

# *Polish Journal* *of* *Political Science*

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# *Polish Journal of Political Science*

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Tomasz Godlewski  
Agata Sucharska

**The phenomenon of anti-system parties in Poland  
on the grounds of the comparative analysis of Kukiz'15 and  
KORWiN/Konfederacja (Confederation) parties' participation  
in parliamentary campaigns of 2015 and 2019**

Abstract:

The aim of this article is to assess whether and to what extent parties operating in Poland which identify themselves as anti-system ones (Kukiz'15 and KORWiN (Konfederacja; Confederation)) are such parties in relation to doctrinally defined characteristics. In order to achieve the aim, the anti-system index was created and based on it, in the context of the above mentioned parties' performance in parliamentary campaigns of 2015 and 2019, the comparative analysis of their anti-system characteristics was performed.

**Keywords:** anti-system, Kukiz'15, KORWiN, political party, political awareness, political scene

## Introduction

The systemic transformation in Poland that began in 1989 caused not only vital changes in the fields of economy and social life but also far-reaching shifts within Polish political scene. A single-party state has been replaced by a multi-party system based on the rules of democratic pluralism. Transformations taking place in the following years led to the stabilization of the system in which dominating roles have been played by two parties that have been taking turns being in government: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość and Platforma Obywatelska. The other two parties co-participating in and influencing the process: PSL and SLD were historically-shaped at least from the time of Round Table Talks.<sup>1</sup> However, stabilization did not mean complete fixation of the Polish political scene. Over the course of more than 30 years there have been appearing parties which opposed not only the non-effectiveness of governments' politics but also the way of policy-making in which the fractures of political scene were perpetuated. What constitutes a common denominator of those opposing parties is a specific 'supernova effect' – the parties were formed shortly before the election, gained social support and... disappeared over time of a parliamentary term. Among them, two parties falling into the category of anti-system parties are especially interesting ones – Kukiz'15 and Konfederacja (Confederation; the former KORWiN). Both of them became popular by embracing the atmosphere that dominated in the society, the atmosphere which may be called

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<sup>1</sup> These parties entered into various coalitions, for example, at present, Lewica (left wing) and PSL-Polish Coalition. They remained, however, the leading political entity in the coalitions, both in terms of leadership as well as human resources and structures.



‘the process of change’, emanating by, among others, the resistance to ‘old’ political parties.<sup>2</sup> Undoubtedly, the electoral success of Kukiz’15 in 2015 and the following one of Konfederacja (Confederation) in 2019 contributed to the popularization of anti-systemism and to strengthening the belief that no system – both among parties and voters – can last forever. Within this context, it is worth asking the question of whether the parties that define themselves as anti-system ones comply with the doctrinal meaning of anti-systemism and its designates. This article is devoted to answer this question in a theoretical and empirical sense. The aim of this piece of work is to reconstruct the anti-system power of Kukiz’15 and Konfederacja (Confederation; the former KORWiN) which those parties showed during parliamentary campaigns in 2015 and 2019. In this regard, however, there is a huge lack of research tools. Therefore, it was necessary to develop a proprietary tool – the anti-system index that covers the analyzed phenomenon in five areas/dimensions of the analysis discussed in detail later in the article.

### 1. Anti-systemism in a classifying sense

Within the field of politics, the idea of anti-systemism is present from the 60s of the last century. It was introduced and popularized by an Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori. The category of an ‘anti-system party’ was an important part of his theoretical concept called polarised pluralism.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> E. Marciniak, T. Godlewski, *A qualitative portrait of the ‘electorate change’ in the parliamentary elections of 2015. Similarities and differences*, e-Politikon, 2015, no. XVII, p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> G. Sartori, *Parties and Party System. A framework for Analysis*, Cambridge, 1976, p. 205.

The name ‘anti-system’ has been used most often to define specific kinds of parties, especially authoritarian ones (e.g. communist, fascist) called as those which ‘participate to destroy’.<sup>4</sup> What is especially important for the purpose of this article, G. Sartori defined two ways in which anti-systemism can be understood: 1) a wide one (also called weak understanding) – appealing to a wide spectrum of behaviours aiming at lowering the level of political system’s legitimacy (in extreme cases – the delegitimacy of it), increasing the degree of polarization and radicalizing the activities of the participants of the political scene; and 2) a narrow one (also called ideological), referring to a set of rules different from the one dominating in the prevailing political system and ideology. In this sense, the main purpose of an anti-system party is not to share the power but to change the current political system.<sup>5</sup> Opposing it takes the form of propaganda and/or specific political actions, including election programs and slogans.

A different approach to anti-systemism emerges from the latest research conducted in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic. As authors claim, what society experienced in 2020 and 2021 not only impacted it in the economic or social context, but also contributed to the intensification of anti-system attitudes of the people – that is, the society shows a higher level of dissatisfaction with the fundamental social and political order. This assertion has been confirmed by international research conducted by a team led by Henrikas Bartusevičius from the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. The study used

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<sup>4</sup> B. Michalak, *Antisystemism of the protest party*, <https://repozytorium.umk.pl/bitstream/handle/item/1576/Antysystemowo%C5%9B%C4%87%20partii%20protestu.pdf>, p. 1, accessed November 2021.

<sup>5</sup> B. Michalak, *Anti-systemism ...*, p. 5.

a significant (amounting more than 6,000 respondents) sample of adult residents coming from the USA, Denmark, Italy and Hungary. The researchers confirmed that there is a correlation between the psychological burden of individuals and the tendency they show to take anti-government and anti-system actions as well as to use political violence (especially when it comes to people whose political orientations are authoritarian and based on domination<sup>6</sup>). This shows how restrictions and social isolation destructively influence the processes of social exclusion and marginalization which stimulate broadly understood anti-system attitudes and actions.<sup>7</sup> This is a completely new strand in the research discourse which certainly requires to be discussed and confirmed in subsequent studies as it may constitute a new, important perspective for understanding and interpreting anti-systemism through the prism of relations between parties and citizens.

Taking all this into account, for the purposes of this article its authors adopted, after G. Sartori, a narrow understanding of anti-systemism, assuming that it is characterized by more specific designates that can be empirically operationalized and measured both qualitatively (content analysis) and quantitatively (the occurrence of a given feature) using the index tool.

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<sup>6</sup> H. Bartusevičius, F. Leeuwen van, M.B. Petersen, *Dominance-Driven Autocratic Political Orientations Predict Political Violence in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) and Non-WEIRD Samples*, *Psychological Science*, Volume 31, Issue 12, December 2020, Pages 1511–1530.

<sup>7</sup> H. Bartusevičius, A. Bor, F. Jørgensen, M.B. Petersen, *The Psychological Burden of the COVID-19 Pandemic Is Associated With Antisystemic Attitudes and Political Violence*, *Psychological Science*, Volume: 32 issue: 9, September 2021 Page(s): 1391–1403.

## 2. Determining the features important in the analysis of anti-system parties

Anti-system parties oppose all political system, including the party system. They indicate many irregularities that are to occur within these organizations. Their postulates often result from the crisis taking place within classic political parties when they are perceived as insufficiently democratic, hierarchical, centralized and corrupt. Although some of the anti-system parties have chosen to lead their management in a more democratic and pluralistic way, as Ryszard Herbut claims, 'at the moment it does not seem to be a common tendency'.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, a conservative approach in terms of form, areas of the subject matter they undertake and their communication can be perceived as a negative feature of classic political parties. When creating the index tool, the authors of the article included the features that are opposite to the dominant order and political system – that is the features which constitute a kind of anti-system syndrome.

The first dimension of the analysis is the ideological one. Political parties and movements oppose (to a various extent) the values, principles and mechanisms on which the political reality is based. They can do this using many political trends, both those considered to be left-wing and those right-wing. Regardless of their worldview, however, the common denominator which they express in political programs and communication styles is undermining the legitimacy of the political system combined with proposing solutions for its reconstruction. At this point, it should be underlined that

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<sup>8</sup> R. Herbut, *Theory and practice of the functioning of political parties*, Publishing House of the University of Wrocław, Wrocław 2002, p. 186.

ideological anti-systemism corresponds to a large extent with the ideology of populism, as many of anti-system postulates refer to the classical trend of populism. This is, in particular, visible in the use of 'the people' and 'the elite' concepts, presenting the first group as the one guided by the public good, possessing popular wisdom, and the second group as corrupt, caring only for particular interests. The intention for communicating such vision of reality is to restore power to citizens and to take it away from depraved elites.

Anti-system parties also put special emphasis on the condition of public finances and the economy, as well as relations between politicians, interest groups and their social background, that is they take advantage of the so-called *the anti-state trend* of populism typical for the parties operating in 1990s. At the same time, what they propose are solutions based on a free market and what they announce is that they will deal with the state's corruption. Therefore, the election lists of these parties may include economic experts or experts from areas which are key for the effective operation of the state. Anti-system movements also try not to use the image of a professional politician but to promote candidates who deal with business and entertainment, who are not affiliated with the ruling political elite and not involved in political scandals.

Apart from that, anti-system parties propose solutions which can be marked as impossible to be implemented within a given international order and those which main goal is to please the voters. At the same time, much more intense than in the case of other political groups, all their theses are announced through messages that use manipulative techniques. This include, inter alia, taking up controversial, often demagogic topics referring to low instincts

and collective negative emotions as well as using expressive language.

Anti-system movements can not gain the support of electorate basing on the traditional right-left division. Therefore, they motivate voters by using a distinctive form and structure. Firstly, they usually take other organizational form than this of a political party, e.g. they are called an association, a movement or a list of independent deputies. They also propose, for example, various other forms of participation in the creation of party programs, in order to make it much more democratic. They also try to be organized internally in a different way, for example by giving up party discipline during parliamentary voting, emphasizing that the party consists of self-thinking people who know themselves what their position on a given issue is, and they make decisions mainly based on the best solutions for voters and the state.

The final dimension of anti-system parties is therefore the electorate which may differ from the electorates of other parties, e.g. because of the so-called strategic voting. Anti-system parties often rely on civic opposition which is reflected in voting for names from the electoral list of a movement or opposition/protest party. This regularity is pointed out by, among others, Meindert Fennema whose observations allow to conclude that many people vote for one of the anti-system parties not because they support its program, but because they can thus manifest their opposition to the political clients of the two parties which are dominant on the political scene.<sup>9</sup> Researching the electorate of anti-system parties should therefore include all criteria indicating a strong need

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<sup>9</sup> M. Fennema, *Populist Parties of the Right*, [in:] Rydgren J., *Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-wing Populism in the Western World*, Hauppauge 2005, p. 16.

for changes in politics, dissatisfaction with the functioning of the current political system and features related to the inclination to social rebellion (e.g. a feeling of hurt, anomie, pessimistic thinking about politics, etc.).

### 3. The construction of the anti-system index

The index of anti-systemism was created based on the analysis of the subject literature and on the multifaceted analysis of the above-discussed areas of anti-system nature. It distinguishes five dimensions:

1. **Election program** – understood as a political offer that is publicly available on the official websites of the party/movement
2. **Political communication** – assuming that information on political communication is obtained primarily by analysing the provisions of the election convention which is a carefully prepared message addressed by a party to the voter during the election campaign
3. **Structure of the political movement;**
4. **Politicians of the political movement** – assuming that they are considered to be people who were given parliamentary mandates while being on that movement's list and/or are on the management board of the movement and/or performed at the election convention of this movement
5. **Electorate of the political movement.**

Within each of the dimensions, a set of distinctive features characteristic for the anti-system party was defined. The occurrence of a given feature meant assigning one point

(present/not present). Some dimensions consist of more than one feature – at that time, the presence of at least one of them in the analyzed party was assumed to be a sufficient criterion of anti-systemism. In total, it was possible for an analysed party to be awarded 10 points. Using the nominal scale was a deliberate procedure as it allows for a sharp marking of the limits of the presence of anti-system signs (features) in the analyzed dimensions.<sup>10</sup>

The first dimension discusses the program and the political offer formulated by the party. It includes two features:

1. **Proposition of making profound changes in the political system** – affecting the operation of state organs and changing basic legal acts;
2. **The presence of populist postulates** – unrealistic, referring to what is socially attractive.

The second dimension covers the sphere of communication. It contains a set of four features:

3. **Undermining the legitimacy of the system** – showing the legal status of the state and the condition of public finances.
4. **Criticising the elite** – exposing the connections between politicians and their relationship with other institutions in the state, pathologies of power, often personal attacks.
5. **Using ‘the people’ concept** – applying the concept in the context of restoring the power to ordinary people, citizens and all other designates of the word ‘people’ in the sense of the ideology of protest populism;

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<sup>10</sup> It is planned to extend the index by adding intermediate values. However, this procedure requires additional qualitative research activities of a verification nature.



6. **Controversiality of the message** – raising controversial topics or topics avoided by other parliamentary groups; the use of social engineering techniques referring to current social moods and negative collective emotions.

