynarodowej, połączoną z wykrzykiwaniem szumnych słów zestawiał M. Kuź ze skuteczną, a prowadzoną pod hasłami nie przywołującymi na myśl wielkich syme boli polityką niemiecką: „Podczas gdy my wciąż mówimy o projekcie neojagiellońskim, którego nie ma, Berlin twardo milczy o niemieckiej Europie, która na naszych oczach po prostu wstaje”¹⁶. By być państwem wiodącym w regionie, Polska musi zdobyć się na szereg reform wzmacniających ją wewnątrz. Wobec prawdopodobnego – jak chciał M. Kuź – powstania w przyszłej Europie szeregu bloków, grupujących kraje o wspólnych interesach, Rzeczpospolita musi stać się „Prusami Europy Środkowo-wschodniej”¹⁷ – państwem doskonale zorganizowanym, sprawnym, umiejącym realizować swoje interesy nawet na przekór słabościom, takim jak fakt posiadania mniejszego potencjału niż mocarstwa europejskie. Zdaniem Kuzia, zwolennicy polityki jagiellońskiej nie potrafią w sposób pragmatyczny sformułować swoich postulatów. Jego zdaniem, należałoby więc zaprzestać stosowania tego typu haseł na rzecz wzmacniania swego potencjału. „Środki daje zaś – pisał Kuź – silny przemysł, własny, narodowy sektor bakowy, sprawny system edukacji, rozwinięta infrastruktura i silna, nowoczesna armia. Dopiero kiedy mamy te zasoby w stopniu znacząco większym niż państwa, na które chcemy oddziaływać, możemy je zacząć do siebie przyciągać”. Jak stwierdził Kuź, w sytuacji, w której polskie banki w 60% należą do kapitału zagranicznego, a pierwszej setce największych polskich przedsiębiorstw tylko 17 należy

¹⁶ M. Kuź, *Zamilknąć nie znaczy zapomnieć*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 3 (54), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/zamilknac-nie-znaczy-zapomniec/>

¹⁷ Idem, *Polska jako Nowe Prusy*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 34 (46), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/polska-jako-nowe-prusy/>

do rodzimego kapitału, trudno mówić o istnieniu silnego potencjału, w oparciu o który można byłoby integrować region¹⁸.

Należy „budować prawdziwie polską gospodarkę, przejmować gdzie się da banki i gazety z rąk obcokrajowców, wzmacniać przemysł i sprzyjać rodzimemu handlowi”, stwierdzał R. Zenderowski. Wzorców upatrywano w Viktorze Orbánie, który był w stanie dokonać odpowiednich reform, stojąc na czele kraju znacznie mniejszego i słabszego przecież niż Polska¹⁹. Zdaniem Zenderowskiego, konieczne byłoby też danie odporu ambicjom Niemiec, roszczących sobie prawo do decydowania o tym co dzieje się w mniejszych krajach.

P. Żurawski vel Grajewski podkreślał, że Polska musi kontynuować lub zainicjować rozbudowę infrastruktury wzmacniającej jej pozycję wobec Rosji: gazoportu w Świnoujściu, elektrowni atomowa w Żarnowcu, elektrowni w Visaginie (Litwa), ropociągu Odessa-Brody-Płock-Gdańsk, rozpocząć przekop Mierzei Wiślanej²⁰. Z kolei M. Staniszewski zwracał uwagę, że poprzez uruchomienie wydobycia gazu łupkowego, Polska mogłaby stać się „gwarantem stabilności energetycznej regionu”. Przyczyniłoby się to także do bezpośredniego osłabienia Rosji, bowiem znacząco zmniejszyłyby się import surowców energetycznych ze wschodu²¹.

¹⁸ Idem, *Zamilknąć nie znaczy...*

¹⁹ R. Zenderowski, *Kropla drąży skałę*. Wywiad, rozm. B. Radziejewski, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 3 (54), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/kropla-drazzy-skale/>

²⁰ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Stać nas na podmiotowość*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2011, nr 4 (6), s. 16–27.

²¹ M. Staniszewski, *Czas dorosnąć do własnych ambicji*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2013, nr 2 (16), s. 6–17.

Bardzo interesujące, biorąc pod uwagę zarówno późniejszą rolę polityczną K. Szczerskiego, jak i ogólnie posunięcia rządu PiS, są wymieniane przezeń w początkach 2015 r. postulaty wzmocnienia państwa, pośród których znajdziemy nie tylko te pozamilitarne jak reindustrializacja kraju, odtworzenie własności narodowej w sektorze bankowym, ale i dotyczące modernizacji armii, rozwijania własnego przemysłu zbrojeniowego, zakupu odpowiednich rodzajów uzbrojenia, budowy obrony terytorialnej²². Na ten ostatni czynnik, kładł nacisk również zadeklarowany zwolennik koncepcji Międzymorza, Romuald Szeremietiew. Masowa obrona terytorialna jawi się mu jako podstawa wzmocnienia militarnej pozycji kraju²³.

Postulat budowy możliwie daleko posuniętej samodzielności militarnej (bez negowania samej potrzeby przynależności do NATO) wysuwał J. Bartosiak: „(...) Musimy opracować nową wielką strategię. Powinniśmy budować własne siły zbrojne, autonomiczne, niezależne od NATO, Stanów Zjednoczonych, z naszym dowodzeniem i zdolnościami operacyjnymi. Musimy tworzyć własne systemy rozpoznawcze i samodzielnie operować, nie licząc na NATO, bo możemy się przeliczyć. Musimy w zakresie tej wielkiej strategii badać nieustannie stan linii komunikacyjnych z państwami morskimi, czyli USA i Wielką Brytanią, które są naszymi sojusznikami. Bo może się okazać, że nie będą w stanie przyjąć nam z pomocą, a innych sojuszników, patrząc realistycznie, nie mamy, może z wyjątkiem państw skandynawskich, które nie licząc Norwegii i Danii, są poza NATO”²⁴. Omawiając

²² K. Szczerski, *Możemy być liderem...*

²³ R. Szeremietiew, *Clausewitz, Mackinder, Piłsudski i... sojusze, czyli polski dylemat*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2016, nr 2 (23), s. 14–23.

²⁴ J. Bartosiak, *NATO na krawędzi*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2016, nr 7 (73), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/nato-na-krawedzi/>

wyniki prac nad Strategicznym Przeglądem Obronnym z 2017 r., Bartosiak rozwijał te uwagi w odniesieniu do położenia Polski na nizinach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. W tonie afirmatywnym komentował zawarte w dokumencie założenia wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa militarnego Polski²⁵.

Sojusznicy Międzymorza

Budowa silnej pozycji Polski poprzez pogłębianie związków z sąsiednimi krajami nie wyczerpywała, zdaniem republikańskich publicystów, zagadnienia wzmocnienia potencjału państwa na arenie międzynarodowej. Pod koniec 2017 r. J. Bartosiak konstatował, że zapóźnienie regionu ma źródła w dualizmie na Łabie, którego skutki – jeśli Polska ma faktycznie stać się znaczącym graczem w Europie – należałoby w przyszłości zniwelować. Widział ku temu trzy drogi: umacnianie związków z UE, a więc Niemcami, strategiczny sojusz z USA, które miałyby wspomagać Polskę w zakresie bezpieczeństwa militarnego, ale i ekonomicznego oraz silne pogłębienie relacji z Chinami²⁶.

Jako najbardziej oczywisty postulat jawiła się wielu publicystom współpraca Polski i regionu ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Waszyngton postrzegany był jako czynnik patrolujący, a wręcz umożliwiający Polsce prowadzenie aktywnej i skutecznej polityki w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej²⁷.

²⁵ Idem, *Armia Nowego Wzoru – znakomity początek*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2017, 6 (84), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/armia-nowego-wzoru-znakomity-poczatek/>

²⁶ Idem, *Mapy mentalne polityki zagranicznej*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2017, nr 11 (89), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/mapy-mentalne-polityki-zagranicznej/>

²⁷ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Warszawa na tle ewolucji UE i NATO*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2015, nr 1 (19), s. 48–56.

Z drugiej strony, podkreślić należy, iż na ogół były to głosy dalekie od bezrefleksyjnego zapatrzenia w sojusz polsko-amerykański. Na łamach „Rzeczy Wspólnych” J. Wojas rozważał scenariusz nakreślony przez George’a Friedmana w książce „Następne 100 lat. Prognoza na XXI wiek”²⁸. Uznawał wsparcie USA dla budowy bloku państw Międzymorza za prawdopodobne w wypadku gwałtownego nasilenia sprzeczności interesów pomiędzy USA a Rosją. Waszyngton zdecydowałby się wtedy aktywniej poprzeć Ukrainę w Donbasie, ale też wzmocnić flankę wschodnią NATO oraz zainicjować na dużą skalę przepływ pieniędzy i technologii do Polski, która stałaby się „czymś w rodzaju środkowoeuropejskiego Izraela”. W bloku tym uczestniczyłyby Polska, Rumunia, Ukraina i państwa bałtyckie – inne państwa byłyby mniej zainteresowane taką współpracą. Bardziej prawdopodobne jednak, że USA dalej koncentrować się będzie na Pacyfiku, wykazując mniejsze zainteresowanie sytuacją w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej²⁹. Zdaniem Wojasa, nie ma pewności czy USA będzie zainteresowane aktywnym finansowaniem projektów integracyjnych w naszym regionie³⁰. Z kolei M. Kędzierski pisał, że „budowanie pozycji Polski na Trójkącie Weimarskim czy wyłącznym aliansie z USA to dopiero utopia. Olbrzymia asymetria potencjałów sprawia bowiem, że Polska może być w tych układach sojuszu niczych tylko wasalem”³¹. W 2014 r. dość sceptycznie wyrażał się na ten temat również J. Bartosiak, który uznawał,

²⁸ G. Friedman, *Następne 100 lat. Prognoza na XXI wiek*, Warszawa 2009.

²⁹ J. Wojas, *Czy Trump zbuduje Międzymorze*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2016, nr 2 (23), s. 160–169.

³⁰ Idem, *Zanim zbudujemy Międzymorze*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2016, nr 1 (22), s. 168–179.

³¹ M. Kędzierski, op. cit.

że Waszyngtonowi wcale nie będzie zależało na wzroście roli Polski w regionie³².

Mniej pisano o relacjach z UE, choć tu dość jasnym wydaje się, iż ogół publicystów żywił przekonanie jakoby wspólna praca państw regionu dopełniała się z polityką UE, a nie podważała jej spójność³³. „Trójmorze z założenia miało być środkowoeuropejską konsolidacją w ramach Unii Europejskiej”, stwierdzał K. Szczerski³⁴.

Co może wydać się interesujące, w charakterze naturalnego sojusznika Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, nie rzadziej niż USA (choć w nieco innym ujęciu), pojawiają się Chiny. Chińskie dążenia miały wręcz współgrać z programem budowy Międzymorza. Zdaniem J. Wojasa, Pekin proponuje Polsce i innym krajom regionu szeroką współpracę, zależy mu na stabilizacji i bezpieczeństwie w regionie – jednak aktywna rola Chin w tym miejscu globu to raczej kwestia przyszłości niż czasów obecnych³⁵. W jeszcze bardziej optymistycznym tonie utrzymana jest wypowiedź W. Tomaszewskiego: „Udział w tym przedsięwzięciu to dla nas, z punktu widzenia Chin, wyróżnienie. Pekin w swojej geopolitycznej układance traktuje Warszawę jako lidera regionu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i – jak na razie – faworyzuje nas”³⁶.

³² J. Bartosiak, *Polska droga od słabości do siły*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 3 (54), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/polska-droga-od-slabosci-do-sily/>

³³ L. Dorn, *Wizja Trumpa*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2017, nr 8 (86), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/wizja-trumpa/>

³⁴ K. Szczerski, *Na romantyzm w polityce niestety nie ma miejsca. Wywiad*, rozm. M Wojnar, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2017, nr 11 (89), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/na-romantyzm-w-polityce-niestety-nie-ma-miejsca/>

³⁵ J. Wojas, *Zanim zbudujemy...*

³⁶ W. Tomaszewski, *Skąd polska chwiejność w sprawie AIIB?*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2015, nr 8 (62), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/skad-polska-chwiejnosc-w-sprawie-aiib/>

Szczególnie perspektywicznym z punktu widzenia polskich interesów miał być projekt Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku. Polska, jak i cały pomost bałtycko-czarnomorski, z uwagi na samo położenie geograficzne, predestynowana byłaby do odegrania w realizacji tego projektu kluczowej roli. Jak pisał J. Bartosiak, o ile Rzeczpospolita będzie w stanie zapewnić sobie możliwość podmiotowego korzystania z tego projektu, to pojawią się możliwości wydatnego wzrostu jej wpływu na kraje sąsiednie³⁷. Zagadnienie rozwijał W. Tomaszewski, którego zdaniem chińskie inwestycje związane z projektem Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku są bardzo perspektywiczne z punktu widzenia interesów Polski w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej: „Budowa tego lotniska w kooperacji polsko-chińskiej, to ogromna szansa na przejęcie części rynku przewozów lotniczych w Europie Środkowej. Chińczycy są także zainteresowani infrastrukturalnymi inwestycjami w Polsce (nowe szlaki komunikacyjne, rozbudowa portów). (...) Chińskie plany pokrycia Międzymorza siecią szybkich szlaków komunikacyjnych, skutkujące zacieśnieniem relacji gospodarczych krajów naszego regionu, wykazują synergię z podobnymi planami zacieśnienia współpracy, propagowanymi przez prezydenta Dudę (grupa ABC). W wymiarze praktycznym może się to przełożyć na przyśpieszenie inwestycji Via Carpathia”³⁸. Co istotne, w wypadku decyzji o pogłębianiu współpracy z Pekinem, Warszawa winna prowadzić asertywną politykę wobec Niemiec, które również

³⁷ J. Bartosiak, *Polska na Jedwabnym Szlaku*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2016, nr 6 (72), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/polska-na-jedwabnym-szlaku/>

³⁸ W. Tomaszewski, *Awansujemy w chińskiej hierarchii*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2016, nr 7 (73), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/awansujemy-w-chinskiej-hierarchii/>

byłyby chętne stać się głównym beneficjentem wzrostu roli Chin w regionie, oraz utrzymać swoją pozycję ekonomiczną względem innych państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Koniecznością byłoby tu opracowanie spójnej, szczegółowej strategii postępowania³⁹.

Z uwagi na istotne położenie geopolityczne, a także – choć otwarcie to nie wybrzmiało – tradycje prometeizmu, podeje mowano również temat współpracy z państwami Kaukazu. P. Żurawski vel Grajewski pisał, że Polska winna wejść do „kombinacji brytyjsko-skandynawsko-polskiej” i stać się jej „środkowoeuropejskim trzonem”, podejmując jednocześnie próbę reaktywacji GUAM. Priorytetem miałyby być także promowanie interesów Gruzji na Zachodzie, nasilanie współpracy energetycznej z Azerbejdżanem. W myśl tych założeń, Warszawa winna próbować „zainteresować” USA tym rejonem, tak by utrudnić Rosji wpływanie na możliwości przesyłu surowców energetycznych przez Kaukaz⁴⁰.

Pośród potencjalnych sojuszników Polski i jej środkowoeuropejskich partnerów pojawiała się także Turcja. Zdaniem J. Bartosiaka, Ankara może widzieć swój interes we współpracy z przewodzącą państwom regionu Polską, gdyby ta osiągnęła odpowiednią pozycję⁴¹. 4 lata wcześniej z dużą krytyką ze strony M. Cichońskiego spotkała się nieumiejętność współpracy polskich rządów z rosnącą w siłę Turcją⁴².

Bardziej rozwinięte były propozycje wykorzystania antyrosyjskiego ukierunkowania polityki Szwecji⁴³, czy ogólnie

³⁹ J. Bartosiak, *Polska na Jedwabnym...*

⁴⁰ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Stać nas...*

⁴¹ J. Bartosiak, *Polska droga...*

⁴² M.A. Cichoński, *O przewrót kopernikański w polityce zagranicznej. Wywiad*, rozm. S. Sękowski, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2011, nr 3 (5), s. 114–123.

⁴³ M. Kuź, *Zamilknąć nie znaczy...*

podjęcia pogłębionej współpracy z państwami skandynawskimi, jako uzupełnienia kooperacji w regionie Międzymorza. Najmocniej rozwinął ten pomysł T. Szatkowski. Jak pisał, kraje skandynawskie są potencjalnym sojusznikiem Polski – mimo że Szwecja i Finlandia nie należą do NATO, to są skłonne współpracować z Zachodem. Z punktu widzenia Warszawy wariant taki miałby przedstawiać znaczące walory, bowiem kraje Skandynawii położone są w istotnym strategicznie miejscu Europy i dysponują względnie poważną siłą. W razie konfliktu są w stanie zablokować Rosjanom swobodę poruszania się po Bałtyku⁴⁴. Finlandia, Szwecja i Norwegia mają w sumie niemal 250 nowoczesnych samolotów wielozadaniowych. W czasie wojny Finowie są w stanie wystawić 350-tysięczną armię, a Szwedzi 70-tysięczną (choć mowa tu o siłach mających charakter obronny). Dodatkowo, przemysł zbrojeniowy państw skandynawskich miałby dużo do zaproponowania Polsce (Finlandia to jeden z liderów w dziedzinie kołowych pojazdów opancerzonych, Norwegowie produkują najlepsze pociski przeciwokrętowe, a Szwedzi słyną z produkcji samolotów wielozadaniowych. Z niektórych skandynawskich ofert Polska już zresztą korzysta)⁴⁵. Biorąc pod uwagę fakt zaangażowania rządu PiS w budowę gazociągu Baltic Pipe można byłoby wątek skandynawski uzupełnić także o czynnik pozamilitarny, choć w przeanalizowanej publicystyce republikańskiej nie był on wyeksponowany.

⁴⁴ T. Szatkowski, *Czy powrót do Międzymorza?*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2011, nr 3 (5), s. 84–103.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

Zagrożenia i wątpliwości

Stosunek do integracji regionu, jakkolwiek na ogół przychylny, daleki był w publicystyce republikańskiej od hurraoptymizmu. Nieraz zwracano uwagę na liczne trudności, które już dziś pojawiają się na drodze do realizacji tak śmiałych, jak by nie patrzeć, zamierzeń geopolitycznych. Czasem podkreślano, że potencjał militarny większości krajów Międzymorza jest niewielki⁴⁶. Z kolei M. Staniszewski, w swojej kompleksowej krytyce polskiej polityki wschodniej, wskazywał na brak spójnej wizji, wykraczającej poza postrzeganie Ukrainy w kategoriach bufora. Nawet wysiłki prezydenta Kaczyńskiego nie sprawiły, że Kijów zaczął postrzegać Polskę w charakterze istotnego czynnika swojej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Rzeczpospolita nie miała Ukrainie nic do zaproponowania, czego najlepszym dowodem była nieumiejętność wykorzystania programu Partnerstwa Wschodniego, w ramach którego postawiono Ukrainę na równi z rządzonymi przez dyktatorów Białorusią i Azerbejdżanem. Niedojrzałość polskich elit spowodować miała, że Warszawa nie wyasygnowała nawet kilku kudziesiąciu milionów euro na projekty wspomagające rozwój społeczeństwa obywatelskiego nad Dnieprem. Polska nie zwiększa też eksploatacji złóż gazu, mimo że mogłaby to przykroczyć się do utraty przez Gazprom monopolu w regionie. Powodownie nie jest w stanie zaproponować Ukrainie dostaw broni, która mogłaby poprawić jej sytuację na froncie⁴⁷. Zdaniem T. Szatkowskiego, słabe państwo ukraińskie w ogóle nie może uchodzić za sojusznika Polski w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ J. Wojaś, *Zanim zbudujemy...*

⁴⁷ M. Staniszewski, *Ukraina nie zostanie szybko strategicznym sojusznikiem Polski*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2014, nr 4 (18), s. 36–45.

⁴⁸ T. Szatkowski, *Czy powrót do Międzymorza?...*

Problemem były też niezgodności pomiędzy narracjami historycznymi Polski i Ukrainy. K. Szczerski, już jako minister, obwiniał ukraińską politykę historyczną o pogorszenie relacji pomiędzy oboma państwami. Wskazywał wręcz, że trudno w takiej sytuacji będzie Polsce prowadzić politykę aktywnego wspierania Ukrainy⁴⁹. Zdaniem Marcina Skalskiego, w 2014 r. publicyście portalu Kresy.pl, który na łamach „Nowej Konfederacji” wystąpił gościnnie, Polska winna stawiać Kijowowi zdecydowane warunki, tak by możliwym stał się efektywny dialog polsko-ukraiński – w innym wypadku głoszenie propolskich haseł miałoby Ukraińców nic nie kosztować⁵⁰. Z drugiej strony, dostrzegano czasem mało znany w Polsce fakt poparcia czołowych środowisk ukraińskiego ruchu nacjonalistycznego dla budowy bloku bałtycko-czarnomorskiego, także z udziałem Polski⁵¹.

Problemem jawiły się również trudne stosunki z Litwą. Autorzy wskazywali na silnie antypolskie tendencje wśród politycznego mainstreamu Litwy, które – jak trzeźwo wskazywała Maja Narbutt – stanowiły faktyczny powód prorosyjskich gestów liderów Akcji Wyborczej Polaków na Litwie⁵². Z niepokojem odnotowywano wzmacnianie roli języka litewskiego, co musi odbijać się na sytuacji polskości na Wileńszczyźnie, oraz szkodliwość uniemożliwienia Orlenowi zakupu

⁴⁹ K. Szczerski, *Na romantyzm w polityce...*

⁵⁰ M. Skalski, *Kijów–Warszawa. Zaszłość i gniew*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 9 (21), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/kijow-warszawa-zaszlosc-i-gniew/>

⁵¹ M. Wojnar, *Ukraińscy radykałowie w służbie Kremla?*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2017, nr 5 (83), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/ukrainscy-radykalowie-w-sluzbie-kremla/>

⁵² M. Narbutt, *Wilno z dala od Polski, Polonia bliżej Kremla*, „Nowa Konfederacja” 2014, nr 20 (32), <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/wilno-z-dala-od-polski-polonia-blizej-kremla/>

rafinerii w Możejkach, czemu zresztą aktywnie sprzyjała Moskwa⁵³.

Zastrzeżenia dotyczyły również współpracy w łonie Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Konstatowano głębokie podziały wewnątrz niej, zachodzące w odniesieniu do sprawy ukraińskiej. Kraje V4 (poza samą Polską) uznane zostały przez M. Kacperka za mocno orientujące się na współpracę z Rosją, widzące w niej czynnik daleko istotniejszy niż państwa Partnerstwa Wschodniego⁵⁴. Z kolei według M. Kuzia, z Polską nie łączą Węgień żadne istotne więzy gospodarcze, inaczej niż z Niemcami⁵⁵. Zabiegi Berlina miały być przeszkodą także na polu stosunków polsko-ukraińskich⁵⁶.