The third dimension relates to politicians who constitute the staff of the group/party. It includes the specificity of the candidates put forward by the parties and their connections with the current political system. This dimension contains one feature:

7. **Non-party politicians** – the party's leader was not a politician before; the presence of local politicians unknown so far as well as experts not related to the establishment.

Within the fourth dimension, the structure of the political party/movement was analyzed. This dimension includes two features:

8. **Form of the political movement** – which is often atypical, deviating from the form of classic political parties (association, no formal party, common list, other form characterized by weak institutionalization);
9. **High degree of democratization** – lack of hierarchy or party discipline within the group.

After all, the fifth dimension relates to the voters who make up the electorate of the anti-system party. The dimension contains one feature:

10. **Anti-system electorate** – that is, among voters there are people with characteristics appropriate to the previously-defined anti-system electorate.

#### 4. A comparative analysis of Kukiz'15 i KORWiN parties' performance in 2015

Two new parties on the political scene took part in the 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland. One of them was the Kukiz'15 movement, which was created with the use of political capital after its leader Paweł Kukiz took third place in the presidential election, and the second one was a formation founded by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, i.e. Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja (the Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic; Freedom and Hope) - KORWiN for short. Both groups showed themselves as anti-system ones, which could already be seen when they were presenting politicians, structures, programs and election conventions, and also partially in the groups' electorates.

##### 4.1. Kukiz'15 performance during the parliamentary campaign in 2015

In its election program, Kukiz'15 postulated at least a few changes to the system. One of them was passing a new Constitution, a new electoral law, and even a new political regime. At the same time, the party demanded introducing lower, fairer and simpler-measured taxes as well as a progressive system. These changes were to apply only to Polish citizens, because non-taxable foreign corporations had to be taxed – which meets the requirements of the criterion of populist promises.

During the pre-election convention, Kukiz '15 distinguished itself many times with its anti-system style of communication. What was questioned in it was the legitimacy of the system, i.a. through suggesting that the Polish state functions only theoretically. What is more, the party questioned the operation

of the system's organs, e.g. the judiciary or the security apparatus. The movement's narrative was also based on criticism of the political elite, blaming them for the poor state of the state. In its messages, the formation also decided to raise one of the more controversial topics at the time, which was the issue of the migration crisis in Europe. In their speeches, Kukiz'15 leaders referred to the fear of the so-called refugees through anecdotal stories about their behaviour that was to be observed in Western countries.

The majority of the candidates who appeared on the Kukiz'15 lists were people for whom politics was not their main occupation. Some of them, like Marek Jakubiak, dealt with politics at the same time being entrepreneurs. Paweł Kukiz had had only little political experience, and on a daily basis, like the popular rapper Piotr-Liroy Marzec, he was involved in music.

In 2015, the leader of the Kukiz'15 movement declared that he would not establish a party because he did not want his movement to operate at the expense of the state (structural criterion). Moreover, it was emphasized that party discipline would not be applied - a member of the movement, Kornel Morawiecki, assessed that such discipline would not appear within Kukiz'15 group because it was inconsistent with the Constitution.<sup>11</sup> The group's lists also included members of such parties as Ruch Narodowy (the National Movement), Kongres Nowej Prawicy (Congress of the New Right; after the departure of Janusz Korwin-Mikke), Demokracja Bezpośrednia (Direct Democracy), Partia Libertariańska (the Libertarian Party), Prawica Rzeczypospolitej (the Right

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<sup>11</sup> Kukiz'15 without party discipline. 'It is unconstitutional' – TV Republic (accessed: November 15, 2021)

of the Republic) and a few members of Polska Razem (Poland Together), Solidarna Polska (Solidary Poland), Wspólnota (Community), Stronnictwo Pracy i Samoobrony (Labor and Self-Defense Party). Most of them were environments focused on deep system changes. In addition, the committee's lists also included Paweł Tanajno (DB; Direct Democracy) and Jacek Wilk (KNP; Congress of the New Right), who, together with Paweł Kukiz, ran for the office of president, and whom Kukiz described in one of the interviews as anti-system candidates.<sup>12</sup>

According to data gathered by CBOS (a research center exploring public opinion), less than one-fifth (i.e. 19%) of the electorate – the supporters of Paweł Kukiz's party in 2015 believed that it had the best program (there were answers: *there is no better program; they have interesting proposals; a historical and overview program, I like their approach to the market, they have a country development plan*). Relatively many supporters of the Kukiz'15 movement (12%) hoped that if the party came to power, it could change the most on the political scene (voters' motivations were included in the statements such as: to change something in the country; because they can change a lot; need to change the political situation). Some voters chose Kukiz'15 because they were *disappointed* with other parties active on the Polish political scene (9% - neither PiS nor PO did not meet my expectations; Kukiz'15 is the most reliable of all). Voters of the Kukiz'15 movement also believed that it was a progressive, democratically ruled party, open to new ideas including the support for Poland's membership of the EU

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<sup>12</sup> Prepared on the basis of: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQDxFhehUyg> (accessed: November 15, 2021).

(to the most extent among other right-wing parties; 5% - a free party, everyone votes in accordance with their conscience; because they have more pro-European views). Voters also pointed out that Kukiz'15 is characterized by social sensitivity and care for ordinary people (4% - they deal with social problems). Moreover, the declared voters of this grouping believed that it was credible, truthful and did not cheat its supporters, and, as the research center emphasizes, it can be assumed what the respondents often meant by this was the person of the group's leader (11% - because he is truthful; they are rather quite credible; their solutions are short, firm and they don't beat around the bush).

There were more arguments relating to the figure of the leader that prompted voters to vote for the movement, including because he is very popular (also thanks to his musical career) and, compared to the leaders of other groups, he attracted followers to the greatest extent (3% - because I like him; sentiment towards music). What's more, as much as 20% of supporters indicated that they voted for Kukiz'15 because its leader is *from the outside of the system*.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> *Motives for voting for political parties*, CBOS research, May 2018 [https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2018/K\\_063\\_18.PDF](https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2018/K_063_18.PDF). (accessed: November 15, 2021).

Table 1. The anti-systemism of Kukiz'15 during parliamentary election in 2015

<b>Ordinal no.</b>	<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Anti-system feature</b>	<b>Points</b>
1.	Program	Propositions of making profound changes in the political system	1
2.		Populist postulates	1
3.	Communication	Undermining the legitimacy of the system	1
4.		Criticising elites	1
5.		Using 'the people' concept	0
6.		Controversiality of the message	1
7.	Politicians	They have no political experience or no ties to the establishment	1
8.	Structure	Unusual forms	1
9.		Democratization	1
10.	Electorate	Having the features of an anti-system electorate	1

#### 4.2. KORWiN performance during the parliamentary campaign in 2015

During the 2015 campaign, the KORWiN party proposed a program in which all areas of the state's activity were taken into account. It contained postulates that could significantly change the scope of functioning of the most important organs as well as change or even remove many basic

legal acts. The proposal took into account most of the constraints imposed by the Constitution and the European Union, and the fact that some changes would require more time. In the program, one could find some promises that could be considered as populist, but on the other hand, many propositions were downright socially unpopular, which ultimately led to not giving the whole program a point for being populist.

The KORWiN party proposed a style of communication similar to this of Kukiz'15 movement. Public speeches focused on proving that the state is broken and corrupt, and blaming for it the political elite, not the partially-ineffective system. The crisis of the state was therefore linked to only one factor, without indicating what should be rectified. More controversial topics or forms of communication have not been dealt with. Also the people have not been shown as simple people who need to be restored to power in opposition to the corrupt elite.

The first election convention of the KORWiN party also provided interesting conclusions regarding the anti-system nature of its politicians and structures. Although the party was formally structured in the same way as all the others, the movement from the very beginning declared openness to cooperation with smaller groups. Members of the movement representing all 16 provinces in Poland and the abroad district were presented at the event. They presented themselves in a specific pattern - first they talked about their profession or education, and then they explained why they decided to join the party. In terms of the type of employment, a large group constituted entrepreneurs which was founded by some activists of Kongres Nowej Prawicy (the Congress of the New Right).

The CBOS's research from 2019 showed that the KORWiN party was only partially anti-system. The party's potential voters were more than average inclined to succumb to conspiratorial thinking about politics. They were also more than average pessimistic. However, the level of political alienation of KORWiN supporters does not differ significantly from the average. Together with the voters' right-wing orientation and not very strong psychological characteristics, no point could be awarded in this area.

Table 2. The anti-systemism of KORWiN party during parliamentary election in 2015

<b>Ordinal no.</b>	<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Anti-system feature</b>	<b>Points</b>
1.	Program	Propositions of making profound changes in the political system	0
2.		Populist postulates	1
3.	Communication	Undermining the legitimacy of the system	1
4.		Criticising elites	1
5.		Using 'the people' concept	0
6.		Controversiality of the message	0
7.	Politicians	They have no political experience or no ties to the establishment	0
8.	Structure	Unusual forms	0
9.		Democratization	1
10.	Electorate	Having the features of an anti-system electorate	0



## 5. The comparative analysis of Kukiz '15 and Konfederacja (Confederation) parties' performance in 2019

### 5.1. Kukiz'15 performance during the parliamentary campaign of 2019

Before the parliamentary elections, the Kukiz'15's election program in 2019 was limited to postulates aiming at strengthening direct democracy in Poland and counteracting corruption, without officially presenting a new program. On the group's website, however, one could read about the strong and stable currency of the zloty, a reduction in excise tax on gasoline or the possibility of dismissing an MP during his term of office, which can be considered as populist offers.

In the field of communication, during the election campaign, Paweł Kukiz called for an end to the political civil war, but he did not refrain from criticizing the system, pointing out that it is its shortcomings, and not directly of politicians, that lead to pathologies within political parties. The controversy of the message was also abandoned, and the people were referred to only once, suggesting that a peasant was at that time abused by the system.

In 2019 the movement lost many anti-system politicians. Out of 42 deputies, only five were elected to the Sejm for the next term of office. One of the most important politicians became Stanisław Tyszka, who was previously connected to Jarosław Gowin's party Polska Razem (Poland Together). Moreover, the Kukiz'15 movement lost the advantage of not being tied to the establishment by making a deal with PSL.

In the case of the structural dimension, Kukiz'15 experienced significant changes which, however, were rather not connected to anti-system postulates. In 2020, Paweł Kukiz decided to register a political party. Nevertheless, the issue

of the internal organization of the party remained unchanged – voting discipline never occurred, and the considerable independence of the deputies in this respect was also confirmed by the greatest inconsistency during the parliamentary votes.

As far as the anti-system character of Kukiz'15 in 2019 in terms of the electorate is concerned, it has significantly decreased to such an extent that it would be unjustified to award a point in this dimension. In the CBOS research conducted just before the parliamentary elections in 2019, it was indicated that over the previous four years the psychological profile of Kukiz'15 voters has changed significantly. The group's supporters showed, inter alia, an average level of pessimism, a consistent level of thinking about politics in terms of a behind-the-scenes conspiracy, and an undistinguishable level of political anomie and alienation. Due to the merger of Kukiz'15 and PSL, the electorate of this party should be considered as voters of the Koalicja Polska-PSL (Polish Coalition). Research carried out by CBOS also indicated features that are characteristic of voters with centrist and agrarian views, which had been typical of the PSL electorate for years.<sup>14</sup> Partly it was a potential electorate who was not satisfied with the current state of the state. However, the pessimism of voters in this respect was not clearly higher than in the case of other opposition formations. While in the survey carried out in March 2020, before the collapse of the PSL (Polish Coalition), only 57% of the respondents had an opposing attitude towards the government, 69% argued that the government was creating an opportunity for economic improvement, and 50% of the respondents was

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<sup>14</sup> 2019 *electorates – views*, CBOS research report, October 12, 2019 [https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K\\_124\\_19.PDF](https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K_124_19.PDF). (accessed: November 15, 2021)

not satisfied with the state of democracy in Poland<sup>15</sup>. Groups such as Lewica (left wing), Konfederacja (Confederation) or Koalicja Obywatelska (Civil Coalition) provided fewer positive responses in this regard.

Table 3. The anti-systemism of Kukiz'15 during parliamentary election in 2019

Ordinal no.	Dimension	Anti-system feature	Punktacja
1.	Program	Propositions of making profound changes in the political system	0
2.		Populist postulates	1
3.	Communication	Undermining the legitimacy of the system	1
4.		Criticising elites	0
5.		Using 'the people' concept	1
6.		Controversiality of the message	0
7.	Politicians	They have no political experience or no ties to the establishment	0
8.	Structure	Unusual forms	1
9.		Democratization	0
10.	Electorate	Having the features of an anti-system electorate	0

<sup>15</sup> *Attitude towards the government in the first half of March*, CBOS research report, March 2020 [https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2020/K\\_036\\_20.PDF](https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2020/K_036_20.PDF). (accessed: November 15, 2021)

## 5.2. Konfederacja (Confederation) during 2019 parliamentary election

As for the Confederation's program, before the parliamentary elections in 2019 it was limited to postulates aimed at strengthening direct democracy in Poland and counter-acting corruption, without presenting a new program. On the website of the movement, however, one could read proposals concerning: the zloty as a strong and stable currency, lowering the excise tax on gasoline or the possibility of dismissing an MP during his term of office, which can be considered a populist offer.