Wszystko to skłaniało niektórych publicystów do postrzeżenia idei budowy środkowoeuropejskiego bloku w charakterze raczej wizji możliwej do zrealizowania w nieokreślonej przyszłości, niż jako program na dziś. „Wielkiego projektu Międzymorza nie możemy zarzucać, ale jest to ciągle program na przyszłość”, pisał J. Wojas. Obecnie najistotniejsze miały być stosunki z sąsiadami z UE⁵⁷. W konsekwencji uznania zupełnej klęski polskiej polityki wobec Ukrainy, M. Staniszewski uznał wizję Międzymorza opartego o te dwa państwa za piękną, ale zupełnie nierealną⁵⁸. Jak jednak widzieliśmy we wcześniejszych częściach artykułu, to asekuracyjne podejście nie przeszkadzało ogółowi opisywanych autorów skłaniać się ku teozom o konieczności nasilania współpracy państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej.

⁵³ M. Kuź, *Zamilknąć nie znaczy...*

⁵⁴ M. Kacperk, *Jakie kraje UE mogą być sojusznikami Polski w polityce wschodniej?*, „Rzeczy wspólne” 2014, nr 4 (18), s. 56–63.

⁵⁵ M. Kuź, *Zamilknąć nie znaczy...*

⁵⁶ M. Staniszewski, *Ukraina nie zostanie...*

⁵⁷ J. Wojas, *Zanim zbudujemy...*

⁵⁸ M. Staniszewski, *Ukraina nie zostanie...*

Podsumowanie

Zagadnienie zacieśniania współpracy państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej cieszyło się w publicystyce środowisk republikańskich dość dużą popularnością. Na ogół nie postrzeżano przy tym wspólnoty państw regionu w charakterze czynnika zdanego wyłącznie na siebie. Co interesujące, dość często spotykano sceptycyzm wobec opierania całokształtu polityki zagranicznej Polski o amerykańskie gwarancje. Wielokrotnie pojawiał się wątek współpracy z rosnącymi w siłę Chinami. W wielu artykułach istotnym było hasło prowadzenia także polityki „miękkiej”, tzw. *soft power*, która mogłaby wpływać na bezpieczeństwo kulturowe krajów regionu. Duży nacisk kładziono na fakt, iż animowanie współpracy regionalnej przez Polskę wymaga stałego wzmacniania przez nią potencjału gospodarczego, politycznego i militarnego. Zdaniem publicystów „Nowej Konfederacji” i „Rzeczy Wspólnych”, mająca charakteryzować poprzednie dwie dekady słabość Warszawy na scenie międzynarodowej wynikała właśnie z wątkości siły wewnętrznej państwa. Nie można też pominąć faktu, że na łamach omawianych pism pojawiały się również zastrzeżenia i wątpliwości w odniesieniu do pomysłów integracji regionu. Na ogół jednak nie były one formułowane w celu pełnej negacji idei współpracy państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, a raczej dotyczyły poszczególnych jej wątków.

Niektóre spośród przeanalizowanych projektów zacieśniania współpracy regionalnej wydają się wносить dużo do debaty nad polską polityką zagraniczną. Szczególnie koncepcje formułowane przez J. Bartosiaka, P. Żurawskiego vel Grajewskiego, T. Szatkowskiego czy M. Staniszewskiego jawią się jako przemyślane i kompleksowe – na tyle, na ile jest

to możliwe na łamach opiniotwórczego periodyku. Uwagę zwraca fakt, że większość spośród publikujących w omawianych mediach autorów posługiwała się paradygmatem realistycznym. Nie negując potrzeby śmiałego zakreślania wizji wzmocnienia Polski na arenie międzynarodowej, gloryfikowano postulat pragmatyzmu metod, prowadzenia polityki realnej, w oparciu o faktyczne możliwości państwa. Za Stefanem Żeromskim W. Jurasz pisał, iż można być „romanetykiem w kapeluszu pozytywisty”⁵⁹. Ważnym czynnikiem, często podkreślanym przez publicystów „Rzeczy Wspólnych” i „Nowej Konfederacji” była konieczność wzmocnienia potencjału ekonomicznego, militarnego i politycznego samego państwa polskiego, bowiem – jak trzeźwo podkreślało wielu autorów – słaba Rzeczpospolita nie byłaby w stanie pełnić roli ośrodka integrującego Europę Środkowo-Wschodnią.

Omówiony materiał należy uznać za istotny zważywszy nie tylko na dużą wartość merytoryczną części przeanalizowanych artykułów, ale i znaczącą rolę, jaką odgrywa wielu spośród ich autorów w tworzeniu zaplecza intelektualnego rządzącego od 2015 roku obozu politycznego. Widać to przede wszystkim w dążeniu rządu do realizacji projektu Trójmorza, ale też m.in. nasilenia współpracy ekonomicznej z Chinami, zbliżenia z krajami skandynawskimi (projekt Baltic Pipe). Większość z tych zagadnień, często nieobecnych w dotychczasowej debacie nad polityką III RP, omawianych było w republikańskiej prasie już przed wyborami prezydenckimi i parlamentarnymi w 2015 r. Można więc przyjąć, że krytyczny ogląd artykułów publikowanych w „Rzeczach Wspólnych” i „Nowej Konfederacji” przybliżył do zrozumienia

⁵⁹ W. Jurasz, *Wieczne są tylko interesy*, „Rzeczy Wspólne” 2015, nr 3 (21), s. 92–103.

niuansów polityki zagranicznej, prowadzonej w ostatnich latach przez polski rząd, a także pozwala wysnuć wnioski na temat tego, jak się będzie ona kształtować w przyszłości.

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Solidarity in the structure of the European Union's axionormative system in the context of the refugee crisis

Abstract

The paper concerns the value of solidarity in the structure of the European Union's axionormative system in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. For the needs of these considerations Florian Znaniecki's concept of axionormative system was chosen. It has a form of three-level hierarchical structure, which consists of the institutional level, the awareness level and the implementation level. All as these levels were analysed in relation to the value of solidarity, in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis. The results of these considerations indicate that while the institutional and awareness levels of the European Union's axionormative system are compatible with each other, there is a clear break between them and the level of implementation, in the context of the refugee crisis.

Keywords: Axionormative system; European Union; refugee crisis; solidarity

Introduction

The value that is absolutely special in the context of building an united Europe after the World War II is solidarity. In European society, which includes many countries whose citizens are associated with diverse cultures and traditions, it was solidarity that turned out to be the binder allowing to build peace and prosperity in our part of the world. It was without no doubt the basis of both axionormative and political order of today's European Union (hereinafter: „the EU”). But is it still that relevant?

In the Schuman Declaration, which proclamation in 1950 is considered as the beginning of modern European integration, one can read: *“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”*¹. This and other quotes from the Declaration create not only a grand vision of an united Europe, but also give very pragmatic clues on how to achieve it. Thanks to following them these *“concrete achievements”* include many initiatives that indeed contributed to economic development and building a peaceful political community with international management over coal mining and the steel industry and abolition of border controls between countries that belong to the Schengen agreement among them. However, the refugee crisis, which has erupted in Europe in 2015, questions whether indeed solidarity continues to be the basis of the EU's axionormative and political order.

Although the postulates for showing solidarity in the context of refugee crisis are extremely often used recently - both

¹ The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950.

by representatives of EU institutions and politicians representing European member states - it is much easier to see the desire to pursue particular interests of individuals and entities in these statements, rather than a willing to realize the vision outlined in the Schuman Declaration. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to show this inconsistency and the thesis, which aims at achieving is: **institutional, awareness and implementation levels of the European Union's axionormative system are not compatible with each other in relation to the value of solidarity in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis.**

In order to prove above presented thesis, in this paper will be discussed first of all definitional issues related to the notion of an axionormative system, then issues related to understanding the idea of solidarity as a key value in the EU axionormative system and then at the end compatibility of the various levels of the EU axionormative system. The conclusions that will be drawn from it will be synthetically included in the summary in the last part of the paper.

Axionormative system – definitional issues

Each community creates a certain social order, which is understood as the way it is organized and functioning. This order is made up of various norms, institutions, values and social roles, characteristic for a given society and constituting a context for its existence and development².

The dimensions of the social order, associated with particular spheres of the functioning of society, are for example

² Ł. Zamecki, *Spoleczne podstawy ładu politycznego*, Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych - Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa 2011, p. 22.

political order, economic order and axionormative order³. This last one includes norms and values aimed at structuring particular elements of order according to specific rules⁴. In sociological terms social norms are a set of regulations and prohibitions in interpersonal relationships, while social values are states or phenomena that occupy a high position in the hierarchy of values in society common perception⁵.

According to the definition proposed by Piotr Sztompka, an axionormative system is *“a related set of rules - norms and values - concerning all manifestations of social life, characteristic for a given culture”*⁶. Florian Znaniecki's concept of axionormative system refers to the situation in which the values underlay actions aimed at compliance with the current ideological system were *“selected and defined on the basis of the same patterns, and the intentions were shaped in accordance with the same norms”*⁷.

Znaniecki presents the structure of the axionormative system as a three-level hierarchical system, which consists of:

1. Institutional level, constituting the superior institutionalized order, connected with the ethical system in force in a given society, which consists of norms and values promoted by institutions (e.g. norms and values propagated by the national state, the Church etc.).

³ E. Budzyńska, *Rząd czy nierząd? Socjologiczna refleksja nad kondycją moralną społeczeństwa polskiego*, „Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Sociologica” 2012, nr 40, p. 12.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ Ł. Zamecki, op. cit., p. 16-17.

⁶ P. Sztompka, *Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa*, Wydawnictwo ZNAK, Kraków 2002, p. 278.

⁷ F. Znaniecki, *Nauki o Kulturze*, PWN, Warszawa 1992, p. 297.

2. Awareness level, which is a socially recognized and shared order, which consists of norms and values declared in a given society (e.g. moral norms).
3. Implementation level, which is an arrangement of norms and values felt and actually implemented in social life (e.g. the application of norms and values in everyday life)⁸.

According to Znaniecki keeping of order consists in maintaining the state of permanence by accepting the ideological basis of all human activities intact. On the other hand, a departure from accepted norms and values resulting from the ideological system in the area of social activities would be, in his opinion, synonymous with disorder (anomie), disorganization and even chaos⁹.

The author of another concept of anomie, is Émil Durkheim. According to him, the state of disorder is associated not so much with departing from accepted norms and values as with unlimited social tolerance for acts worthy of condemnation, resulting in blurring of the boundaries between moral good and moral evil. Among the causes of anomie he mentions: in a situation of economic crisis - inability to reduce the requirements and needs, in a situation of economic growth - awareness of the inability to satisfy constantly growing aspirations, lack of moral authorities capable of restraining human passions and increasing individual freedom at the expense of social solidarity¹⁰.

⁸ E. Budzyńska, op. cit., p. 1-13.

⁹ F. Znaniecki, op. cit., p. 277.

¹⁰ É. Durkheim, *Samobójstwo. Studium z socjologii*, PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 313-329.