In turn, during the last election convention of the Konfederacja (Confederation) in 2019, the movement was distinguished by political communication that was characterized by all anti-system features. During the speeches, the concept of the people appeared more than once in the context of restoring power to them and adapting the political system to it. It was emphasized that the current system does not work due to the law, which is, firstly, incomprehensible, secondly overregulated, and thirdly, of a flawed structure. The 'founders' of the system, i.e. PO, PiS, PSL, SLD, were blamed for this state of affairs. The message of the convention was also very controversial. Among the issues that were raised were, among others, problems of LGBT+ people or raising children in relation to cultural gender.

In terms of politicians, in the 2019 parliamentary campaign KORWiN was undoubtedly an anti-system party. Janusz Korwin-Mike is certainly a politician with extensive experience, but he has no connection to the establishment, and this has remained unchanged over the years 2015–2019. During this period, many entrepreneurs, experts and politicians

who could be described as non-partisans were also involved in the movements he led.

In terms of structure, it is worth emphasizing that since 2019 the party has become a coalition consisting of several parties and movements that pursued a common policy in each area. At the same time, after its conclusion, it was announced that party discipline would not function. However, no similar announcements were made in 2015, which did not allow the authors of this article to award a point in this area.

In 2019, the main feature of the party's electorate was its approach to economic and libertarian changes. Konfederacja (Confederation) identified itself as an anti-system group in terms of its approach to the system, but also as an ideological and new right wing one. In the studies of its potential electorate, the influence of an ideological rather than an anti-system approach is more visible. According to the latest CBOS survey conducted in December 2020, 69% of the potential voters of the Konfederacja (Confederation) assessed the current political situation as bad.<sup>16</sup> In turn, when asked whether this situation was going in the right or wrong direction, 75% of the potential electorate of this formation chose the second answer. The voters of this party, however, were not particularly pessimistic in this regard. The situation in Poland was assessed worse, among others, by potential supporters of Poland 2050 led by Szymon Hołownia. The Konfederacja (Confederation)'s voters, however, assessed the economic situation in the country the worst of all the parties, with 64% of such votes.

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<sup>16</sup> *Social mood in December*, CBOS research report, December 2020 [https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2020/K\\_161\\_20.PDF](https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2020/K_161_20.PDF). (accessed: November 15, 2021).

Table 4. The anti-systemism of Konfederacja (Confederation) during parliamentary election in 2019

<b>Ordinal no.</b>	<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Anti-system feature</b>	<b>Punktacja</b>
1.	Program	Propositions of making profound changes in the political system	0
2.		Populist postulates	1
3.	Communication	Undermining the legitimacy of the system	1
4.		Criticising elites	1
5.		Using 'the people' concept	1
6.		Controversiality of the message	1
7.	Politicians	They have no political experience or no ties to the establishment	1
8.	Structure	Unusual forms	1
9.		Democratization	1
10.	Electorate	Having the features of an anti-system electorate	0

### 5. Summary

The conducted analysis made it possible not only to identify the level of compliance of the analyzed groups with the doctrinal features of anti-system parties, but also to capture the change in the strength of anti-systemism that took place between the two parliamentary elections of 2015 and 2019.

On the Polish political scene there is no ‘completely’ anti-system party – meaning a party characterized by all the features included in the anti-system index. It is also worth to notice a fundamental change of opposite directions that took place between Kukiz’15 and KORWiN / Konfederacja (Confederation) parties in just four years. In the parliamentary campaign of 2015, the Kukiz’15 movement was much more anti-system. The group had 9 out of 10 traits and was anti-system in all dimensions. In the same year, KORWiN had only 4 features in just three analyzed dimensions.

In turn, four years later, before the 2019 parliamentary elections, the Konfederacja (Confederation) was definitely more anti-system. At that time, Kukiz’15 lost its anti-system character in as many as 5 features and two dimensions. Quite a significant change as regards Paweł Kukiz’s party occurred in the area of the structure of the movement and its politicians, which was caused by the movement’s joining the PSL (Polish Coalition). Konfederacja (Confederation), on the other hand, increased its anti-system character by 4 features and one dimension. It was mainly the result of changes that appeared in the style of its political communication – which became even more aggressive, controversial and critical towards the system. Therefore, we can talk about a significant change in anti-system parties in Poland. In 2019 a new leader appeared, systematically gaining importance and appropriating this segment of the Polish political scene to an ever greater extent.

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## **Family - Nation - State. The Triad of Creating Poland's National Security**

### Abstract

The aim of this study is to comprehensively define the notions of family, nation and state and their interrelations from the perspective of security sciences. Mutual dependencies between the family, nation and state determine a general state of national security. The primary research method used in this study is analysis performed in the form of literature study on family, nation, state and security. The other methods used are synthesis, induction and a comparative method.

**Keywords:** security studies, security, national security, family, state, nation, national awareness, national identity, sovereignty, Poland.

## Introduction

In Michał Brzeziński's opinion the concept of national security broadens the traditional understanding of state security. This relates to the state's functions to preserve its territory, sovereign power, internal order, rule of law and survival. In the view of this Polish expert, national security is the external security and individual security of a state in international relations, determining its foreign security policy.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Waldemar Kitler proves that "National security is the most important value, national need and the compelling priority of the state, individuals and social groups, and at the same time a process involving various measures, guaranteeing a permanent, undisturbed existence and national (state) development. This includes protection and defence of the state as a political institution and protection of individuals and the whole society, their goods and the natural environment against threats that significantly limit its functioning or threaten goods subject to special protection".<sup>2</sup> While the thematic link between the notions of nation and state is evident and widely covered in the literature on the subject both in the studies of political science and security science, it is not apparent to include the family in this triad. Cezary Smuniewski unequivocally points to the family as a research topic directly related to the issue of national security. The scientist comes to the following conclusion:

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<sup>1</sup> M. Brzeziński, *Rodzaje bezpieczeństwa państwa*, in: *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne państwa. Wybrane zagadnienia*, S. Sulowski, M. Brzeziński (ed.), Elipsa, Warszawa 2009, pp. 38–39.

<sup>2</sup> W. Kitler, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie. Uwarunkowania. System*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2011, p. 31.

“the family seen as a social event is directly related to matters such as upbringing, national heritage, system of values, patriotism, settling into society, individual and social identity, recognition of threats or defensive attitudes. Supposing creation of security is such a serious matter that it should not be left to changing and spontaneous cultural trends, the family need to be perceived as an entity predisposed to participate in the creation of not only social, public and cultural security, but also in a much broader context, the national security”.<sup>3</sup> In the research of this Warsaw-based scientist, the family is understood as a reality related to the nation and the state. It is a place where the future generations are brought up to create national security, build a civic society, learn how to create relations in society and take responsibility for the common good. The family is the place of axiological shaping.<sup>4</sup> In the light of the above, it is fully justified to enquire about the triad: family, nation, state<sup>5</sup>; and about interrelationships and implications for creating national security.

### The family in research on the creation of Poland's national security

In the opinion of Cezary Smuniewski, the family occupies an important area of exploration in studies on the creation

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<sup>3</sup> C. Smuniewski, *W poszukiwaniu sposobu tworzenia bezpieczeństwa. Refleksja o roli rodziny w społeczeństwie*, in: *Rodzina w lokalnych i globalnych kontekstach bezpieczeństwa*, I. Urych, C. Smuniewski (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2015, p. 34.

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem, pp. 17–38.

<sup>5</sup> The need to compile and study the triad of national security of Poland “family - nation - state” has been repeatedly expressed in the interviews by prof. Cezary Smuniewski.

of Poland's national security. This mainly concerns the analysis of identity security (collective identity) as well as social and cultural security which are part of the thought on national security. In research on the creation of Poland's national security, the family is important due to its primordial character in relation to other social groups. As Cezary Smuniewski, a Polish security expert, aptly noted, "The family has existed for eternity. In a sense, we do not know a person who functions outside of it: an individual is born in a family, is brought up in a family, establishes a family, lives among families. The first space for collective life is the family".<sup>6</sup>

Józef Rembowski is of the opinion that the family is the primary social group, composed of a man and a woman united by marriage, their children (own or adopted), and in some cases also of other people, usually their closest relatives.<sup>7</sup> A similar position is presented by a Polish sociologist, Prof. Jan Szczepański in whose opinion the family is a social group consisting of people connected by a marriage and a parent-child relationship. Family members usually live under the same roof and form one household, which may span two or more generations. The family is based on consistent behavioural patterns and patterns of mutual influence. The roles of members are defined not only by mutual emotional involvement but also in the context of wider communities: country, church, local community and also various

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<sup>6</sup> C. Smuniewski, *W poszukiwaniu...*, op. cit., p. 20. Cf. A. Skrabacz, S. Sulowski, *Wstęp, in: Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Pojęcia. Uwagowania. Wyzwania*, A. Skrabacz, A. Sulowski (ed.), Elipsa, Warszawa 2012, p. 7; W. Kitler, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe RP...*, op. cit., pp. 30–31.

<sup>7</sup> J. Rembowski, *Więzi uczuciowe w rodzinie*, PWN, Warszawa 1972, p. 14.

other institutions specialized in caring for a child or mother or whose task is to support husbands, mothers, wives, fathers and children.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, Maria Ziemska shares the view of Smuniewski and explains that the family is the basic group as it provides the individual with the first and most complete experience of belonging to a social group, whereas the emotional and social relations that occur in it are not subject to changes to the same extent as mutual relations in social groups.<sup>9</sup>

According to Maria Ziemska, the functions of the family need to be analysed from two perspectives. The first is the tasks performed for the benefit of society, the other is obligations towards its own members. The family is a social microstructure that fulfils the tasks of the macrostructure and hence it can be said that it satisfies the general social as well as the national needs. Therefore, it performs such functions as:

- procreative – it provides new members not only for its own group but also for the whole society;
- productive – it supplies workers to society and increases the creative and productive forces;
- service and care – it plays a service role in meeting the basic needs of its members, as well as provides care for those who do not have complete independence due to illness or age, which are children and the elderly;
- socializing – it introduces new citizens to the society, passing on to them the language, habits and patterns

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<sup>8</sup> J. Szczepański, *Elementarne pojęcia socjologii*, PWN, Warszawa 1970, p. 300.

<sup>9</sup> M. Ziemska, *Rodzina i dziecko*, PWN, Warszawa 1986, p. 11.

of behaviour that apply in a given society, as well as customs, traditions, moral and cultural values;

- psychohygienic – it guarantees that the household members meet their emotional and psychological needs, provides security, guarantees emotional balance, the possibility of emotional exchange and also conditions for the development of the personality.<sup>10</sup>

Agnieszka Szaladzińska came to interesting conclusions in which she claims in her research on the creation of Poland's national security that the family by performing its functions is conducive to strengthening and cultivating mental health in the society. Apart from the societal tasks, the family also performs tasks towards its own members, and these are mainly in the form of satisfying their various needs: biological, economic and psychosocial. In marriage also the sexual needs of husband and wife are also satisfied which is connected with the procreative function. The family also meets the living and caring needs of its members, and also it is where caring for others and experiencing care is taught. At the same time such emotional needs are satisfied within the family as love, sense of belonging, understanding, exchange of emotions, recognition, respect and security.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, Henryk Cudak in his publication entitled *The role of parents' pedagogical culture in eliminating family dysfunctions* presents the position that the family is a cohesive whole that requires from its members, above all the parents, to be united and to pursue jointly set goals arising from a sense of internal necessity. The foundation of proper relations in the family are in particular the relations between

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<sup>10</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>11</sup> A. Szaladzińska, *Małżeństwo i rodzina jako wartość i cel młodości*, „Wychowanie na co dzień” 2008, No. 3, pp. 37–39.



parents, the emotional bond, as well as the sense of responsibility. If these conditions are met it is possible to properly fulfil the obligations in the field of childcare and education, whose aim always need to be the best interest of the child. In a properly functioning family the relations between parents are based on mutually agreed rules of raising children and the division of responsibilities.<sup>12</sup>

Such a multifaceted approach to the family is extremely important from the point of view of analysis in the field of security sciences where, as Cezary Smuniewski noted, “Interdisciplinary reflections on the family in which the humanistic and social approach may be considered an axis of considerations indicating the anthropological foundations of the processes of creating security, creates the potential to build an axiology of national security. It is possible that such a thought will not materialize without the turbulent clash of the foundations of the family ethos with contemporary trends revealed in socio-cultural changes and the expectations of members of the nation”.<sup>13</sup> In the context of the above explanation, Ilona Urych points out that “The reflections on the role of the family in creating the security of its members can be started with the statement that if the family does not properly perform one of its tasks, it limits its proper functioning, then to become a dysfunctional family hindering or even making it impossible to meet the needs of its members. This applies to both lower-order needs, guaranteeing continuance, and higher-order needs driving development. The essence of continuance and development of an individual is their security, which not only allows them to survive and exist

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<sup>12</sup> H. Cudak, *Rola kultury pedagogicznej rodziców w eliminowaniu dysfunkcji rodziny*, „Pedagogika Rodziny” 2012, No 2(3), pp. 15–22.

<sup>13</sup> C. Smuniewski, *W poszukiwaniu...*, op. cit., p. 35.

in integrity and independence, but also to develop in a way that provides protection and enriches the identity of an individual and, more broadly, a nation”.<sup>14</sup>

In the context of the family analysed from the perspective of security sciences, it is worth paying attention to the ongoing changes in culture, everyday life, social roles, work and the area of acceptance of the social roles. These trends affect the family, especially the organization of family life, the system of intra-family roles and the position of power. It is also worth mentioning that social risks are constantly increasing as a result of further loosening of social contacts and a decline in the of social control. In other words, contemporary socio-cultural changes have contributed to a change in family relationships (in many cases to their development but their disorganization or dysfunction is not uncommon). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that an individual needs a family throughout their life but this need applies to various aspects and depends on age. A child requires care and tenderness, an adult needs a group of friendly, kind and devoted people with whom they will be able to share joy and problems, while an elderly person requires care, support, awareness that they are not alone and that someone still needs them.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> I. Urych, *Rodzina i jej funkcje. Studium socjologiczno-pedagogiczne*, in: *Rodzina w lokalnych i globalnych kontekstach bezpieczeństwa*, I. Urych, C. Smuniewski (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2015, pp. 213–214.

<sup>15</sup> M. Nowotka, *Wychowanie bez granic we współczesnej rodzinie*, „Nowa Szkoła” 2007, No. 9, pp. 7–12.

### The question of nation in studies on the creation of Poland's national security

In studies on the creation of Poland's national security the issue of nation is essential since constitutes the subject of that security. Thus, a theoretical analysis of the understanding of the essence of the nation needs to be conducted. Professor Antonina Kłoskowska defines the nation as a community participating in certain cultural values. As that Polish sociologist emphasizes, the role of national culture was significant in the formation and functioning of the nation, especially in the case of Poland, which lost its statehood for 123 years.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, in the opinion of Czesław Znamierowski, a renowned Polish lawyer and philosopher, the nation need to be identified with a national sense, which consists of "strong belief in common ancestry, awareness and equal perception of common history, a sense of common life interests in the present and in the future, equal assessments of the practice of life and finally the mutual kindness and favour between members of the community as well as sense of attachment to it".<sup>17</sup> Barbara Szacka also drew similar conclusions proving that the nation is "a phenomenon closely related to the sphere of consciousness, identity and values. (...) the nation as a community in the macro-social scale has all the features of society, though society does not have all the features of a nation. (...) There are extremely strong feelings connected with the nation. People sacrifice their lives for the nation and take it away from others in the name

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<sup>16</sup> A. Kłoskowska, *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 1996, pp. 15–40.

<sup>17</sup> C. Znamierowski, *Szkoła prawa. Rozważania o państwie*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 1999, p. 3.

of the nation. The nation is an autotelic value. (...) The nation is perceived as a unified whole, as a community whose members are all brothers, regardless of what latitude they live in and what they do (...).<sup>18</sup> In turn, one of the most prominent security theorists - Prof. Waldemar Kitler is of the opinion that there are two notional systems that define a nation today. In one of them, it is assumed that the nation is a great human community that in most cases live in the same territory. In this example, the factors that bind such community together are history, culture, language and, to some extent, economy. In other terms, Prof. Kitler believes that the nation is a clear political community of people who create it and provide it with sovereign existence.<sup>19</sup>

While studying the concepts the nation, a reflection on national identity arises whose importance in state security is emphasized by numerous specialists in security sciences.<sup>20</sup> From the anthropological perspective, national identity is determined by an ethnic group one belongs to, while in political science national identity is associated with citizenship of a country and an individual's actions driven by a sense of responsibility, loyalty and solidarity towards the country and other fellow citizens.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, to quote Elżbieta Kornacka-Skwara,

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<sup>18</sup> B. Szacka, *Wprowadzenie do socjologii*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2008, pp. 246–247.

<sup>19</sup> W. Kitler, *Bezpieczeństwo...*, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> D. Domalewska, I. Urych, *Aksjologiczne i antropologiczne uwarunkowania tożsamości narodowej młodych Polaków w świetle badań własnych. Implikacje dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, „De Securitate et Defensione. O Bezpieczeństwie i Obronności” 2020, No. 1(6), p. 199; J. Czaja, *Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe. Zarys problematyki*, Krakowskie Towarzystwo Edukacyjne, Kraków 2004.

<sup>21</sup> K. Błęszyńska, *Tożsamość Polaków w Dobie Globalnej*, in: *Edukacja Wobec Ładu Globalnego*, T. Lewowicki (ed.), Wyd. Akademickie „Żak”, Warszawa 2002, pp. 245–255.

“National identity is usually defined as a feeling of distinctiveness from other nations shaped by national-creating factors, such as: national symbols, language, national colour, origin awareness, nation’s history and its knowledge, national identity, blood ties, attitude to cultural heritage, culture and arts, territory and national character. The sense of national identity is particularly evident in crisis situations when joint action is required for the generally understood good of the nation”.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, Samuel Huntington indicates that the national identity includes such elements as: national heritage, i.e. history that creates the individuality of a nation; cultural uniformity as opposed to cultural diversity; religion and faith as values facilitating cultural participation, social solidarity and conflict resolution; ethnocentrism.<sup>23</sup>

It is also worth mentioning that the issue of ethnicity also belongs to the subjectivity of the nation. Its essence is a sense of group identity and an intense belief in one’s own distinctiveness. An ethnic community is also characterized by cohesion and strong social ties between its members, which results, among other things, in awareness of the sharp division between *us* and *them*. In this sense, *we*, that is the members of a given ethne, are endowed with our own special characteristics, and at the same time we grossly distinguish us from all others.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> E. Kornacka-Skwara, *Tożsamość narodowa w świetle przemian kulturowych*, „Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie” 2011, z. XX, p. 113; C. Smuniewski, *Tożsamość – horyzont zagadnień*, in: *Spoleczne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa. Wybrane zagadnienia psychologii i socjologii*, pt 1, L. Kanarski, M. Koter, K. Loranty, I. Urych (ed.), Wydawnictwo AON, Warszawa 2015, pp. 96–116.

<sup>23</sup> S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon&Schister, New York 2011.

<sup>24</sup> B. Szacka, *Wprowadzenie...*, op. cit., p. 247.

Due to the interest in the nation in research on the creation of Poland's national security, it is worth analysing the concept of the nation as a specific natural community. In this sense, the nation is a community in the most general sense, and the fundamental factor forming it is its reference to the common good.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it should be stated that all social groups or smaller communities constitute a nation, and *bonum commune* is a constitutive factor for the existence of the nation (however, it is not a sufficient factor). The nation is primarily people who, apart from the specific teleological nature of existence expressed in contributing to the common good, are marked by specific conditions such as their place of birth or residence, language and culture. The nation is therefore a community defined by the common good and the homeland, which is the place where this good is brought about.<sup>26</sup>

Waldemar Kitler draws attention to the fact that nowadays there has been a growing process, which is causing the concept of the nation to expand. The scientist notes that "apart from the traditional meaning the expression nation also defines a multicultural (multi-ethnic) civil society, inhabiting a specific territory (always identified with the territory of the state), connected by material and moral values (...), while speaking of the nation, in a broader sense, it stands out intrinsic features and values of the general public of a given state, which "agrees" to inhabit and to respect the values it serves".<sup>27</sup> It should also be pointed out that the con-

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<sup>25</sup> M. Gogacz, *Wprowadzenie do etyki chronienia osób*, Wydawnictwo B.R.J. Navo, Warszawa 1998, p. 96.

<sup>26</sup> J. Babiński, *Teologia „małej ojczyzny” ks. Franciszka Mantheya*, „Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne” 2019, vol. 32, No. 3, p. 103.

<sup>27</sup> W. Kitler, *Bezpieczeństwo...*, op. cit., p. 21.

temporary understanding of multiculturalism is not limited to the awareness of the existence of numerous cultures side by side, but also to the interactions between them.<sup>28</sup> According to Barbara Szacka, this means that in the present reality people live in differently perceived worlds, and thus they perceive the worlds of others differently.<sup>29</sup> This provokes many problems and leads to conflicts, as deftly pointed out by Samuel P. Huntington, who understands civilization as a specific cultural whole, being the greatest cultural unit. He also indicates that the new world that emerged after the Cold War is the world of seven or eight civilizations. Therefore, according to Huntington, the most severe and dangerous conflicts will take place not between classes or other groups classified on an economic basis, but between peoples belonging to different cultures.<sup>30</sup> Zygmunt Bauman adds that the phenomenon of multiculturalism is an act of community in a diverse world, which – due to the processes of deepening globalization and metropolisation – is becoming increasingly common.<sup>31</sup>

The analysis of the nation in research on the creation of Poland's national security is particularly important in the context of the ongoing processes of globalization and migration. The socio-cultural changes occurring in the face of globalization affect the universalization of culture, westernisation and disintegration, which interfere with the sphere of identity and cause the synchronization or hybridization of cultures,

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<sup>28</sup> H. Mamzer, *Tożsamość w podróży. Wielokulturowość a kształtowanie tożsamości jednostki*, Poznań 2003, p. 33.

<sup>29</sup> B. Szacka, *Wprowadzenie do socjologii...*, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>30</sup> S. Huntington, *The Clash...*, op. cit.

<sup>31</sup> Z. Bauman, *Wspólnota. W poszukiwaniu bezpieczeństwa w niepewnym świecie*, PWN, Kraków 2008.

as well as the relativization of norms and identities. The sustained high level of emigration and increased immigration is a very complex phenomenon and affects many aspects of social life resulting in cultural, ethnic and social conflicts, with far-reaching consequences both for the nation, as well as for national and international security.<sup>32</sup>

### **The question of the state in research on the creation of Poland's national security**

The question of the state in research on the creation of Poland's national security is at the centre of the analysis. Concern for states and their citizens has been one of the major topics in scientific and political debates. The state and various categories of its functioning are the subject of discussions of philosophers, sociologists, strategists and diplomats. They are also the area of inference of many national programs and international agendas, as well. Therefore, contemporary definitions of the state do emphasize its complexity and are being subject to constant changes. Nevertheless, the origin of the concept dates back to the ancient Greeks. At that time, Greece was a *polis*, which meant a properly organized society. Such an understanding also points to one of the features of the state - it is an organization.<sup>33</sup>

In the opinions of Bogumił Szmulik and Marek Żmigrodzki, the state is a historically established organization of present-day societies, which is characterized by a high degree of organization. The purpose and sense of the state's existence

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<sup>32</sup> J. Scholte, *Globalization: A critical introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005.

<sup>33</sup> M. Hansen, *Polis An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006.



is the good of a human-being in the individual and collective dimension. A human-being - a social being who lives and functions in a group in which they not only exist but also develop and find fulfilment.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, the opinion of Jan Krukowski that "The starting point in shaping the state is man as a social being, who aims to satisfy material and spiritual needs, connects with other people, creating both informal social groups (a family, a tribe, a nation) and formalized (political parties, states, international organizations)"<sup>35</sup> must be deemed correct. However, the basic duty of each state is also the implementation of defence preparations to ensure national security.<sup>36</sup> The thesis of Ilona Urych and Anna Orzyłowska that "Human-being is the highest value, they have the right to comprehensive protection against threats, guaranteed by the legislation and macrostructural systems, the right to security at all levels" is correct.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, in security sciences the following Waldemar Kitler's point of view is recognised: "The state is a formalized, equipped with authorities, large and territorially extensive social organization as it covers the entire population living in a given territory, subject to the norms and principles that make up the internal order, which allocates specific responsibilities and powers to all".<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> B. Szmulik, M. Żmigrodzki, *Wprowadzenie do nauki o państwie i polityce*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2007, p. 23.

<sup>35</sup> J. Krukowski, *Wstęp do nauki o państwie i prawie*, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 2004, p. 14.

<sup>36</sup> M. Kuliczkowski, *Przygotowania obronne w Polsce. Uwarunkowania formalnoprawne, dylematy pojęciowe i próba systematyzacji*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2013, p. 27.

<sup>37</sup> I. Urych, A. Orzyłowska, *Wiedza o bezpieczeństwie w praktyce pedagogicznej*, Wydawnictwo ASzWoj, Warszawa 2020, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> W. Kitler, *Bezpieczeństwo...*, op. cit., p. 22.