Solidarity in European Union's axionormative system

The sphere of politics is strongly conditioned by norms and values constituting the essence of the axionormative order. The system of values functioning in a given society is a source for adopting specific political attitudes and for legitimizing (or not legitimizing) activities of individual political institutions. Political ideologies are also structured through the prism of what their creators and believers regard as valuable and what they do not¹¹. It can be said that in this sense, the axionormative order „translates” into the political order functioning in a given society.

As it has already been indicated in the introduction, solidarity is a particularly important value, both in the context of the axionormative and political order of the European Union. Due to the fact that it is an extremely complex and multidimensional concept, it will be discussed in its essential contexts - etymological, related to its historical feature (including meaning for beginnings of European integration), legal and functioning in the current discourse considering refugees in the EU.

The concept of solidarity is derived from Latin (in Latin: *soliditas*), in which it means density, power. However, it owes its idea of meaning to Roman law. The codex obligation of the *obligate in soldium* concerned providing assistance in settling financial obligations for the members of a family while at the same time bearing responsibility for the consequences of the decisions made by them¹². Later, it also referred to

¹¹ S. Feldman, *Wartości, ideologia i strukturyzacja postaw politycznych*, [in:] *Psychologia polityczna*, ed. D.O. Sears, L. Huddy, R. Jervis, Kraków 2008, p. 446–452.

¹² Piotr D. Dobrzański, *Nowożytna idea solidarności*, [in:] D. Dobrzański, A. Wawrzynowicz (ed.), *Idea solidarności w kontekstach*

guarantees for granting credit. Now it is used in civil codes of most European countries in the formula of the so-called solidary commitments, both on the part of creditors (passive solidarity) and on the part of debtors (active solidarity)¹³.

The word solidarity came into common use at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that is in times of great social changes. Interestingly, one can even indicate the first text in which it was used in a non-legal context. Pierre Leroux himself admitted: „*I first borrowed the term*” *solidarité* „*from legal language to introduce it to philosophy, that is, according to my concept of religion: I wanted to replace the Christian caritas with human solidaritas. [...] Christianity is the greatest religion of the past; but there is something greater than Christianity: humanity. [...] By means of the principle of mutual solidarity, the present society is capable of organizing the love of one’s neighbour*”¹⁴. On this basis, it can be concluded that solidarity was to become the fundamental value around which modern societies should be organized.

The classic understanding of the concept of solidarity shaped as a result of the events taking place during the French Revolution and the development of self-help in the United Kingdom as well as social policy in Germany¹⁵, and

filozoficzno-historycznych, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Poznań 2006, p. 13.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 13-14.

¹⁴ P. Leroux, *De l’humanité* (1840), cited after: P.J. Cordes, *Communio. Utopia czy program?*, translated: B. Widła, Wydawnictwo Księży Miranów, Warszawa 1996, p. 28; see Z. Stawrowski, *Solidarność a idea doskonałej wspólnoty*, [in:] *Wokół idei wspólnoty*, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, Kraków 2012, p. 187-198.

¹⁵ K.H. Metz, *Solidarity and History, Institutions and Social Concepts of Solidarity in 19th Century Western Europe*; [in:] K. Bayertz (ed.), *Solidarity*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1999, s. 191.

in this sense it is close to the meaning Leroux wanted to give it. It assumes, first and foremost, help for weaker members of a community, mainly of an economic and social nature, but whose goal is essentially to stabilize political order. The richer social classes should feel to show solidarity to the poorer in order to counteract the antisystemic or even revolutionary movements, thus ensuring the stability of social and state structures.

No wonder that the founding fathers of a united Europe followed the same line of thought. Wanting to ensure peace and security on the continent, where the World War II left a severe mark, they referred to solidarity - a grand idea, having the character of a moral principle imperative, which at the same time contains the „instruction” of its implementation, based on economic and social help for the poorer part of society.

At present, an important place of solidarity in the European Union’s axiomatic system reflects its place in current legislation. Although in the so-called EU’s constitutional law legal definition of this concept has not been included, in the the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter „TEU”) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter „TFEU”) can be pointed to its use, one can point out its multiple usage.

For instance, the term solidarity falls within the preamble of the TEU, when the representatives of the member states signing it state that they want to “deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions”¹⁶. Article 3 of TEU says that the EU

¹⁶ Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

*“promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States”*¹⁷ and a particularly important part of this treaty from the point of view of the considerations contained in this paper is that in Article 24 states that *“the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States’ actions”*¹⁸.

Then in Article 67 of TFEU one can read that the EU *“shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For the purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals”*¹⁹ and in Article 80 of TFEU that issues in the field of border control, asylum and immigration policies are subject to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States, including these in the financial field²⁰.

Solidarity in discourse considering European refugee crisis

Although the migration itself is not a new phenomenon, its intensity on the old continent in recent years, definitely is. The European Commission in a joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “Addressing the

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibidem.

Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External Action” issued in September 2015, stated that the EU is currently facing the “the largest refugee crisis since the end of World War II”²¹. In fact, at the moment many people coming to the EU are moving not only for profit, but above all in seeking refuge from wars and persecution. According to Eurostat, in the years 2015-2016 alone, the number of asylum applications in its member states amounted to nearly 2.5 million²².

How has the European Union and its member states responded to this crisis? In accordance with the above-mentioned provisions of the TFEU, does the Union develop a common policy in the field of asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between member states and a fair to third-country nationals? Unfortunately, it seems to be the opposite. The intensification of migrations in Europe in recent years has so far resulted in unprecedented disputes between Member States regarding the relocation of refugees, limiting the functioning of the Schengen area, increasing national tendencies (which may result in the leaving EU by several countries, as in the case of Brexit), and some say that it can even contribute to bring to an end of European integration in general²³.

²¹ Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External Action” of 9 September 2015.

²² *Asylum and managed migration* [access: 12.09.2018], <<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration>>.

²³ B. Rudawski, *Konsekwencje kryzysu migracyjnego dla Niemiec i Unii Europejskiej. Sprawozdanie z konferencji*, 08.06.2016 [access: 16.09.2018] <<https://pl.boell.org/pl/2016/06/08/konsekwencje-kryzysu-migracyjnego-dla-niemiec-i-unii-europejskiej-sprawozdanie-z>>.

In the discourse on the refugee crisis, which is related to the concept of solidarity, two main contradictory narratives can be distinguished:

1. Appealing to the failure of implementation of common arrangements in the area of EU migration and asylum policy in the name of arrangements made on the basis of EU legislation, including the above-quoted treaties, and also failing to implement the arrangements for the relocation of refugees throughout the European Union. This narrative was used to mobilize relocation of refugees in the name of solidarity and sharing common responsibilities.
2. „Pulling” Europe into a crisis by Germany, caused by Angela Merkel and the so-called *Willkommenskultur* (in German: welcome culture). Germans were accused in this narrative of demonstrating the lack of solidarity towards other member states of European Union. The decision made by Germany to allow hundreds of thousands of immigrants to be let into its area, began to be considered as a source of refugee crisis in Europe in general, and solidarity with the refugees shown by Germany also meant a lack of solidarity towards other member states because it exposed them to this crisis.

The concept of solidarity, as a result of fierce political disputes regarding the refugee crisis, was slowly losing its traditional meaning, which aimed at helping the weaker members of the community, mainly by economic and social support, but whose goal is essentially to stabilize the political order. The word itself was often treated instrumentally, in order to push through some particular political options, and its usage began to be associated with hypocrisy of politicians.

Analysis of compatibility of institutional, awareness and implementation levels of the European Union's axionormative system in relation to the value of solidarity, in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis

Analysis of compatibility of institutional, awareness and implementation levels of the European Union's axionormative system in relation to the value of solidarity, in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis will be carried out using the structure of the axionormative system presented by Florian Znaniecki, which was discussed in the first subsection of this paper. As a reminder, it constitutes a three-tier, hierarchical system, which consists of the following levels: institutional level, awareness level and implementation level. When they are compatible with each other, one can talk about an order and when they are not compatible with each other, one can talk about disorder (anomie).

The institutional level refers to the superior, institutionalized order, which consists of **norms and values promoted by the institutions**. In this case, this level should be referring to the EU law and institutions that uphold its obedience. Solidarity is a key value for this level. Numerous passages of the treaties refer to its application as a principle to guide the activities of the EU as a whole and its member states. This also applies to the field of asylum and immigration. Article 80 of TFEU clearly shows that it is subject to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between member states, including in financial terms.

The level of awareness concerns the socially recognized and shared order, which is made up of **norms and values declared in a given society**. *Nomen omen* it is the Schuman Declaration that puts solidarity at the center of the EU's

axionormative order. Solidarity is the justification for the EU structural policy, which aims to equalize the disparities between regions and remove delays in the development in the poorest areas, which in turn is to translate into a harmonious growth of the entire European Union. The politicians of various options also refer to solidarity in the discourse on the subject of refugees as to the value that is supposed to justify taking (or not taking) individual actions. It can therefore be said that the level of awareness is compatible with the above-described institutional level.

The level of implementation is a system of **norms and values felt and actually implemented in social life**. The refugee crisis has shown that not all EU member states are able to show solidarity to refugees. Some of them - Poland and Hungary, refused to help in the form of relocation to even one person²⁴. It can be considered as a drastic inconsistency with the above described institutional and awareness level in the context of the implementation of actions based on solidarity. Instead of helping refugees, politicians from member states who do not participate in the relocation mechanism, on the contrary, argue that it was the states that accepted refugees that showed a lack of solidarity, because their unilateral actions were the source of the crisis and thus created the need to create a relocation mechanism.

Summary and conclusions

Solidarity is the core value of the EU axionormative and political order. However, the 2015 refugee crisis made it legitimate

²⁴ *Migracja: Raport o relokacjach* [access: 07.09.2018], <https://ec.europa.eu/poland/news/170906_migrations_pl>.

to ask, whether it still remains that important. The purpose of this paper was to try to answer this question with the help of following thesis: **institutional, awareness and implementation levels of the European Union's axionormative system are not compatible with each other in relation to the value of solidarity in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis.** The argumentation, carried out for the purpose of proving this statement, proved its validity. While the institutional and consciousness levels are compatible with each other, there is a clear break between them and the level of implementation. Solidarity still is deeply rooted in EU legislation, and European politicians are still referring to it, but often distorting its classical understanding and acting in its name in ways that have nothing to do with solidarity.

At this point, it is worth to recall the assumptions of the concept of anomia by Émil Durkheim. According to him, the state of disorder means not so much an open departure from the adopted values (after all, on the institutional and conscious level, solidarity still remains a value recognized by all), but unlimited social tolerance for acts worthy of condemnation. In such case, it remains to hope that those who ignore these acts will remind oneself one day, that solidarity means above all to help the weaker.

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Abstract

Tourist in The Natural Environment in The Light of The Ecological Policy of The State

Since the beginning of its history, man has been using natural resources. At the same time, one of the characteristic signs of his behaviour is movement in space. This reality is a specific human need, and its expression can be the manifestation of emotions in the face of natural beauty. However, the development of the desired sensitivity depends on many factors, including one's own experiences and motivations. That is why a tourist cannot still be clearly identified with a nature lover, and many examples indicate that in contact with nature he feels uncomfortable and behaves incomprehensibly. For this reason, his actions as an individual, as well as those of entire societies, should be subject to institutional control within the broader environmental policy of the state. The aim of the article was to show the potential for development of an individual human being through his tourist and recreational contact with the natural environment, which is subject to the control of various entities of government administration. Tourist cognition, although often characterised by unreflective consumption of goods, also creates a brighter perspective, which appears as a path towards the fullness of humanity thanks to the discovery of the essence of primordial nature.

Key words: tourism, natural environment, personal development, environmental policy

Humanistyczna refleksja dotycząca warunków współistnienia człowieka z jego środowiskiem przyrodniczym ma swoje źródło w czasach antycznych. Już wówczas stanowiła ona ważny element filozofii przyrody, odnoszącej się między innymi do problematyki materii, czasoprzestrzeni czy też składek przyrody żywej i nieożywionej. Z upływem wieków zagadnienia te coraz częściej stawały się polem eksploracji medycyny i biologii, a współcześnie są również przedmiotem badań dyscyplin znajdujących się na pograniczu wiedzy przyrodniczej i społecznej. Należą do nich między innymi ekologia, socjobiologia czy sozologia. W drugiej połowie XX wieku wykształciła się również ekofilozofia, koncentrująca swoje zainteresowania wokół związków człowieka z otoczeniem ekologicznym w świetle dynamicznych przeobrażeń cywilizacyjnych¹.

Warto zaznaczyć, że na przestrzeni dziejów stosunek ludzi do przyrody ulegał częstym zmianom, co znajdowało swój wyraz w kolejnych koncepcjach filozoficznych zawierających się w szerokim zakresie pomiędzy zdeklarowanym naturocentryzmem, a skrajnym antropocentryzmem. Według przedstawicieli filozoficznej szkoły pitagorejskiej istota ludzka stanowi integralny element harmonijnej struktury świata, która jest powołana do odkrywania jego piękna, otrzymując przy tym wskazówki jak kształt nadawać swemu życiu. Z wyjątkiem poglądów świętego Franciszka z Asyżu czy reprezentującego nieco późniejsze czasy Michela de Montaigne'a i nielicznych im współczesnych idee te porzucono w epoce średniowiecza i odrodzenia. Zaczęły wówczas dominować poglądy o wyjątkowej roli człowieka,

¹ W. Tyburski, Człowiek – środowisko przyrodnicze w świetle wybranych stanowisk filozoficznych i ekofilozoficznych, *Paedagogia Christiana*, nr 2(28), 2011, 41-63.

który zaczął ustawiać się ponad naturą, a niekiedy nawet przeciw niej. Zainteresowaniu naturą przypisywano głównie znaczenie utylitarno-poznawcze. Zakładano wręcz, że każdy rodzaj działania wobec środowiska przyrodniczego jest moralnie dopuszczalny, jeśli przynosi konkretny pożytek nie szkodząc działającej jednostce bądź innym ludziom. Jeszcze dalej w tego typu rozważaniach posunął się Kartezjusz, który w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku stał się twórcą mechanistycznej koncepcji przyrody, w myśl której człowiek powinien poznać prawa mechaniki rządzące przyrodą, aby podporządkować ją sobie, a dosłownie według jego słów – stać się jej panem i posiadaczem ².

Z czasów oświecenia godnymi zapamiętania są poglądy Jana Jakuba Rousseau, afirmującego naturę w świetle przesytu kulturą i zmęczenia cywilizacją. Natomiast jednym z ważniejszych moralistów XX wieku reprezentującym ducha humanizmu ekologicznego był Albert Schweitzer. Uważał on, że tradycyjna etyka, kojarzona wyłącznie z człowiekiem jest obecnie niewystarczająca. Dlatego istnieje potrzeba rozwoju etyki globalnej, na tyle elementarnej i głębokiej, aby zasięgiem swoim obejmowała też wszelkie inne formy życia ³.

Tak więc zagadnienie stosunku ludzi do środowiska przyrodniczego zawiera w sobie wskazanie na taki kierunek przeobrażeń, który uwzględniałby zarówno potrzeby człowieka, jak również dobro innych istot żywych oraz zasiedlanych przez nie ekosystemów. Pojawia się więc pytanie o możliwość przyjęcia takiego modelu cywilizacji, który będzie gwarantował harmonijną koegzystencję świata ludzkiego ze światem

² Tamże

³ W. Tyburski, Człowiek – środowisko przyrodnicze w świetle wybranych stanowisk filozoficznych i ekofilozoficznych, Paedagogia Christiana, nr 2(28), 2011, 41-63.

biosfery ⁴. Założenie, jakoby harmonia ta stała się faktem jedynie na skutek mobilizacji jednostki jest błędne w obliczu wieloletnich obserwacji związków człowieka z przyrodą. Stąd niezbędna staje się realizacja określonej polityki ekologicznej, uwzględniającej konieczność ochrony środowiska przyrodniczego, przy czym szczególnie istotne wydaje się być znalezienie właściwych proporcji między niezbędnym interwencjonizmem a wolnym rynkiem. Interwencjonizm państwa musi być rozumiany jako zapobieganie dewastacji lub rabunkowej eksploatacji zasobów środowiska. Konflikt pojawia się gdy przedstawiciele organizacji ekologicznych postulują ochronę środowiska za wszelką cenę, natomiast przedsiębiorcy oczekują ograniczenia nakładanych na nich obciążeń ekologicznych. Państwo stara się łagodzić ten konflikt przez racjonalną politykę środowiskową, w myśl zasad zrównoważonego rozwoju, który zyskał rangę konstytucyjną i wymieniany jest jako integralna część licznych planów i działań, tak na szczeblu centralnym, jak i w praktyce funkcjonowania samorządów terytorialnych ⁵.

Konkluzja do rozważań na temat skrajnego naturocentryzmu i antropocentryzmu zawiera stwierdzenie, że człowiek jako elementarna część przyrody nie może całkowicie uwolnić się od jej wpływu. Mimo tego nadal jesteśmy świadkami walki z przyrodą, a nawet pewnej wobec niej arogancji, wbrew wielu hasłom, a nawet kampaniom ekologicznym. W połączeniu ze skłonnościami do sedenterijnego i konsumpcyjnego stylu życia znajduje to swój wyraz w eskalacji

⁴ Tamże

⁵ A. Lorek, *Ocena polskiej polityki ekologicznej w warunkach wdrażania zrównoważonego rozwoju*, Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, nr 409, 2015, 38-47.

chorób cywilizacyjnych⁶. Poza wymienionymi obiektywnymi tego przyczynami zauważyć trzeba, że współczesnemu społeczeństwu o tyle trudniej o przymierze z naturą, że człowiek utracił poczucie zadomowienia w przyrodzie⁷, a socjalizacja do niej coraz częściej odbywa się przy pomocy środków charakterystycznych dla cywilizacji technicznej. Wydaje się wręcz, że współczesność można określić jako czasy strachu przed naturą⁸.

Głoszona przez ekologów idea zachowania dobroczynnych dla życia właściwości przyrody, pozostaje w związku z wnioskami zawartymi w znanych koncepcjach kultury fizycznej. Postuluje się zatem zawarcie trwałego strategicznego sojuszu kultury fizycznej i kultury ekologicznej⁹. Jego efekt ma jawić się w postaci dobrego, mądrego i pięknego, a nadto zdrowego i sprawnego człowieka jako idealnego postulatu kultury fizycznej oraz racjonalnie funkcjonującego i uporządkowanego, a zatem pięknego i zdrowego świata jako docelowego wzorca kultury ekologicznej. Istnieje przy tym uzasadnienie dla utożsamiania kultury fizycznej z turystyką, mimo wielu oczywistych rozbieżności między tymi dziedzinami aktywności człowieka. Jest bowiem turystyka, obok rekreacji ruchowej, sportu kwalifikowanego, rehabilitacji medycznej oraz

⁶ W. Pańczyk, *Posługiwanie się ciałem wobec zagrożeń cywilizacji konsumpcyjnej*, Lider, numer specjalny, 2003, s. 13-18; W. Pańczyk, *Aktywność fizyczna w kontakcie z przyrodą* [w:] *Myśli i uwagi o wychowaniu fizycznym i sporcie*, red. K. Zuchora, AWF, Warszawa 2000, s. 284-294.

⁷ S. Zięba, *Dylematy bezpieczeństwa ekologicznego*, KUL, Lublin 1998, s. 27-57.

⁸ K. Janowska, P. Mucharski, *Rozmowy na koniec wieku*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Warszawa 1999, s. 296.

⁹ J. Lipiec, *Człowiek wobec natury. Kultura fizyczna a kultura ekologiczna* [w:] *Nauki o kulturze fizycznej wobec wyzwań współczesnej cywilizacji*, red. J. Raczek, AWF, Katowice 1995, s. 7-25.

wychowania fizycznego, jedną z form uczestnictwa w kulturze fizycznej¹⁰.

Środowisko przyrodnicze jest dla osób zaangażowanych w turystykę układem różnorodnych wartości. Stanowi na przykład miejsce specyficznych interakcji, twórczej inspiracji oraz zasobne źródło wiedzy. W związku z tym wszyscy uprawiający aktywność fizyczną, w tym turystyczną w przyrodzie, nie są jedynie odbiorcami bodźców, lecz czynnie poszukują i przetwarzają płynące z niej informacje. Zakres ich przyswajania jest rzecz jasna charakterystyczny dla każdego z osobna, co wynika z faktu indywidualnego i subiektywnego stosunku emocjonalnego do przyrody oraz z różnego poziomu intelektualnego ludzi¹¹.

W dobie kryzysu ekologicznego, a zarazem dotyczącego wielu kryzysu egzystencjalnego nadzieją na odrodzenie człog wieka, a szczególnie odrodzenie moralne, jest wciąż aktualna możliwość czerpania z bezdennych źródeł natury nieskażonej wpływem cywilizacji, do których zaliczyć można mniej dostępne pasma górskie, lasy, morza czy pustynie. Przestrzenie te, stanowiąc w mniemaniu przedstawicieli wcześniejszych pokoleń, mało przydatny teren, współcześnie uchodzą za nośnik najbardziej pożądaných i oczekiwanych funkcji. Dopiero wszak w ich obliczu człowiek pozbywa się ukształtowanej przez kulturę warstwy obcych mu treści, w których zatracił swą pierwotną istotę. Pozwala mu to zapomnieć o troskach codzienności i uwolnić się od konwencji i pesymistycznych nastrojów. W przypadku turystów samotników

¹⁰ H. Grabowski, *Teoria fizycznej edukacji*, WSiP, Warszawa 1999, s. 144.

¹¹ S. Toczek-Werner, Środowisko przyrodnicze jako wartość w kulturze fizycznej [w:] *Kultura fizyczna w środowisku przyrodniczym w okresie letnim*, red. R. Błacha, W. Bigiel, AWF, Wrocław 2003, s. 7-15.

jest to równoznaczne z całkowitym odizolowaniem się od innych ludzi, lecz kosztem rozluźnienia bądź zerwania więzi społecznych możliwe staje się pełne porozumienie i zbliżenie z naturą. Jednakże, wydaje się przy tym, że jednostka wyeluzwolona z warstwy kulturowej swego „ja” znacząco zwiększa prawdopodobieństwo nawiązania intymnej i trwałej więzi z wszelkimi rodzajami elementami bytu transcendentnego, którymi są także inni ludzie. Paradoksalnie więc, droga do pełnego poczucia wspólnoty między ludźmi prowadzić może przez pogłębiony skrajny indywidualizm. Zwracał na to uwagę Krawczyk¹², prezentując wielokrotnie dokonywane często przez żeglarza i taternika Mariusza Zaruskiego opisy sytuacji grupowych na pełnym morzu lub na górskich graniach, koncentrujące się na świadomości wybranego uczestnika wyprawy. Sens doświadczenia podróźniczego opierał się według niego na bezpośrednim i niezmaconym wpływem drugiego człowieka, kontakcie z przyrodą, któremu towarzyszyć powinna kontemplacja w atmosferze ciszy lub co najwyżej - odgłosów natury.