The state is a separate system of institutions that has the power to create the rules governing society. Thus, it should be pointed out that the state possesses such institutions as the armed forces, state officials or state bureaucracy, the judiciary, as well as local and national councils of elected representatives such as the parliament. At the same time the state is equipped with the attributes of supreme authority to protect its residents against external and internal threats and to ensure order and favourable living conditions.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the state is not a uniform entity, but rather a group of institutions that determine the place and scale of political conflicts between various interests such as for resources or directions of action in public matters. These conflicts often occur between elected politicians who represent different segments of the state. Hence, it is might be uneasy to indicate what constitutes an important state interest as various parts of the state apparatus may represent a variety interests and express a different preferences.<sup>40</sup>

The analysis of state in research on the creation of Poland's national security raise the importance of the nature of state power. The set of institutions as a whole has no capacity to act. This is due to the fact that those social actors within the state that make decisions do not necessarily implement politics. This contributes to an important issue concerning the state's sovereignty, which has been raised numerous times in recent years. The pluralists perceive the state as an entity acting in the interest of specific social groups. Thus, state actions are reactions to group pressure. However, some pluralists

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<sup>39</sup> R. Jakubczak, J. Flis, *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe Polski w XXI wieku. Wyzwania strategii*, Poltext, Warszawa 2006, p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> K. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense. A General Theory*, Harper, New York 1962.

claim the state is an arena of conflicts constituting pressure groups where state policy is the result of these conflicts. On the other hand, another theory on this subject is that the state decides what in the best national interest is and arbitrates the demands of various social groups.<sup>41</sup>

Roger King is of the opinion that all definitions of a state acknowledge its complexity as the limits of its domain are not clearly defined and are constantly changing. The state is the area of internal conflicts between the organizations that are part of it, but also within them. In addition, there is no single interest of the state as a whole and there are various interests within a part of it. These interests are not only focused on the state or society, but are transformed through negotiations between different groups of civil society and social activists.<sup>42</sup> It should be assumed, as did Ilona Urych and Anna Orzyłowska, that “the inclusion of subjective reference to human rights in the current canon of rights and norms has become a particularly important value of the democratic system. In accordance with the political culture of the democratic system, delivering security to citizens in the individual and collective dimension is an unquestionable imperative included in the tasks assigned to administration at the government, local and non-governmental levels and social organizations”.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> M. Chmaj, W. Sokół, *Polityka, ustrój, idee*, Wydawnictwo Morpol, Lublin 1999.

<sup>42</sup> R. King, *The State in Modern Society. New Directions in Political Sociology*, Palgrave, London 1986.

<sup>43</sup> I. Urych, A. Orzyłowska, *Wiedza o bezpieczeństwie...*, op. cit., p. 48.

## Conclusion

Assuming that national security is associated with the lack of threats, or at least their minimization, and protection against dangers, it should be perceived not only in relation to the state and its security. It should also be referred to the family defined as the basic social unit, a specific birthplace of the nation and of its fundamental shaping. The family-nation-state triad seen in the perspective of the processes of creating Polish national security has a number of axiological and functional connections. The political community (nation) constantly draws strength from the family to use it in building the power of the state. Therefore, the family appears to be one of the basic common goods of the nation and the state. The conclusion of Cezary Smuniewski's research needs to be confirmed: "the discourse on the family in security sciences is one of the central topics for social, public and cultural security, having a significant impact on the creation of national security and is a permanent element conditioning the security of a democratic state".<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> C. Smuniewski, *W poszukiwaniu...*, op. cit., p. 36.

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Paweł Soliwoda

**Houses of culture in Poland.  
A contribution to societal security studies.**

Abstract

The work presents the functioning of “houses of culture” in Poland. The author analyses his own research carried out by way of a diagnostic (questionnaire) survey. The work is located in research in the area of security studies through focusing on societal and cultural security.

**Key words:** Houses of culture in Poland, societal security, cultural security, national security, local community security

## Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present houses of culture in Poland as an institution potentially capable of contributing to the creation of societal security. The implementation of this undertaking assumes a diagnosis of those institutions carried into effect at the turn of the second and third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Such specification seems important from the viewpoint of the changes taking place in recent years as regards the understanding of the role of culture in Polish politics. The work is divided into three distinct parts. The first part represents an introduction to the author's own research. The second one consists in a study of literature in the area of the growing importance of societal security in shaping collective life. The third part presents the role of houses of culture in shaping this security in light of the questionnaire surveys that have been carried out. The work also comprises a recapitulation outlining conclusions and research prospects.

### The issues of and introduction to own research

At the beginning, let us specify the distinction between 'societal security' and 'social security'. The former is associated with the culture of a nation, the security of its identity, frequently refers to the process of its construction in social groups studies both in the past and nowadays. It is associated with protection against the undesirable influence of foreign cultures. On the other hand, 'social security' remains in reference to the satisfaction of crucial social needs and the ability of a society to survive.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. O. Wæver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Pinter Publishers Ltd., London 1993.

In this paper - after Janusz Gierszewski – we assume that the term ‘societal security’ is used in the socio-cultural meaning, which is characterised by a high degree of connection with an individual and the society.<sup>2</sup>

Societal security does not constitute a uniform concept, all the more so that such a concept could have appeared if there had been rich traditions connected with this type of security.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, it is possible to delimit the areas this security deals with, first of all cultural development,<sup>4</sup> prosperity – cultural as well as economic and material, shaping the quality of life not only not only basing on financial aspects but in a large measure actually on cultural aspects associated e.g. with leisure or lifestyle. This security exhibits not only the expectations of the community but also of individuals.<sup>5</sup> It accepts the growing privileges and civil liberties. It focuses on making the inhabitants function in such a way so that a common category is satisfaction with access

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. J. Gierszewski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne jako dziedzina bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, “Historia i Polityka” No. 23(30) /2018, p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. A. Skrabacz, *Uwarunkowania tworzenia bezpieczeństwa społecznego w XXI wieku*, in: *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Pojęcia, uwarunkowania, wyzwania*, A. Skrabacz, S. Sulowski (ed.), Dom Wydawniczy “Elipsa”, Warszawa 2021, p. 53; K. Olak, A. Olak, *Współczesne rozumienie bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, “Acta Scientifica Academiae Ostroviensis. Nauki Humanistyczne, Społeczne i Techniczne” 7(1) /2016, pp. 468–469.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. A. Skrabacz, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Podstawy teoretyczne i praktyczne*, Dom Wydawniczy “Elipsa”, Warszawa 2012, p. 81.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. J. Gierszewski, *Model bezpieczeństwa społecznego na tle teorii systemów*, “Colloquium” No. 2/2013, 65–80; L. Hyb, Ł. Pietras, *Aktywność społeczna w obszarze bezpieczeństwa społecznego*, in: *Współczesne wyzwania bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego*, P. Ramiączek, M. Gajdowska red.), Wydawnictwo Stowarzyszenia Współpracy Polska-Wschód, Kielce-Tarnobrzeg 2019, pp. 25–40.

to public services owing to their high quality and the development of the private sector guaranteeing respect for crucial rights.<sup>6</sup>

The symphonic reflection on the issue of houses of culture and the processes of creating societal security in Poland assumes that there is a set that is common for those notions. For the sake of formality, let us specify that the issue of houses of culture remains in a direct reference to the notion of cultural security and national heritage. This clarification seems to contribute to the confirmation of the above-mentioned common set. Its existence is confirmed, among others, by one of the leading researchers of societal security in Poland – Janusz Gierszewski. The scholar notes that “Societal security is associated with the probability of the occurrence of undesirable social phenomena (problems) and limitation of risks connected with survival and quality of life in the economic and cultural sphere.”<sup>7</sup> In the same work, the researcher rightly notes that “Societal security is also associated with the protection of national identity defined as the ability to uphold culture, customs or language.”<sup>8</sup> Janusz Gierszewski is also of the opinion that cultural problems are among those which underlie social problem,

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. M. Cieślarczyk, A. Filipek, A. Świdorski, J. Ważniewska, *Istota kultury bezpieczeństwa i jej znaczenie dla człowieka i grup społecznych*, “Kultura Bezpieczeństwa” No. 1–2 (2014), p. 40.

<sup>7</sup> J. Gierszewski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne jako dziedzina bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem, p. 25. On cultural identity from the viewpoint of societal security and national security cf. C. Smuniewski, *Tożsamość – horyzont zagadnień*, in: *Společne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa. Wybrane zagadnienia psychologii i socjologii*, Part 1, L. Kanarski, M. Koter, K. Loranty, I. Urych (ed.), Wydawnictwo AON, Warszawa 2015, pp. 106–113.

which in turn affect the functioning of the state and processes in the area of security.<sup>9</sup>

The combined reflection on the issue of houses of culture and the processes of creating societal security leads to the consideration of the development and security of local communities. When we speak in this place about the security of local communities we are primarily concerned with the protection of vital interest of a local community and local institutions against external and internal threats, as well as ensuring conditions for the realisation of those interest that contribute to the creation of common good. Local communities (cities, boroughs, counties, municipalities, villages) are threatened not only such phenomena as e.g. unemployment, lack of necessary social and everyday life infrastructure, inactivity of NGOs, relative unavailability of medical care, shortage of facilities for the handicapped, insufficient public transport, but also – which we would like to put a particular stress on in this place – a distance or lack of real access to culture in its institutions. So conceived societal security at the local level is close to universal, public,<sup>10</sup> personal and cultural security.

When thinking about local development it is worth noticing houses of culture. Those entities, also called “centres of culture” or “cultural centres” are institutions involved

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. J. Gierszewski, *Bezpieczeństwo społeczne. Studium z zakresu teorii bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Difin, Warszawa 2013, p. 181.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. M. Etel, Miejsce popełnienia przestępstwa w ujęciu statystycznym, in: *Współczesne oblicza bezpieczeństwa*, E. Guzik-Makaruk, E. Pływaczewski (ed.), Temida 2, Białystok 2015, p. 135; M. Adamczyk, *Teoretyczne wprowadzenie do badań nad bezpieczeństwem*, in: *Polska-Europa-Świat. Wczoraj i dziś*, M. Debita, M. Adamczyk (ed.), Media-Expo, Poznań 2017, p. 60.

in planning and organizing undertaking in the area of socio-cultural activity. Houses of culture comprise various entities supporting the mission of cultural centres, e.g. reading rooms of theatre halls. They can be combined with sports and recreation centres, thanks to which their activities are also developed in the sport and recreational areas. "Houses of culture are entities the fundamental statutory goals of which include cultural education and formation through art, creating conditions for the development of amateur artistic movement and interest in knowledge and arts, recognising, stimulating and satisfying cultural needs and interests."<sup>11</sup> It is houses of culture that carry out multidirectional socio-cultural activities.<sup>12</sup> The research focused on houses of culture includes, among others, such issues as: political transformations seen as a background of culture,<sup>13</sup> cultural needs of society,<sup>14</sup> building civil society,<sup>15</sup> activeness of local communities.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> G. Bucior, E. Jaworska, R. Kotapski, W. Turowska, *Raportowanie finansowe, pozafinansowe i kosztowe w polskich instytucjach kultury*, Wydawnictwo Ius Publicum, Katowice 2021, p. 30.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. J. Graczyk, *Kultura lokalna po 1989 roku*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, pp. 23–27.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. M. Matyjewicz, *Potrzeby kulturalne współczesnego społeczeństwa*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, pp. 28–34.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. E. Bobrowska, *Dom kultury jako instytucja społeczeństwa obywatelskiego*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, pp. 35–44.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. T. Ignalski, *Miejski Dom Kultury "Batory" w Chorzowie – model animacji inspirowany lokalną tradycją* in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn

In light of Polish law houses of culture are among the fundamental organisational forms of cultural activity alongside theatres, opera or operetta houses, philharmonic halls, art centres, art galleries and centres for studies and documentation in various fields of culture.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, they represent cultural activity which consists in creating, popularising and protecting culture sponsored by the public sector which supports and promotes artistic activities, cultural education, cultural activities and initiatives as well as protection of historical monuments and national heritage both in Poland and abroad.<sup>18</sup>

Barbara Jedlewska and Bohdan Skrzypczak claim that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century human imagination has been stirred, new dreams and anxieties have been awakened, people have been mobilised to seek the ways of the future. Researchers note that in the past century it was claimed that the events

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2009, pp. 69–74. A. Fabisiak-Hill, *Model satelitarnego ośrodka kultury. Na podstawie metody Gminnego Ośrodka Kultury w Dywitach*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, pp. 75–79. K. Polewski, *Nowe metody pracy w Gminnym Ośrodku Kultury w Mykanowie*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, pp. 80–88. P. Henzler, S. Retmianiak, *Animacja środowiska – kluczem do sukcesu Gminnego Ośrodka Kultury w Somiance*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, pp. 89–93. M. Wójcik, *Ośrodek Kultury w Brzeszczach jako centrum aktywności lokalnej*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, pp. 94–97.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Act of 25 October 1991 on organising and conducting cultural activities (Journal of Laws 2020 item 194), Art. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Ibidem*, Art. 1. 1. and 1. 2.

after the year 2000 would become a reality different from the earlier social conditions. It was predicted that all walks of life would be modified beyond recognition. It was believed that the 21<sup>st</sup> century would be a time of culture. Popular were the view that culture would play a major role in shaping the new era, while access to culture would be an integral factor uniting people and nations, which access to culture would be one of the greatest values.<sup>19</sup> The author note that the forecasts from before 2000 start to come true. The role of culture “as a factor of the development of continents, nations, societies and local communities” has radically grown. “Culture has become a main instrument for the promotion of countries, regions, cities and villages, its importance in the model of education and formation has increased, a dense network of new entities operating for the development of local and national cultures as well as international cultural exchange has been formed.”<sup>20</sup>