W czasie eksploracji turystycznej dzika przyroda stwarza człowiekowi potencjalną możliwość zetknięcia się z realnym, a niekiedy nawet śmiertelnym niebezpieczeństwem. Zaruski doceniał wartość wyzwalanego w ten sposób napięcia psychicznego, dzięki któremu człowiek wyzwala się z przeciętności, zyskując nieznaną mu dotychczas perspektywę, ukazującą zupełnie odmienną hierarchię wartości. W walce z żywiołami przyrody wyzwala ją w nim zwierzęcy instynkt uwalnia go od wpływów kultury, wzmagając w pragnienie dokonania czynu. I choć walce tej najczęściej

¹² Z. Krawczyk, *Natura Kultura Sport. Kontrowersje teoretyczne*, PWN, Warszawa 1970, s. 126-142.

towarzyszy paniczny lęk, to ostatecznie zarówno on jak i fizyczne oraz duchowe lenistwo zostają unicestwione. Dzięki przewycięzeniu zarówno własnych słabości jak i oporu przyrody, człowieczeństwo ponownie staje się dzięki temu synonimem wartości najwyższej¹³.

Uwzględniając egzystencjalne aspekty kontaktu człowieka z naturą, warto przez chwilę skoncentrować uwagę na praktycznych możliwościach kształtowania zarówno wrażliwości jak i intelektu w turystycznym czy rekreacyjnym kontakcie ze środowiskiem przyrodniczym. Należy do nich niewątpliwie edukacja ekologiczna, która może być realizowana poprzez plenerowe imprezy turystyczne. Zalicza się do nich zwłaszcza liczne przykłady turystyki kwalifikowanej, a także gry i zabawy terenowe organizowane przez szkoły, stowarzyszenia czy różne kluby.

Szczególnie atrakcyjną przestrzenią spędzania czasu wolnego, aczkolwiek nie wyzwalającą tak skrajnych nastrojów jak otwarte morze czy wysokie góry, wydają się być kompleksy leśne, będące jednymi z najbardziej złożonych ekosystemów lądowych. Ich charakterystyczna struktura wewnętrzna oraz zależności pomiędzy zasiedlającymi je organizmami stanowią bogate źródło doznań. Przebywanie w tym środowisku pozwala lepiej, aniżeli z poziomu sali szkolnej czy wykładowej, zrozumieć procesy zachodzące w otaczającej przyrodzie, a personifikacja środowiska naturalnego może skutkować trwałą zmianą codziennych nawyków na bardziej ekologiczne¹⁴.

¹³ Tamże

¹⁴ A. Ostrowska, *Rola turystyki i rekreacji plenerowej w edukacji ekologicznej dzieci i młodzieży* [w:] *Problemy zrównoważonego rozwoju turystyki, rekreacji i sportu w lasach*, red. K. Pieńkos, AWF, Warszawa 2004, s. 122-125.

Jakkolwiek proces upowszechniania się turystyki przynosi korzyści w postaci realizacji potrzeb człowieka, to jednak nierzadko powoduje też określone dysfunkcje powodujące degradację środowiska. Z reguły bowiem w miarę angażowania się w aktywność turystyczną coraz większej liczby ludzi, rośnie poziom przekształceń środowiska i wynikających stąd dalszych zagrożeń. O ile jednak turystyka amatorska organizowana indywidualnie lub w małych grupach, ujmowana w ramy działalności organizacji społecznych, korzysta z przyrody zasadniczo jej nie zagrażając, to w przypadku turystyki specjalistycznej uprawianej między innymi przez alpinistów, skałkowiczów i grotolazów czy entuzjastów sportów motorowych można mówić o presji ekologicznej, często porównywanej do drastycznych skutków oddziaływania turystyki masowej. Także w przypadku turystyki komercyjnej, dla której głównym celem jest zysk przedsiębiorcy, dostrzec można wiele przykładów obsługi ruchu turystycznego godzących w autonomię naturalnego otoczenia. O jej naruszeniu może zdecydować wybór takiego, a nie innego miejsca lokalizacji obiektów i urządzeń obsługi, przebieg szlaków turystycznych, wykorzystanie niektórych środków transportu oraz proponowane turystom sposoby spędzania czasu. Właściciele biur turystycznych, pensjonatów, hoteli czy środków transportu mają tendencję do traktowania przyrody jako dobra bez konkretnego właściciela, występując przeciw próbom ograniczania korzystania z tego dobra. Często też usiłują uchylać się od ponoszenia kosztów ochrony oraz naprawy szkód poczynionych w przyrodzie ¹⁵. Za chlubny wyjątek w tej materii uznać należy podmioty turystyczne,

¹⁵ Z. Wnuk, *Ochrona przyrody a turystyka* [w:] *Turystyka i rekreacja*, red. A. Gajewski, J. Kłyszajko, J. Popko, AWF, Warszawa 2005, tom 1, s. 33-38.

których działalności przyświeca idea społecznej odpowiedzialności biznesu znanej w międzynarodowej terminologii jako *corporate social responsibility*. Wielu przedsiębiorców coraz częściej dostrzega ekonomiczne i wizerunkowe zalety prowadzenia polityki proekologicznej, która w warunkach rosnącej konkurencyjności na rynku turystycznym zdaje się być kluczowym czynnikiem decydującym o sukcesie w tej branży¹⁶.

Społeczna odpowiedzialność biznesu może odnosić się do wielu elementów polityki ekologicznej państwa, w tym do gospodarki ściekowej i gospodarki odpadami, ochrony klimatu, powietrza i bioróżnorodności. W przestrzeni turystycznej kwestie te mogą być ujęte w ramy polityki ekologicznej hoteli, pensjonatów i gospodarstw agroturystycznych, spośród których szczególnie te pierwsze mogą ubiegać się o specjalne certyfikaty ekologiczne¹⁷, znane pod nazwą ekoetykiety¹⁸, dla których w terminologii międzynarodowej funkcjonuje określenie *eco-labelling*¹⁹.

Tak więc zarówno w ujęciu indywidualnym jak i instytucjonalnym pojawiają się propozycje pogodzenia zjawiska zwiększonego uczestnictwa w turystyce z nieinwazyjnym

¹⁶ W. Leoński, *Ekologiczne aspekty społecznej odpowiedzialności biznesu*, Studia i Prace WNEiZ US, nr 43(1), 2016, s. 45-53.

¹⁷ A. Pawlicz, M. Sidorkiewicz, *Ekologia jako podstawa innowacyjnego produktu hotelarskiego* [w:] *Innowacyjne rozwiązania we współczesnym hotelarstwie*, red. P. Dominik, Almamery Szkoła Wyższa, Warszawa 2013, s. 195–207.

¹⁸ E. Targosz-Wrona, *Etykiety środowiskowe jako znaki towarowe w marketingu produktów przyjaznych środowisku w dobie globalizacji*, Zeszyty Naukowe. Zarządzanie i Marketing, Wyższa Szkoła Humanitas, nr 1, 2007, s. 87-99.

¹⁹ A. Kuna-Marszałek, *Eco-labelling* [w:] *Business and the Environment*, red. T. Dorożyński, A. Kuna-Marszałek, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego 2016, s. 57-78.

wpływem na przyrodnicze otoczenie. W projekty te wpisany jest proces wychowania do turystyki i przez turystykę, umożliwiający właściwe, całościowe przygotowanie do aktywności turystycznej. Jest on właściwie równoznaczny z koncepcją ekopedagogiki, uwzględniającą ideę życia w plenerze. Poza wcześniej wymienianymi skutkami jej wcielania można też osiąść społecznie pożądane cechy takie jak odpowiedzialność, umiejętność współpracy w grupie czy poszanowanie drugiego człowieka ²⁰.

Żyjąc i rozwijając się w cywilizacji naukowo-technicznej człowiek uznaje jej paradygmaty, z których dość znaczna część dotyczy świata przyrody. Czasami jednak ogarnia go refleksja, której źródeł nie sposób znaleźć w fizycznych, chemicznych czy społecznych uwarunkowaniach. Refleksja ta wiąże się z pytaniami o sens własnego życia a także o sens i porządek natury i ma okazję ujawnić się między innymi podczas turystycznych spotkań z przyrodą. Pytania jakie turysta wówczas sobie zadaje skupiają się wokół stosunku człowieka do przyrody, a więc kwestii etycznych oraz trudnego do zdefiniowania piękna przyrody ²¹. Pyta jednak tylko wtedy, gdy otaczająca go rzeczywistość stwarza mu ku temu warunki, a z pewnością nie w obliczu ciżby i zgiełku towarzyszącego turyście w miejscach szczególnie popularnych turystycznie. Są one bowiem pozbawione nie tylko ciszy, lecz także pewnych pierwotnych właściwości ekologiczno-krajo-
brazowych, bez których refleksja taka jest dalece utrudniona,

²⁰ R. Rowiński, J. Klawender, *Wychowanie przez turystykę i sport jako proces zapewniający poszanowanie przyrody i ochronę środowiska* [w:] *Problemy zrównoważonego rozwoju turystyki, rekreacji i sportu w lasach*, red. K. Pieńkos, AWF, Warszawa 2004, s. 314-318.

²¹ K. Koźuchowski, *Walory przyrodnicze w turystyce i rekreacji*, Wydawnictwo KURPISZ S.A., Poznań 2005, s. 27-39.

by nie rzecz – niemożliwa. Dlatego w rozważaniach powraca postulowana przez Zaruskiego możliwość choć krótkotrwałego społecznego odizolowania na rzecz zjednoczenia z naturą przez powrót na jej łono. Umożliwi to poznanie nowych walorów estetycznych przyrody, elementów rozumienia jej filozofii oraz form percepcji krajobrazu, a wreszcie odnajdywania „ducha miejsca” czy „nastroju chwili”. Tylko wtedy człowiek będący częścią przyrody ma szansę dostrzec panującą w niej harmonię i wolność i odkryć chęć poszukiwania ich w sobie samym.

Ocena polskiej polityki ekologicznej musi zawierać uwagi krytyczne, choćby ze względu na fakt, iż mimo starannie opracowanej dokumentacji, problemem są zbyt okazjonalne praktyczne działania polityków. W tej sytuacji konieczna wydaje się być zarówno zmiana ich postaw jak i presja społeczna. Zwiększająca się, również na skutek turystycznego obcowania z naturą, świadomość ekologiczna społeczeństwa, może stanowić bowiem impuls do większego zainteresowania władz państwowych i lokalnych tą problematyką. Dzięki temu liczne zapisy odnoszące się do polityki ekologicznej, zaawarte w różnego rodzaju dokumentach strategicznych, będą miały szansę na praktyczne wdrożenie, z myślą o przywróceniu pełnej równowagi między człowiekiem i jego otoczeniem.

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Greed and piety

– political reason in the philosophy of John Locke

Abstract

John Locke's political philosophy is to this day an important inspiration for the discourse oscillating around the issues of civil rights, the role and scope of political power and the relationship between property and ethics. However, this discourse is dominated by the one-sided and strongly impoverishing perception of the English philosopher's thought whose sources lie in Leo Strauss's interpretation. This article is a polemic with Strauss's interpretive standpoint, based on a comprehensive reading of Locke's philosophy. The aim of the text is both to demystify the secular nature of his thought, and to point out its unique coherence and conceptual precision which make it impossible, against Strauss and his followers' standpoint, to reduce Locke's philosophy to only a more radical, at the same time less coherent, version of Thomas Hobbes's political thought.