Thinking about culture from the viewpoint of security studies one should agree with Cezary Smuniewski. Writing about the need to build the culture of common life the scholar draws, among others, the following conclusion: “Facing the existing reality man recognises it as a task, as an obligation. Such a reality is for him common life. This task is to be fulfilled by culture. Culture is seen as man’s unceasing expression towards the one who is the other one and who will come as the third one. This is how a community is formed and this is also how humanity is confirmed. Culture is not

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<sup>19</sup> B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak, *Z tradycją w przyszłość – droga polskich domów kultury w XXI wiek*, in: *Domy kultury w XXI wieku. Wizje, niepokoje, rozwiązania*, B. Jedlewska, B. Skrzypczak (ed.), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych, Olsztyn 2009, p. 9.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem.



created singlehandedly; in this deed man reveals himself as a social creature – he builds culture in community with others. It is also how he creates himself and the society. This means that the culture of common life does not occur without cooperation, co-thinking and – what is crucial – without communication based on mutual sharing. Culture assumes the rank of a basic good of human communities if it is constantly ready to serve the common good.”<sup>21</sup> It is hard not to notice the personalist attitude characterising Cezary Smuniewski’s thinking about society and the relations between an individual and a social group. This is undoubtedly why he formulates another conclusion, in which he sees culture as a space for the formation of individual and social identities, and thus building responsibility for the communities in which man lives. He supplements this statement: “To create the culture of common life involves living together and for one another. To live together means also to live for oneself to live even more for others. Since culture exists for man, common life serves man insofar as it itself affirms him.”<sup>22</sup> The above statement of Cezary Smuniewski may be referred to the mission of houses of culture in society. After all, it is in those institutions that the culture of common life should be created.

The importance of culture is undoubtedly growing, while the predictions concerning its role in shaping common life in most cases prove to be true. Nevertheless,

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<sup>21</sup> C. Smuniewski, *Tworząc bezpieczeństwo. O potrzebie budowania kultury życia wspólnego w cywilizacji zachodniej*, in: *Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa. O kształtowaniu kultury bezpieczeństwa*, A. Skrabacz, L. Kanarski, K. Loranty (ed.), wyd. Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej, Warszawa 2015, pp. 33–34.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 34.

the comprehensive perception of houses of culture – as an integral component of the system of security, including societal security, but also security in general – is not as popular as it would be expected. In a large measure this situation is a result of access to culture, the offer of houses of culture as well as individual expectations of members of the society. Therefore, it becomes necessary to supervise the functioning of the institutions and entities of culture in order to be able to implement new solutions, realise ideas that serve the society and listen to the expectation of local communities. This situation made the author of this work carry out own research as regards the role of houses of culture in Poland in shaping societal security.

### **The role of houses of culture in light of own research**

With a view to the fact that one of the major entities of the public sector dealing with societal security are houses of culture, own research consisted in showing the role of houses on culture in shaping this security. The research was focused on houses of culture in the system of societal security.

The research was aimed at determining the role of houses of culture in shaping societal security. It was so because most probably societal security actually most fully absorbs contemporary expectations of the society as regards culture, access to it and its offer implemented in a large measure by houses of culture which represent one of the major organisational forms of cultural activity.

Prior to starting the research, the following research problem was posed: “What is the role of houses of culture play in shaping societal security?” Referring to the so formulated research problem, a research hypothesis was identified,

which assumed that houses of culture play an important role in shaping societal security and one of its manifestations is the improvement of their offer. This hypothesis was subject to verification in the course of analysing the results of own research.

The research was carried out in the form of a diagnostic (questionnaire) survey. The survey covered the minimum number of respondents recognized as a representative group in questionnaire surveys – the surveyed sample amounted to one hundred people. However, the respondents were selected exclusively from among those who used the services of houses of culture, which decidedly improved the adequacy of the research sample with respect to the goals set by the author. Three questions were prepared, which were considered as fundamental with respect to measuring the role of house of culture in shaping societal security. Those questions were considered as such at least at the stage at which similar measurements and studies are at the moment and it should be noted that they are only starting to be popularised.

Table 1 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Table 1. Respondents' socio-demographic profile

Research sample	Percentage
<b>Gender</b>	
Female	51%
Male	49%
<b>Age</b>	
Less than 29 years	27%
30–44 years	42%
45 years and more	31%

<b>Place of residence</b>	
City with agglomeration over 500 thou.	52%
Town over 250 thou.	15%
Town over 100 thou.	13%
Town of less 100 thou.	11%
Rural area	9%

Source: Own elaboration.

As shown in Table 1, which presents the socio-demographic profile of respondents, the survey sample was much differentiated both with respect to gender as well as age. The majority of respondents live in cities with agglomeration over 500 thou. inhabitants.

The following questions were asked:

1. What is your own subjective evaluation of the role of houses of culture in shaping societal security, i.e. security associated with culture, access to it and non-material factors of quality of life?
2. How do you evaluate the attractiveness of the offer of houses of culture as compared with individual expectations?
3. 3. What is your opinion about the improvement of the offer of houses of culture in connection with giving ever greater meaning to societal security, which emphasises the significance of a broad access to high quality culture and its diverse resources?

Table 2 presents the answers of respondents to the questions concerning the role houses of culture play in shaping societal security.

Table 2. Respondents by their evaluation of the role houses of culture play in shaping societal security

<b>Answers</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Own subjective evaluation of the role of houses of culture in shaping societal security - associated with culture, access to it and non-material factors of quality of life?	33%
Very large	37%
Large	19%
Average	7%
Small	4%
Very small	
Attractiveness of the offer of houses of culture as compared with individual expectations	29%
Very high	44%
High	17%
Average	8%
Small	2%
Very small	
Opinion about the improvement of the offer of houses of culture in connection with giving ever greater meaning to societal security, which emphasises the significance of a broad access to high quality culture and its diverse resources	43%
Rather yes	28%
Definitely yes	19%
Rather no	10%
Definitely no	

Source: Own elaboration.

Table 2 shows that the majority of respondents are convinced at least as to the significant role houses of culture play in shaping societal security – security understood through

associations with culture, access to it and non-material factors of quality of life. On the other hand, almost one-fifth of the respondents evaluate that the role houses of culture play in shaping societal security is average.

The majority of the users of services offered by houses of culture are satisfied with their offer as compared with their individual expectations. Nonetheless, as many as 17% of the users of services offered by houses of culture evaluate the attractiveness of their offer average as compared with their own expectations.

Generally, the respondents are convinced that the offer of houses of culture in connection with giving ever greater meaning to societal security, which emphasises the significance of a broad access to high quality culture and its diverse resources is improving. On the other hand, almost one-fifth of the users of services offered by houses of culture are rather not convinced about it, whereas every tenth respondent believes that the process of improvement of the offer of houses of culture in connection with giving an ever greater meaning to societal security decidedly does not occur.

On the basis of the survey results it should be stated that the research hypothesis, which assumed that houses of culture play an important role in shaping societal security, a manifestation of which is the improvement of their offer, has been to a large measure confirmed. However, the society's expectations are actually higher than the quality offered by houses of culture. This leads to a conclusion that although houses of culture play a major role in shaping societal security and improve their offer, they lag behind the trends and needs of the people.

## Implications and further research prospects

Both the results of own research and the situation of houses of culture in Poland at the turn of the second and third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century warrant the formulation of main conclusions and indication of further directions of research.

1. Houses of culture indubitably play a significant role in shaping societal security. The role of houses of culture in this respect was noticed by the users of services rendered by houses of culture. Nevertheless, about 3/10 of the users of services offered by houses of culture are of the opinion that those facilities could better perform their mission with respect to shaping societal security. A similar group claims that the offer of houses of culture needs to be more attractive. A similar group is not convinced that the offer of houses of culture in connection with giving ever greater meaning to societal security, which emphasises the significance of a broad access to high quality culture and its diverse resources will get improved.

2. Societal security, co-shaped by houses of culture, is developing and it is only starting to improve social awareness. On the other hand, the growing social expectations cause that the offer of public institutions is developing. Society expects security in the full meaning of this word, and an integral component of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is societal security which is associated *inter alia* with an improvement of the cultural offer. In consequence, it is necessary to continue research on the role of houses of culture in shaping social life.

3. Houses of culture are obliged to continue improving their offer and take into account even individual expectations of the users of public services. Therefore, it should be

expected that houses of culture will offer services that are more appreciated by the users. Houses of culture are also obliged to broaden their mission – they should encourage new people to avail themselves of cultural propositions.

4. Having in mind the aspirations associated with shaping societal security and the growing role of the latter in shaping the collective, social integration and quality of life, the following should be expected: a greater position of houses of culture in the process of organising cultural activity, an improvement of the offer of houses of culture, as well as the growing awareness of culture managers that their responsibility is not limited to realising tasks that are conventionally expected of them, but involves also giving a new dimension to culture - worthy of the turn of the second and third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – connected with an ever greater importance of societal security, which emphasises the significance of a broad access to high quality culture and its diverse resource.

5. Houses of culture aspire to creating a complementary offer for the users of their services. This offer is developing because the importance of social and cultural aspects of security is growing and they can and should be actively created by houses of culture. Therefore, houses of culture play a significant role in shaping security, especially in its societal dimension. It is all the more so since the standards, norms and quality of societal security depend on the transparency, pace and quality of the implementation of tasks by institutions and bodies responsible for culture, social integration and prevention of social threats.

6. Societal security has become a new category of security and the area of its interests includes to a large measure: ensuring cultural progress, maintaining and possibly development



of wellbeing as well as development of the concept of quality of life. The concept of quality of life started to be developed with respect to security with a view to an ever broader consideration of – as regards factors which are decisive for security – culture, lifestyles, leisure activities as well as other undertaking aimed at satisfaction with life in which a source of social integration has been perceived, improvement of the norms of collective life and respect for the expanding civil rights.

7. The issue of houses of culture and various types of cultural institutions requires further in-depth and extensive research from the viewpoint of creating Poland's cultural security and societal security which is inseparably linked with it. The potential of houses of culture which may be useful in creating the security of identity of local communities requires urgent identification.

### Conclusion

Houses of culture in Poland are institutions of a local character which serve the identity and development of local communities. They should be perceived as entities which not only contribute to creating cultural security in the nation, but which also directly co-create societal security. Houses of culture have a potential which predestines them to an ever broader and more effective participation in creating societal security in Poland. Those institutions should become subject to subsequent research with the use of instruments suitable for the observation of diverse processes of building cultural and societal security.

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## **The process of development of Polish special forces since Poland's regaining of independence in 1918**

### Abstract

The aim of this study is to depict the process of shaping and development of special forces in the Polish historical space since 1918 as well as to illustrate the need for special forces to function as a guarantor of international and national security. The research method used in this study is primarily an analysis in the form of an in-depth study of Polish literature on special forces and special units, as well as synthesis, induction and a comparative method.

**Keywords:** Polish special forces, sabotage, partisans, GROM, FORMOZA, NIL, AGAT, Jednostka Wojskowa Komandosów, uprising, commandos, military history

## Introduction

The period of development of Polish special forces falls on the post-war years when the Polish People's Republic, inspired by Eastern socialist models, began to build its first special-purpose military units. However, the roots of the special forces in the Polish realities should be found much earlier because in the period of early medieval Slavs who long before the formation of the tribe of Polans and Polish statehood conducted a characteristic way of fighting. During the the First Polish Republic, specifically in the period of the Swedish Deluge, the so-called hit-and-run war (guerrilla warfare) was developed, which in fact was the initial form of partisan activities. Its initiator was Stefan Czarniecki, the national hero known from the Polish anthem. In the post-partition period, special operations were carried out as part of both national uprisings. While Poland was regaining its independence, Polish operations in Upper Silesia could certainly be classified as special operations carried out by specially trained groups. However, it was the period of the Second World War that was the foundation for the formation of special forces later in the communist period. Partisan, sabotage and subversive activities developed on a large scale in Nazi-occupied Poland, and the famous Cichociemni are considered the progenitors of modern commandos. For centuries, Poland has been the leader in hit-and-run tactic and guerrilla wars so today it can be presumed that the high reputation of our special formations: GROM, FORMOZA, AGAT, NIL, *Lubliniec Soldiers* and their position in the world special forces are historically justified. It is not without reason that the aforementioned special units in their tradition refer, among others, to the *Cichociemni*, Agat AK, special formations from

the period of Polish People's Republic and whose patrons are Polish national heroes such as Stefan Grot-Rowecki.