Keywords: natural law, property, reason, politics, society, greed, piety

This article is a polemic with Leo Strauss's interpretation of John Locke's philosophy. The critical reference to the above-mentioned interpretation is obviously significant not so much because of Strauss himself, as due to the fact that countless contemporary interpretations are largely based on his standpoint. It can be summarised in three main points, which will be elaborated on later in the text. Firstly, Locke created a theory of politics based on secular humanism and liberal individualism; secondly, the liberal theory of property rights is central to his political philosophy; and thirdly, Locke's philosophy of morality and philosophical anthropology of a clearly Christian character are only an attempt to hide the revolutionary character of property theory from the eyes of potential critics or the result of Locke's blind attachment to certain beliefs, largely obsolete due to his own philosophy. The refutation of the above conclusions is, contrary to appearances, not difficult if Locke's texts are taken into consideration, however under two basic conditions: firstly, reaching beyond *Treatises of Government*, and secondly, reading them without Strauss's interpretative bias, which for some, probably significant and objective reasons, has now become a means of widespread misinterpretation of Locke's thoughts.

The great and Chief and therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and puting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property. To which in the state of Nature there are many things waiting (...) an establish'd, settled, known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of Right and Wrong (...) a known and indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine all differences according to the established Law (...) Power to back and suport the Sentence when right, and

*give it due Execution.*¹ The above thought, taken from *Two Treatises of Government*, indicates what constitutes the essence of Leo Strauss's interpretation – firstly, the fact that the state has been established for the preservation and multiplication of worldly possessions, and secondly, that the positive law arises on the basis of universal consent, agreement, at the same time constituting a criterion based on the authority that allows to resolve internal conflicts in society. Hence, at first glance, this is a theory of secular authority legitimised on the basis of practical functions it is to perform towards society, i.e. securing secular values, such as personal freedom, bodily inviolability, the right to grow rich, etc.

What is equally important, in the light of Strauss's interpretation, human nature is conceived as one-dimensional, as only lustful, egoistic, and the human being as an entity that ultimately only has obligations towards oneself. Strauss writes directly that *Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the moral world, since man – as distinguished from man's and – had become that center or origin. Locke's doctrine of property is still more advanced expression of this radical change than was the political philosophy of Hobbes. According to Locke, man and not nature, the work of man and not gift from nature, is the origin of almost everything valuable: man owes almost everything valuable to his own efforts. (...) Locke is a hedonist: That is properly good or bad, is nothing but berealy pleasure or pain. But his is a peculiar hedonism: The greatest happiness consists not in enjoying*

¹ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Cambridge 1960, p. 368-369.

*the greatest pleasures but in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasures.*² It is the understanding of human nature as primarily lustful and the recognition of private property as the supreme principle of social existence in Locke's theory that allows Strauss to say that Locke's doctrine of property, which is almost literally the central part of his political teaching, is certainly its most characteristic part.³

Locke, like Thomas Hobbes, assumes at the starting point of his deliberations that *to understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State are Men are naturally in (...)*, but at the same time he rejects and negates the Hobbesian notion of a natural state saying that *it is (...) a State of perfect Freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.*⁴ The right to preserve life, freedom and property is connected with the right to punish criminals, that is, those who go against the law of nature, thus limiting the rights of others. This entitlement, because of non-existence in the state of nature of the authority being able to settle disputes and having the power necessary to enforce judgments, rests in the hands of the aggrieved, or in any case of a person who considers oneself the aggrieved. Enforcing the right to punish an aggressor and compensate losses suffered, at the same time introduces both sides of the conflict into a state of war, a state of mutual hostility and willingness to retaliate. Because of the human desire to retaliate and revenge, Locke admits

² L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, Chicago & London 1953, p. 248-249.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 234.

⁴ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 285.

that the state of war, once it has occurred, continues, and to avoid this state of War is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature⁵.

In Locke's theory, the state of nature is undoubtedly the rudiment and point of reference for the dynamic, historical development of interpersonal relationships, based on work and the necessity to preserve its fruits. This development, presented by Locke in the chapter entitled *Of property*, from *Second Treatise of Government* (the most comprehensive chapter, which is not so just by accident, as Strauss suggests), allows to understand the dynamic process of transforming of the proper state of nature into a state of war. Property in the proper state of nature is not yet property in the literal sense – it is the property of everyone, and therefore, only potentially private property.⁶ Work, as an act of absorbing, humanisation of nature, as a tool securing the self-preservation of the human being through the transforming of nature, becomes at the same time a tool for updating private property only potential at the starting point. A part of what previously belonged to common property, i.e. nature, is attached to the work, which is the first property of the human being, as its effect. And, as Strauss rightly points out, *the natural right to property is a corollary of the fundamental right of self-preservation; it is not derivative from compact, from any action of society. If everyone has the natural right to preserve himself, he necessarily has the right to everything that is necessary for his self-preservation*⁷. It should not, however, lead to a conclusion that this necessarily causes a state of universal war for property, or for what property can

⁵ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 300.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 304-305.

⁷ L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p. 235.

be made of – natural wealth. However, the preservation of private property of a human being is not ultimately guaranteed by the law of nature prohibiting the restriction of the natural rights of another person, because in the state of nature there is no political society that can guard these rights. It is guaranteed by the real conditions of human life in the state of nature: huge, untapped natural potential, as well as the lack of the possibility of collecting goods over the ability to use them. It is the primitive stage of civilisation development that protects private property, which is limited to what is not worth appropriating against the law of nature, and not because of it, but because it is easier to take away the same good from nature than from another person.⁸

The situation, however, changes dramatically along with the proportional, in relation to the enlargement of the human population, decrease in natural goods that do not constitute anybody's property – *The same Rule of Property, that every Man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the World, without straining any body, since there is Land enough in the World to suffice the Inhabitants had not the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced larger Possessions, and the Right to them*⁹. The invention of money has revolutionised both relationships between people and between people and nature. From that moment, it became possible to accumulate unlimited quantities of goods in a form in which they were not subject to spoiling. At the same time, however, the appropriation of someone else's goods, the desire or the need to seize them became a real threat to the institution of

⁸ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 311.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

property – *If Man in the State of Nature be so free (...); If he be absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no Body, why will he part with his Freedom? (...) To which 'tis obvious to Answer, that though in hte State of Nature he hath such a right, yrt the Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others*¹⁰. Thus, it can be seen that while the concept of the state of war allows Locke to draw attention to the necessity of a civic society aimed to safeguard the natural rights of a human being to possess (also material) property in the situation of a high degree of civilisation development, the model of the proper state of nature, due to the character of the living conditions of the human being in it, within which the rights are preserved in a universal and conflict-free way, allows to determine the character of these rights. Therefore, Strauss rightly emphasises that in Locke's concept *Men own property prior to civil socjety; they enter civil society in order to preserve ot protect the property which they acquired in the state of nature*¹¹, i.e. the proper state of nature, as opposed to the state of war.

Strauss, however, primarily exploits the notion of property, as material property when he interprets Locke's socialisation theory. He sees private property as the source of social development. Let us, than, take a look at what arguments in favour of his own interpretation Strauss quotes: *Since there is no longer enough and as good left in common for everyone, equity would seem to demand that man's nature right to appropriate as much as he can use should be restricted to the right to appropriate as much as he needs, lest*

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 368.

¹¹ L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p. 235.

the poor be straitened. And, since gold and silver are now immensely valuable, equity would seem to demand that man should lose the natural right to accumulate as much money as he pleases. Yet Locke teaches exactly the opposite: the right to appropriate is much more restricted in the state of nature than in civil society. One privilege enjoyed by man in the state of nature is indeed denied to man living in civil society: labor no longer creates a sufficient title to property. But this loss is only a part of the enormous gain which the right of appropriation makes after the first ages.¹² What gains does, in Strauss's opinion, Locke find? He justifies the emancipation of acquisitiveness in the only way in which it can be defended: he shows that it is conducive to the common good, to public happiness or the temporal prosperity of society.¹³

The real capability of accumulating an unlimited number of goods provokes unfailingly a psychological mechanism of competition between proprietors, which has little to do with the necessity of biological survival. Locke admits that *the uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of Delight with it, is that we call Desire.¹⁴ Envy is an uneasiness of Mind, caused by the consideration of a Good we desire, obtained by one, we think should not have had it before us.¹⁵ Like in the case of the Hobbesian model of socialisation, it can be noticed here that *covetousness and concupiscence, far from being essentially evil or foolish, are, if**

¹² Ibidem, p. 240.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 242.

¹⁴ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Oxford 1975, p. 230.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 231.

*properly channeled, eminently beneficial and reasonable much mores o than exemplary charity.*¹⁶ Competition between proprietors of goods who, competing with each other, force the possessionless part of society to do socially useful work, takes the form of a measure of economic development and a factor cementing the bonds of mutual dependencies between citizens, thus uniting society in a joint effort to raise the general standard of living.

Contrary to Strauss's standpoint, the above presented mechanism of economic and political building of social structures does not exhaust Locke's political philosophy. Strauss breaks Locke's philosophy into its "proper" element (the theory of private property) and "random" element (the theory of natural law with its religious and anthropological dimension). He does so in the conviction that *it was indeed easy for Locke to see a problem where later men saw only an occasion for applauding progres or themselves, since in his age most people still adhered to the older view according to which the unlimited acquisition of wealth is unjust or morally wrong. This also axplains why, in stating his doctrine of property, Locke so involved his sense, that it is not easy to understand hi mor wenr as much as possible with the herd.*¹⁷ Locke saw the phenomenon of this common-sense concept of justice, strongly rooted in reality, but he did not disregard it and did not treat it with indulgence. On the contrary, it has become an impulse for him to develop an original and unusual concept of human nature and natural law, in accordance with the maxim: *Utility is not the basis*

¹⁶ L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p. 247.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 246.

*of the law or ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it.*¹⁸

In his *Essays on the Law of Nature*, Locke gives five arguments for the existence of the law of nature – at the moment, the first of them is of interest to us. Aristotle, says Locke, (...) *rightly concludes that the proper function of man is acting in conformity with reason, so much so that man must of necessity perform what reason prescribes.*¹⁹ Although the human being shares vegetative and lustful life functions with other creatures, differs from them in a peculiar function – the activity of the soul in accordance with reason or not without reason. Thanks to that, the human being is predisposed to live in a political community. Locke, referring to the authority of Aristotle, tries to reconstruct the way of thinking useful in defining the relationship between human nature and objective, socio-political conditions, within which its potential is updated. What is, however, of key importance here is Locke's theory of natural law: *Since therefore all men are by nature rational, and since there is harmony between this law and the rational nature, and this harmony can be known by the light of nature, it follows that all those who are endowed with a rational nature, i.e. all men in the world, are morally bound by this law.*²⁰

To clarify the concepts of reason and rationality, let us take a look at the solutions contained in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding – Whence ha sit all the materials of Reason and Knowlegde? To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that, all our Knowlegde is founded;*

¹⁸ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, Oxford 1954, p. 215.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 113.

²⁰ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 199.

*and from that it ultimately derives it self.*²¹ Locke's quoted thought, which could be called the sensualist manifesto, establishes a clear cognitive perspective as a starting point: there are no innate rules – neither speculative nor practical, all our knowledge comes only from the mind's work on the material provided by sensory experience. Nature, with the exception of reason, *has put into a Man a desire of Happiness, and a aversion to Misery, and as Locke adds a little sarcastically: these indeed are innate practical Principles, which do continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions, without ceasing.*²² Good is not yet of moral character here, but only volitional – good or evil can only be described by virtue of pleasure or resentment. We are dealing here with moral relativism resulting from the diversity of human feelings, aspirations and desires. The law of nature, on the other hand, defines the universal and unchangeable rules of human behaviour because of one's specifically human nature. *Cognitive principles regulating human behaviour*, defining natural law, can only be recognised via reason. Thus, belonging to human nature, activity in accordance with reason, whose work is based on material of only empirical origin, is here to be synonymous with following the rules of the law of nature.

However, doubts arise whether we are not dealing here with a naturalistic error. Does the fact that the human being is endowed with reason and in fact uses it to achieve one's particular goals, mean, out of necessity, that the human being will be using it in accordance with the requirements of the law of nature, requiring every human being *to preserve*

²¹ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 104.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 67.

the whole human race? Is there really no gulf between the descriptive element of the law of nature, in accordance with which human nature is characterised by the invariable use of reason, and its normative element? How is it possible (if it really is possible) for the eternal rules of the law of nature to comply with the activity of reason, which draws material for its work only from the senses. In order to show that in Locke's theory the use of reason is tantamount to observing the principles of coexistence determined by the law of nature, it should be added that it is impossible when there are no suitable conditions, and necessary – when these conditions occur. So if Aristotle claims that the human being can achieve the optimum of one's perfection defined by nature only within a political community, than Locke adds that the state has the task of not so much shaping a human being, as letting one shape oneself, according to one's nature, establishing only the legal-political basis for social reality, within which an individual is able to acquire the natural law rules as one's own, but without the mediation of the authority of the positive law. In view of the above, conditions necessary for the practical identity of reason and the law of nature should be characterised.

According to Locke, for no Body can be under a Law, which is not promulgated to him; *and this Law being promulgated or made known by Reason only, he that is not come to the Use of his Reason, cannot be said to be under this Law,*²³ while reason cannot be used by children or the insane because they do not have it. Is, however, having reason, synonymous with using it? Of course not, after all *any vehement pain of the body; the ungovernable passion of a*

²³ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 323.

*Man violently in love; or the impatient desire of revenge, keeps the will steady and intent.*²⁴ Because the will is only a certain ability of a human being, which normally is determined by reason, and is subject to its decision, wanting or not, then freedom appertains to the individual as a rational being.²⁵ And although Locke argues that in most cases the reason has the power to restrain or stop actions and satisfaction of its desires, he is fully aware that when a human being is subjected to strong pressure from external reality, then the rule of reason ceases to be so easy and commonplace.²⁶ Anxieties and conflicts of a religious, political or economic nature exert an unquestionably greatly negative influence on the human possibilities of using reason – being led by it as the guiding principle of conduct. The task of the state is to eliminate conflicts by safeguarding the laws of nature of all citizens. Thanks to this, safeguarding individual, egoistic interests is possible only on the basis of reciprocity. However, it is not the state and its authority that are the source of normativity and its warrant. This source is constituted by social practices, and basically, one of them: religion.

The interference of the state, consisting in securing the natural rights of all members of society establishes principles of coexistence which exclude the functioning of religion as a political and ideological force, competitive against the policy of secular government. Not only does religion cease to be an ideology that generates spiritual conflicts that exclude rational principles of coexistence within the society, but at the same time gains the status of a culture-creating

²⁴ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 350-351.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 241.

²⁶ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 263.

factor, i.e. supporting the rationalisation and normalisation of social practices. On the other hand, religion does not take the form of a political tool for exercising power here. Locke had a strong conviction that religiosity belongs to human nature to a degree no lower than the self-preservation instinct, and in the same fashion, it can become a culture-creating factor capable of organising interpersonal relationships to a degree that enables harmonious co-existence in civil society as soon as its huge natural potential is properly utilised. To quote Locke: *A church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshiping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.*²⁷ Whereas, the task of the state is to create real legal and political conditions that implement this maxim. Religious tolerance, according to Locke, is a basic condition for ordering the rules of coexistence, in order for natural and spontaneous religiosity not to be harnessed into ideological conflicts, for its power to remain in the service of culture and not the, directed against it, violence and lawlessness. Religious tolerance, however, is not to mean only activity in the area of law and politics, but as a consequence, of course – also in the social dimension. Locke's religious relativism stems from the fact that knowledge about things inaccessible to our senses is not, in fact, knowledge, but a set of beliefs belonging to the area of only faith. And if so, some beliefs cannot be placed above others. Locke harnesses this logic in a wider context – his concept of the human being. Well, he believes that only proper religious experiences, that

²⁷ J. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Indianapolis 1955, p. 20.

is, those that always remain in the area of what is spontaneous and voluntary, can act as a factor that bonds interpersonal relationships, colouring them with what is irrational, but more powerful than the rational, while remaining an intimate and authentic care for one's own good. But what is the basis of the culture-forming potential of spontaneous and authentic religiosity, or rather the feelings that accompany it?

While the task of the state is to eliminate intra-social conflicts, the social work of religion consists in restraining lust, which is to open the way for rationality as a common rule of conduct. It is worth reminding that Locke, stressing the necessity of religious tolerance, indicates that not theological dogmas, not specific religious practices, ways of worshipping God, but above all, the work on ousting instincts aimed against universal reciprocity in interpersonal relations constitutes the culture-forming power of religion. From this point of view, the nature of the official doctrine of a particular church is of secondary importance, if only confessing it becomes a means of ousting what is lustful. At the same time, the adoption of a thesis according to which the human being is by nature a being that is not only rational but also religious is a necessary condition here. Hence, let us look at the third argument for the existence of the law of nature, which Locke offers in his *Essays on the Law of Nature*: (...) *the mind, after more carefully considering in itself the fabric of this world perceived by the senses and after contemplating the beauty of the objects to be observed, their order, array, and motion, thence proceeds to an inquiry into their origin, to find out what was the cause, and who the maker, of such an excellent work, for it is surely undisputed that this could not have come together casually and by chance into so regular and in every respect so perfect and ingeniously prepared a*

*structure. Hence it is undoubtedly inferred that there must be a powerful and wise creator of all this things, who has made and built this whole universe and us mortals who are not the lowest part of it.*²⁸ We should pay attention to the fact that we are dealing here with the perspective of perceiving the world as a whole of natural processes, harmonised by means of eternal and unchanging rules,²⁹ and as Locke adds – (...) *it does not seem that man alone is independent of laws while everything is bound,*³⁰ which constitutes the third mentioned argument.

However, the law of nature, which we deal with in our considerations, and thus the one applicable to the human being only, although it is an immanent part of the whole established legislation, it does not function with the same force of necessity as, for instance, the law of gravity. The reason for this is, of course, specifically human nature, not limited only to what is physical or vegetative. The human being, as the previously presented first argument teaches us, has a reason – the source of one's freedom and, consequently, the possibility of deciding about one's own life, also in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the law of nature, which becomes possible only in a situation when the norms of the law of nature and the positive law are not fully accepted by a citizen as one's own. What can make one actually accept them? Locke replies that (...) *some things bind of themselves and by their intrinsic force, other indirectly*

²⁸ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 153.

²⁹ This opens the perspective of faith in the Creator, born spontaneously through rationally discovering in experience the rules of the world's manifestation, as perfect, unchangeable and, above all, amazing in their purposefulness.

³⁰ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 117.

*and by a power external to themselves. Of itself and by intrinsic force (and only so) is the divine will binding, and either it can be known by the light of nature (...) or it is revealed by God-inspired men or in some other manner, in which case it is the positive divine law. Indirectly and by delegated power the will of any other superior is binding, be it that of a king or a parent, to whom we are subject by the will of God.*³¹ The will of the God-creator applies only by virtue of faith, but (so) in a manner so authoritative that even a rational, universally understood and expressing vital human and social interest natural law cannot match it. It must be based on the authority of faith placed within the framework of the doctrine of a particular church in order to gain the universal acceptance which it needs and which it cannot otherwise gain.

Locke indeed puts a great deal of emphasis on the authority of the legislator, as the surest, in his opinion, guarantee for the law. He argues that every law must be defined as the will of the legislator, the will to which subjects must willingly submit; this applies to every law, in particular to the law of nature, which can only draw legitimacy from this source, and at the same time constitutes the foundation for every possible secular legislation.³² When we refer to the second argument for the existence of the law of nature, which can be expressed in this concise formula: (...) *no one who commits a wicked action is acquitted on his own judgement*,³³ we will be able to notice how great a role is attributed by Locke to conscience, which does not only “reveal” the existence of the law of nature, but also shows the source of obedience to

³¹ Ibidem, p. 187.

³² J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 151.

³³ Ibidem, p. 117.

it. Conscience is a proper guarantee for the operation of the law of nature – an instance that prevents the human being from egoistic actions, as directed against social principles of reciprocity, enables life in harmony with reason. Locke presents a model of the spiritual organisation of the human being, which consists in renouncing the irrational as lustful in favour of what is rational, through faith – an irrational factor, but with rationality remaining in natural harmony – compatible with it in its claims. It is faith that allows one to curb lusts so as to enable the human being to live in harmony with reason; faith, or, rather, the authority of the Creator-Lawmaker unfailingly connected with it, internalised and expressed in the work of conscience, is the normative base for social order. It is not without reason that Locke writes: *those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.*³⁴

It should be added, at the same time, that Locke clearly assesses the cultural potential of religiosity, also the negative one. On the one hand, he puts a special emphasis on the assimilation of cultural norms through religion, as a way to guarantee the constitution of cultural processes, and on the other hand, he at all costs refrains from the idea that imposing religion on civil society as the authoritative and institutionalised form of a political tool for exercising power constitutes a solution to any social problems. Undoubtedly, Locke is extremely critical of such attempts: *the some may not color their spirit of presecution and un-Christian cruelty with a pretense of care of public weal and observation of the laws; and that others, under pretense of religion may*

³⁴ J. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, p. 52.

*not seek impunity of their libertinism, and licentiousness (...) I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other.*³⁵ It is worth noting that Locke denies the state the “educational” functions in the sphere of opinion and morality, in accordance with the principle: *the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man’s good and person.*³⁶ The state is to be a completely morally and religiously neutral instance, the role of which is solely to eliminate the pathological conditions of social functioning. When the separation between religion and the state is not carried out in a clear and determined way, then the state of war for material goods is replaced by the state of religious wars, *than, at last, it appears what zeal for the church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce, and how easily the pretense of religion and of the care of souls serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.*³⁷

The analyses presented in the article leave no doubt that, unlike Hobbes, Locke is successful in creating a model of the rationalisation of social and cultural processes that are not subject to absolutisation. Locke presents the theory of natural law and political rules that are to initiate the processes of a socio-economic organisation as developing on the basis of its own structure, which from the sphere of politics draws only guarantees of continuous securing of the unchanging basis of socialisation and normalisation of intra-social relations.

³⁵ J. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, p. 16-17.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

Religion, inscribed in the movement of socialisation itself, unable to be established in what is political, draws directly from the spontaneous, specifically human way of perceiving the world and emotions associated with it, simultaneously creating conditions for the process in which it is entangled, abolishing what is selfish and only particularist. What is, however, the most important, Strauss's interpretation, in accordance with which Locke's political philosophy is only a more radical version of Hobbes's concept, turns out to be unsupportable.

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