### Development of the special forces in the interwar period

According to Krystian Frącik, after Poland regained independence in 1918, special operations were used during the Silesian uprisings. In his opinion special groups were organized to reinforce the insurgents' actions. Their tasks included damaging communication lines, breaking connections, and exerting unfavorable psychological pressure on German opponents. As a result of such activities, as many as seven bridges on the main railway routes of Upper Silesia were destroyed. In Frącik's view, it is fascinating that the destructive troops did not suffer fatal losses. Their another success was that they were never deciphered by the German or Entente states' intelligence operating in the plebiscite area. The researcher is of the opinion that without the participation of special groups, the plebiscites in Silesia would have been far more unfavourable for Poland<sup>1</sup>.

Bogusław Pacek's position is that the roots of Polish special operations based mainly on irregular activities dates back to the January Uprising, but only after Poland regained independence in 1918, it was possible to take steps to create regular units prepared for the undertake special missions. According to the author it was during that period that the Department of Active Affairs of the Polish Military Organization was established, which functioned within the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the Supreme Command of the Polish Armed Forces. One of the tasks of this

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<sup>1</sup> K. Frącik, *Geneza polskich wojsk specjalnych*, in: *Wojska Specjalne*, K. Frącik (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, Warszawa 2017, pp. 14–16.

department was to manage special sabotage and subversive activities. In 1919 formation of flying and partisan units began, which were soon deployed in the Polish-Russian war. These were groups of a dozen or so people to undertake subversive actions in the behind the lines of Soviet troops. In the opinion of General Professor Bogusław Pacek in July 1919 five partisan units and a flying squad were established and they soon began combat and subversive operations. In 1920 a secret subversive organization called the Union for the Defense of the Fatherland was organized, and its task was to carry out subversive and combat operations. However, the union was disbanded in August 1920, after the Polish troops went on the counter-offensive. The author is of the opinion that the subversive activities were also carried out by the Polish Military Organization in Silesia in small flying squads. In 1919, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division of the Supreme Military Command organized subversive activities due to the threat posed by Germany.<sup>2</sup>

In 1921, the Intelligence Department of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division of the Supreme Command of the Polish Armed Forces created Department A. It was a special unit for activities in the field of subversion carried out outside the front. Between 1921 and 1923 Department A created a dozen or so subversive and intelligence groups. These groups were deployed in the territory of Germany and on the border with *Soviet* Russia and Germany. The department was dissolved in 1929 while a year later the department of subversive posts was created, transformed after a short time into Branch no 6, and then into Branch no 2. The same year, five groups were also created to conduct subversive activities in the border area and in neighbouring

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<sup>2</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska Specjalne Sił Zbrojnych RP*, Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, Siedlce 2019, pp. 41–42.



countries. In the opinion of Bogusław Pacek, in 1933, after Adolf Hitler had gained power, Branch no 2 set out to increase a number of secret subversive groups in the Polish-German border zone. The groups that stationed along the borders were commonly known as the *threes*, and their main tasks included conducting diversion, sabotage, and carrying out intelligence and propaganda tasks. The *threes* were prepared to establish communications and conduct combat operations. According to General Professor Bogusław Pacek these groups were also deployed to German territory in 1934.<sup>3</sup>

In the opinion of the former Commander-in-Chief of the Military Police, another significant activity of Branch no 2 undertaken at the end of the 1930s was the location of sabotage and intelligence posts near ammunition and food depots as well as enemy railways. Their task, apart from reconnaissance, was to prepare for the implementation of subversive activities. According to the researcher, in 1938 the creation of a diversionary network began in Greater Poland, and a year later in the Podhale region. In mid-1939, similar networks were created in the region of Zagłębie Dąbrowskie (Dąbrowa Basin) and in Pomerania. When the war broke out on 1 September 1939, sabotage and defence groups took part in numerous effective actions. In Pacek's opinion after the Germans had imposed the rule to kill three Poles for each German soldier assassinated, the groups limited their tasks to night actions, attacking mainly the German command and equipment. After the September 1939 defeat, special operations carried out under the conditions of the underground in occupied Poland acquired significant importance.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

## Polish special forces during the Second World War

In the opinion of General Professor Bogusław Pacek with the development of structures of *special forces* in the West during Second World War, the history of Polish special forces units formed in Western Europe began. During that period, the *Cichociemni* branches were formed in Great Britain.<sup>5</sup> The *Cichociemni* were the elite of the Polish Army, trained to combat the invader and prepared to organize a resistance movement among the Polish population. According to the author the transfer of the *Cichociemni* to Poland was carried out by airborne landing, in accordance with the well-developed British patterns. He claims that the 1<sup>st</sup> Independent Commando Company were established in Great Britain as well. It was commanded by Captain Władysław Smrokowski, and the proposal to create it came from the Britons themselves in 1942. Volunteers for the company were recruited from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Rifle Battalion. The formation was included in the allied commando forces as the 6<sup>th</sup> Company of the 10<sup>th</sup> Allied Commando and then into the 2<sup>nd</sup> Motorized Commando Battalion. General Professor Bogusław Pacek unequivocally states that these actions gave rise to the contemporary Special Forces of the Republic of Poland.<sup>6</sup>

It is believed that during Second World War the forces and resources at the disposal of the Polish irregular forces

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<sup>5</sup> See also: K. Śledziński, *Cichociemni – Elita polskiej dywersji*, Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2012; P. Bystrzycki, *Znak Cichociemnych*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa 1985; Bellona, *Drogi Cichociemnych*, Bellona, Warszawa 2008.

<sup>6</sup> Pacek, *Wojska...*, op. cit., p. 39–41. Similar position: J. Mędrzycki, *Geneza polskich wojsk specjalnych*, in: *Wojska specjalne w systemie Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, K. Frącik, J. Mędrzycki (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, Warszawa 2017, pp. 17–22.

(partisan and special) were not inferior to those of their allies or opponents in terms of combat training, will to fight, or initiative in combat operations. The Home Army operating under both German and Soviet occupations was the strongest and best organized underground army operating in Europe at that time. In the opinion of Bogusław Pacek, special operations were also carried out within the Polish armed forces in the Soviet Union, and were carried out by groups of the Polish Independent Special Battalion operating as part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps of the Polish Armed Forces. The battalion was responsible for carrying out special tasks behind the line of the German troops. The Polish researcher states that the soldiers were trained in mining in connection with the planned operation on communication routes, and also underwent parachute training. The battalion consisted of two assault companies, a communications company, a mining company, mortars, anti-tank and heavy machine guns. Curiously, one of the companies consisted exclusively of women. The battalion carried out special tasks for the 1<sup>st</sup> Corps. In January 1945, the Main Staff of the Polish Army began training special parachute and intelligence groups, which were to be transferred to the eastern territories of the Reich. According to Bogusław Pacek, between January and April 1945, 21 groups were formed and all of them were transferred to the rears of the German troops. Among the soldiers of parachute groups were members of the Polish Independent Parachute Battalion, as well as German deserters and partisans.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid, pp. 43–48.

## Development of Polish special forces in Polish People's Republic

After the Second World War, the Polish armed forces counted around 400,000 soldiers and were organized in line with the models of the USSR army. At the end of the 1940s, the Soviets began the process of creating special-purpose reconnaissance companies and their main task was to support armoured units. In the opinion of General Professor Pacek, the rapid development of Soviet special units (the so-called *Spetsnaz*<sup>8</sup>) took place in the early 1960s. To quote Bogusław Pacek, 'It was then that six special brigades were created in the Soviet army. Their purpose, equipment and training were gradually changed, until the 1970s and 1980s, when Soviet special forces were planned to conduct special and anti-terrorist operations'.<sup>9</sup>

According to researchers and experts in the field of special forces, under the influence of the above-mentioned patterns, the formation of the first special-type sub-units in Poland began in the early 1950s. In 1951, the 5<sup>th</sup> Independent Reconnaissance Platoon was formed by the 6<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Battalion in Sztum as well as the 6<sup>th</sup> Independent Reconnaissance Platoon by the 7<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Battalion in Opole.<sup>10</sup> 'Each of the platoons consisted of 37 soldiers. The soldiers of the newly created special units were being trained in the field of tactics of the operations of special groups, they were undergoing engineering, subversive, hand-to-hand combat, topography,

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<sup>8</sup> Rus. *Спецназ – Подразделения специального назначения Российской Федерации*. See also.: M. Ryan, C. Mann, A. Stilwell, *Encyklopedia oddziałów specjalnych*, Dom Wydawniczy Bellona, Warszawa 2003. pp. 178–179.

<sup>9</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49.

<sup>10</sup> J. Mędrzycki, *Geneza...*, *op. cit.*, p. 41–47. Similar position: B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49; K. Frącik, *Geneza...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

communication, and independent survival trainings in the field. They were performing parachute jumps and were studying English and German. They were wearing camouflage outfits'.<sup>11</sup> In 1953, a company was created on the basis of both platoons. The 9<sup>th</sup> Independent Reconnaissance Company was formed from the 5<sup>th</sup> Independent Platoon and the 10<sup>th</sup> Independent Reconnaissance Company was formed from the 6<sup>th</sup> Platoon. Both formations consisted of the command, a communications platoon, a sapper platoon, three reconnaissance platoons and each company counted 118 soldiers. In September 1954, the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Companies were incorporated into the new unit - the 19<sup>th</sup> Independent Reconnaissance Battalion in Oleśnica. The first battalion commander was Captain Dmitri Musko.<sup>12</sup> In Bogusław Pacek's opinion the battalion counted 190 soldiers, and its activity and functioning were based on models from across the eastern border. On 20 October 1959 the 19<sup>th</sup> Independent Reconnaissance Battalion became part of the 6<sup>th</sup> Pomeranian Airborne Division, which had been operating for six years, and was given a new dislocation site in Bielsko.<sup>13</sup> To quote Bogusław Pacek, 'Included in the 6<sup>th</sup> Pomeranian Airborne Division, it was being kept secret since it was entrusted with reconnaissance and subversive tasks. In 1961 the battalion was no longer being kept undercover and its name was changed to the 18<sup>th</sup> Kołobrzeg Airborne

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<sup>11</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>12</sup> Cpt. Dymitr Muśko – the first commander of the 18<sup>th</sup> Bielsko Airborne Battalion between 1954–1957.

<sup>13</sup> Warto w tym miejscu odnotować publikacje o charakterze popularnonaukowym: *Spadochroniarze z bielskiego batalionu nad Pustynią Błędowską*, <https://bielskobiała.naszemiasto.pl/spadochroniarze-z-bielskiego-batalionu-nad-pustynia/ar/c1-1637575>, (access: 29 July 2021 r.).

Battalion'.<sup>14</sup> According to the former Commander-in-Chief of the Military Police, in 1961 a second reconnaissance battalion was created – the 26<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Battalion no 4101 in Wola Justowska. The battalion, apart from the command and staff, consisted of three reconnaissance companies, communication platoons and a transport and economic company, and also had its own parachute. In 1964, the 26<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Battalion was separated from the 6<sup>th</sup> Pomeranian Airborne Division<sup>15</sup> and handed over to the main Training Inspectorate of the Ministry of National Defense. During that period, the battalion was moved from Wola Justowska to Dziwnów.<sup>16</sup> A few months later, the 26<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Battalion was named the 1<sup>st</sup> Assault Battalion.<sup>17</sup>

General Professor Bogusław Pacek in his publication on *special forces* clearly states that it was the 1<sup>st</sup> Assault Battalion that began the history of creating fully Polish *special forces* after World War II. Along with the 1<sup>st</sup> Assault Battalion<sup>18</sup> special companies were separated from it – the 56<sup>th</sup> Company in the Pomeranian Military District, the 62<sup>nd</sup> Company in the Silesian Military District and the 48<sup>th</sup> Company in the Warsaw Military District. The author claims that the 56<sup>th</sup> Special Company was moved to Szczecin. To quote Bogusław Pacek, 'Apart from the headquarters and the command team, it consisted of three reconnaissance platoons,

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<sup>14</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>15</sup> H. Królikowski, *6 Pomorska Dywizja Powietrznodesantowa*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Ajaks, Pruszków 1997.

<sup>16</sup> A town in Western Pomerania region on the Baltic Sea (its western part is located on the Wolin Island – a tourist centre).

<sup>17</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, op. cit., pp. 49–50. Similar position: K. Frącik, *Geneza...*, op. cit., p. 23; J. Mędrzycki, *Geneza...*, op. cit., p. 49.

<sup>18</sup> H. Królikowski, *1 Batalion Szturmowy w operacji „Dunaj”*, „Militarny Magazyn Specjalny Komandos” 2008: 9, cz. 1, pp. 34–41.

platoons of divers, communications, transport and economic and parachuting. The company could carry out tasks with twelve reconnaissance groups and three combat groups of divers. There were 7-8 commando soldiers in each reconnaissance group'.<sup>19</sup> According to Pacek, the 62<sup>nd</sup> Special Company deployed in Bolesławiec had a similar composition and structure as the 56<sup>th</sup>, except that instead of a platoon it had a transport and economic team as well as a vehicle repair team. According to him, the composition of special groups and combat diving groups were similar. The company could operate in twelve special groups and four diving groups, which were smaller than in the 56<sup>th</sup> Company. The 48<sup>th</sup> Special Company<sup>20</sup> was stationed in Krakow and, according to the expert in this matter, it was composed of three special platoons, a diving and communication platoon, and a transport and economic team, apart from the command element. Eventually, all three special companies were disbanded in 1993. According to Bogusław Pacek, the soldiers of the disbanded companies continued their service in other special units such as GROM or the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Commando Regiment. According to the researcher, some of them went to the 6<sup>th</sup> Air Assault Brigade<sup>21</sup> and the 25<sup>th</sup> Air Cavalry Division.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, op. cit., p. 51; R. Szewczyk, *1 Batalion Szturmowy podczas przygotowań interwencji w Czechosłowacji w 1968 r.*, „Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy” 2019: 20, 3, pp. 158–179.

<sup>20</sup> A military unit of long-distance reconnaissance of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic, as well as of the period of systemic transformation. Finally disbanded in 1994, its last commander was Capt. Andrzej Knap.

<sup>21</sup> 6<sup>th</sup> Airborne Brigade Brig. Gen. Stanisław Sosabowski. See popular science publication for more insight: „Szósta” Brygada na spadochronach, <http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/14565?t=-szosta-brygada-na-spadochronach#>, (access: 29 July 2021 r.).

<sup>22</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, op. cit., pp. 51–52.

Likewise in case of the creation of special units in the land forces in the Polish Navy, similar activities were also undertaken. In 1974, the Research Team for Sea Divers was established, headed by Cdr. Józef Rembisz.<sup>23</sup> Upon completion of the concept work, a decision was made to establish the Department of Divers, which in fact was the Department of Special Maritime Activities. According to General Professor Bogusław Pacek, the city of Gdynia was the location of the Department. The department was located in the territory of the naval port within the 3<sup>rd</sup> Ship Flotilla, whom it was also subordinated. An interesting question raised by the researcher is the necessity to keep the unit secret. For this reason it was placed in the Torpedo House No. 1, specifically in the building in the Gdańsk Bay, used by the Germans during World War II as a torpedo assembly hall.<sup>24</sup> According to Pacek, in September 1987 the Department of Scuba Divers changed its name to the Department of Special Operations. The unit's main Focus of operation was training seafarers in the field of maritime special operations, however it was disbanded as early as in 1990. In its place, a Special Group of Navy Divers was established. In Pacek's opinion it was the foundation of the future special FORMOZA unit.<sup>25</sup> The scientist, in his analysis of the history of the creation of Polish special forces claims that, from naval special forces' perspective, the Special Operations Department, unlike

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<sup>23</sup> See popular science publication for more insight: R. Starkowicz, *By wspierać "specjalsów"*, <https://gdansk.gosc.pl/doc/2153581.By-wspierac-specjalsow>, (access: 29 July 2021 r.).

<sup>24</sup> M. Kardas, *Okupacja hitlerowska helu. Wybrane aspekty*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej” 2011: 2 (185), p. 167.

<sup>25</sup> Military Unit Formoza Lieutenant General Włodzimierz Potasiński (JW 4026). Currently, the head of the FORMOZA Military Unit is Commander Radosław Tokarski.



special land units, did not use the patterns of other countries, and developed its own training methods.<sup>26</sup>

### Special forces in post-communist Poland

In his publication *The Special Forces of the Polish Armed Forces* Bogusław Pacek, describing the history of creating special forces in Poland, draws attention to the fact that the beginning of the 20th century is still the time of the separate functioning of three special units in the Polish Army: the GROM, the 1st Special Commando Regiment and the Special Frogmen Group. The researcher points out that Poland's accession to NATO in 1999 has brought a number of new challenges and tasks in the field of defense. He emphasizes that the main one was the development of *special forces* and the creation of an independent type of armed forces. The creation of a separate type of armed forces in 2007 and the expansion of special formations was not an impulse decision. As a result of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the world realised that with the escalation of terrorist threats, an era was coming when it will be necessary to prepare for new threats of a special nature. Bogusław Pacek maintains his position that this has given priority to the development of special forces in numerous countries.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, *op. cit.*, p. 52. Similar position: K. Frącik, *Geneza...*, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Krystian Frącik, the divers had to undergo a special 3-year training, during which they were improving their shooting skills, retraining driving techniques, swimming, and studying foreign languages as well as boarding and destroying watercraft techniques.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

The newly created Special Forces Command was already a command body at the operational and strategic level heading the fourth type of the Polish Armed Forces - Special Forces established by the Act of 24 May 2007 amending the Act on the universal obligation to defend the Republic of Poland and amending certain other acts<sup>28</sup>, which entered into force on 4 July 2007. The establishment of the SFC (Pol. *Dowództwo Wojsk Specjalnych, DWS*)<sup>29</sup> has become an important element in the adjustment of the command structure of the Polish Armed Forces to the global trends in system transformation in the management and command of troops. In the opinion of Bogusław Pacek, the SFC was the only command in the Polish Armed Forces capable of managing special operations on land, in the air and at sea. Pacek in his publication reports that the SFC, while serving as the entity preparing the army and at the same time the user of the army, clearly differed from the other commands in the armed forces. Only one of these tasks was performed by the other elements. The researcher emphasizes that despite fulfilling all functions, the SFC was the least numerous command body at the operational level in the Polish Army and the command model adopted by *special forces* shortened and simplified the managing relations, which was perceived as a fundamental factor reducing bureaucracy in military structures.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2007 r. o zmianie ustawy o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o zmianie niektórych innych ustaw, (Dz.U. 2007 nr 107 poz. 732).

<sup>29</sup> Pol. Dowództwo Wojsk Specjalnych (DWS). See also.: J. Kręcikij, *Organizacja dowodzenia Wojsk Specjalnych Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – od normalności do nieudanych eksperymentów*, „Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka” 2016: 3, pp. 63–80.

<sup>30</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, op. cit., p. 55. Similar positions: M. Bieniek, *Siły specjalne – rola i zadania oraz system dowodzenia nimi*, in:

According to the act, the SFC was responsible not only for command, but also for training and preparing subordinate units for combat operations. It was originally part of the special forces, however, unlike other commands, the SFC did not transfer subordinate units to the Armed Forces Operational Command for the duration of combat operations. The information contained in the publication *Wojska Specjalne Sił Zbrojnych RP* (Eng. *Special Forces of the Polish Armed Forces*) by Bogusław Pacek clearly shows that the SFC also played the role of an operational command. According to the researcher, such a solution was in line with NATO standards for the use of *special forces* (both in peacekeeping operations and during war). Major General Jan Kempara,<sup>31</sup> who served, among others, in the 1st Assault Battalion, is considered to be the initiator and originator of the establishment of the institution managing military units engaged in special operations. To quote Bogusław Pacek, 'the SFC was established by the decision of the Minister of National Defence of 1 January 2007

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*Wojska Specjalne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, M. Bieniek, S. Mazur (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM KAAF, Kraków 2016, p. 15; E. Gruszka, *Zarys wizji transformacji Wojsk Specjalnych Sił Zbrojnych RP*, in: *Wojska Specjalne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, M. Bieniek, S. Mazur (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM KAAF, Kraków 2016, p. 23; P. Patalong, *Rola i miejsce wojsk specjalnych w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa*, in: *Wojska Specjalne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, M. Bieniek, S. Mazur (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM KAAF, Kraków 2016, p. 33; J. Gut, *Wkład polskich wojsk specjalnych w umacnianie bezpieczeństwa regionalnego i pozycji Polski w NATO*, in: *Wojska Specjalne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, M. Bieniek, S. Mazur (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM KAAF, Kraków 2016, p. 40; M. Olbrycht, *Wojska specjalne widziane oczami dowódcy*, in: *Wojska Specjalne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, M. Bieniek, S. Mazur (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM KAAF, Kraków 2016, p. 49.

<sup>31</sup> See also a brief biographical note of Gen. Kempara: *Gen. dyw. w st. spocz. Jan KEMPARA*, <https://szkolyfeniks.pl/kadra/gen-dyw-w-st-spocz-jan-kempara/>, (access: 29 July 2021 r.).

and was legally sanctioned on 24 May 2007. The command was formed mainly by soldiers of the Special Operations Headquarters (led by Major General Jan Kempara), which was part of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, and officers of commands and staffs of military units of a special nature'.<sup>32</sup> After the creation of the Special Forces Command, special units were subordinated to the single new command. This guaranteed the harmonious development and training of *special forces* based on their own developed doctrines. This solution was also facilitated by the quick, classified and appropriate equipping of troops with the latest generation equipment and weapons.<sup>33</sup>

According to many scientists, Polish *special forces*, like such formations from other countries, are intended to carry out single actions and conduct entire special operations both in the country and abroad. These types of troops can operate in times of peace, crisis and war, and are also able to cooperate with conventional troops or act on their own. Tasks carried out by special forces can be of operational or even strategic importance. The structure of the *special forces* after their separation as an independent branch of the Polish Armed Forces, comprises independent units and subunits. The soldiers making part of them are specially selected, trained, armed and equipped. This is to facilitate operating in highest risk environments.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> P. Drozdowski, Ogólny zarys operacji specjalnych, w: Teoretyczne aspekty prowadzenia operacji specjalnych, K. Frącik (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, Warszawa 2018, pp. 24–25; A. Furman, Miejsce i rola sił specjalnych we współczesnej operacji, w: Siły specjalne we współczesnych operacjach, M. Kubiński (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2009, p. 67; B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–59..

*Special Forces* account for approximately 3 per cent of the size of the Polish Armed Forces, and the cost of their operation accounts for approximately 2.75 per cent of the annual budget of the Ministry of National Defence. In relation to the cost of maintenance the effectiveness of this type of troops is disproportionately high. The development of special forces, as Bogusław Pacek notes, is becoming a global trend due to the nature of contemporary threats. The researcher states that along secret services they become the best response to contemporary asymmetric threats. Being ready to conduct a wide range of special operations, these formations make a significant contribution to the stabilization of international security<sup>35</sup>, becoming an important weapon in a number of occurrences and solving tasks from the catalogue of special situations.<sup>36</sup>

According to the former Commander-in-Chief of the Military Police, the Special Forces Command has survived only seven years since its creation in an unchanged structure. To quote Bogusław Pacek, 'As a result of the Act of 21 June 2013 amending the Act on the office of the Minister of National Defence, on 1 January 2014, the Special Forces Command had its name altered. As a result of the reform of the steering and command system of the Armed Forces carried out when the Ministry of National Defence was headed by Minister Tomasz Siemoniak, the General Command of the Armed Forces was established, which included several inspectorates together with the Special Forces Inspectorate.'<sup>37</sup>

On 1 January 2014 pursuant to art. 11 of the Act amending the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defence

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<sup>35</sup> E. Gruszka, *Zarys...*, op. cit., pp. 23–24.

<sup>36</sup> B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, op. cit., pp. 57.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

and certain other acts<sup>38</sup>, the Special Forces Command was disbanded, and its legal successors, taking over the tasks of the SFC, were the Armed Forces General Command and the Armed Forces Operational Command. Generally speaking, the newly created Special Forces Command was subordinate to the same general commander as the tactical-level command with military units subordinated so far. The Special Forces Inspectorate was established at the level of the general command. Another decision of the Ministry of National Defence of 3 January 2014, established Special Operations Centre – Special Forces Component Command in place of Special Forces Command and subordinated it to the Armed Forces Operational Commander.<sup>39</sup>

### Conclusion

Summarizing the history of creating *special forces* in Poland, one might claim that after more than nineteen months since the disbandment of the Special Forces Command, on 3 August 2015, the Special Operations Center – Special Forces Component Command was transformed into the Special Forces Component Command. The newly created command received a large part of the SFC tasks existing until December 2013 in the new command structure.

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<sup>38</sup> Ustawa z dnia 21 czerwca 2013 r. o zmianie ustawy o urzędzie Ministra Obrony Narodowej oraz niektórych innych ustaw, (Dz.U. 2013 poz. 852), art. 11.

<sup>39</sup> S. Gulak, S. Bylina, *Jednostka Wojskowa AGAT*, in: *Wojska Specjalne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, M. Bieniek, S. Mazur (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM KAAF, Kraków 2016, p. 75. Similar position: B. Pacek, *Wojska...*, op.cit., pp. 57–58; K. Frącik, *Geneza...*, op. cit., p. 25; M. Bieniek, *Sily...*, op. cit., p. 21

SFCC<sup>40</sup> reports directly to the Armed Forces General Commander. In addition, the Special Forces Inspectorate is still located in the structures of the Armed Forces General Command. Finally, encapsulating the history of the creation of Polish *special forces*, it can be concluded that the changes that followed were the result of long and arduous efforts by Brigadier Jerzy Gut and the Inspector Major General Piotr Pata-long. Currently all *special forces* units are under the SFCC, while the SFCC staff is the core of the Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) created with the main participation of Polish *special forces*<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> Pol. Dowództwo Komponentu Wojsk Specjalnych (DKWS), Eng. Special Operations Centre – Special Forces Component Command (SOC SFCC)

<sup>41</sup> K. Frącik, *Geneza...*, op. cit., p. 31.

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